
















The Dissertation Committee for Jacqueline Renee Hunsicker Certifies that this is 
the approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
 







Sanford V. Levinson, Supervisor 
Gary J. Jacobsohn 
Jeffrey K. Tulis 
H.W. Perry 
Devin A. Stauffer 
Robert G. Moser 
J. Russell Muirhead 









Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 











I am in great debt to my teachers, past and present, who pushed me as far as I 
could go and then farther.  Special thanks go to my supervisors, Stephen Elkin first for 
my undergraduate thesis, Russell Muirhead for my master’s thesis, and Sanford Levinson 
for this dissertation.  Additionally, I would like to thank Charles Butterworth, Vladimir 
Tismaneanu, Russell Muirhead, Gary Jacobsohn, Jeffrey Tulis, H.W. Perry, and Devin 
Stauffer for guiding me through my education and my theses.   
Several outside scholars also provided gracious assistance with various parts of 
the thesis, including Jack Balkin and Mark Graber. 
Personal thanks go to my supportive friends and colleagues in graduate school, 
not limited to but including Kathleen Fritz, Jacqueline Way, Laura Fox, Marco Paoli, 
William Blake, Stephen Joyce, Matthew Vandenbroek, Justin Dyer, Kevin Stuart, Ann 
Orsinger, Pete Mohanty, Adam Myers, Randy Uang, Kristie Kelly, Clare Brock, Michelle 
Whyman, and Joshua Bandoch.  Even greater thanks go to my family—Mom, Steve, 
Bob, Grammy and Grandpa, Grandma and Pop Pop, and the rest of the extended family.  
All writers—and people, for that matter—bring their life experience to the table when 
they work, and without my experiences with my family and friends, I would be much 
poorer a person and a scholar.   
That said, although these people have influenced me in significant ways, all 
difficulties and problems with this work are solely of my own doing. 
 
 vi 
Critical Veneration and the Art of Constitutional Aspirationalism 
 
Jacqueline Renee Hunsicker, PhD 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 
 
Supervisor:  Sanford V. Levinson 
 
In this dissertation I will argue that what I call critical veneration of the American 
Constitution is necessary to realizing the aspirations we, as American citizens, have set 
for ourselves in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution.  I 
begin from James Madison’s concept of blind veneration, which he argues in the 14th 
Federalist is dangerous because it blinds people to the necessity of changing 
governments to suit new or changed peoples.  However, Madison does not support 
critical veneration either.  Rather, he is a proponent of what I call cautious veneration: 
“‘The people…ought to be enlightened, to be awakened, to be united, that after 
establishing a government they should watch over it, as well as obey it.’”1  I call this 
cautious veneration because it involves more active and critical thought than blind 
veneration, but it falls short of the evaluative and normative standards that I associate 
with critical veneration.  Madisonian cautious veneration is tethered more tightly to the 
existing Constitution than to aspirations set forth in the Constitution: in particular, the 
promise of continual moral and political improvement achieved over the historical span 
                                                
1 ( Gibson, Alan. 2005. “Veneration and Vigilance: James Madison and Public Opinion, 1785-1800.” The 
Review of Politics 67 2005, 19.  
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of the American project, so long as it should last.  Critical veneration, on the other hand, 
must be joined with a theory of aspirational constitutionalism, which requires 
simultaneous reverence for the Constitution and critique of that Constitution’s 
inadequacies in order to push the country forward towards realizing its aspirations. 
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The American Constitution is a project.  It is not static, nor is the order it 
inaugurates.  The simplest way we can easily identify places where it has changed is to 
look at its amendments.  Some of these changes have been profound, like ending slavery, 
and some of these changes have been merely procedural, like adjusting—or rather not 
adjusting—compensation for Congress.  But then there are amendments that are both 
profound and procedural, like the 12th amendment that changed the mode of electing 
presidents.  This is procedural insofar as it deals with election procedure—seemingly 
boring reforms, but also profound because it effectively condones the party system that 
the founders wanted to avoid at the start.  This is not to say that there was not previous 
party action.  The founders’ attempt at abstinence from parties only lasted roughly 
through George Washington’s first term.  But the 12th amendment significantly altered 
the procedural structure of the federal election system by joining Presidents and Vice 
Presidents on the same ticket.  The implicit sanction of parties by the men who cried 
faction when the Constitution was being created lends the profundity to this argument.  
There was, to be sure, a practical problem in electing Presidents and Vice Presidents 
potentially from different parties, but the profound change was that these men, the 
founders of our constitutional order, were able to make their peace with parties.  This is 
significant not merely because parties were no longer seen as factional, but even more so 
because the founders’ demonstrated in this amendment that the Constitution was 
changeable, even so soon after its ratification.  Thus, the Constitution is set up to be a 
project that can continually build on itself in both procedural and profound or symbolic 
ways.  
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The American Constitution is also a project of interpretation by the branches of 
government it establishes.  Although most lawyers, legal scholars, and ordinary citizens 
consider the Supreme Court’s opinions to be supreme over all other interpretations, they 
are not the only voices in this debate.  The reason that we can also find prominent 
Americans like Andrew Jackson or Abraham Lincoln who argue that all branches of 
government are entitled to interpret the Constitution is that all three branches of 
government have both the legitimacy and the authority to interpret constitutional texts.  
Furthermore, opinions from various branches might be more or less important depending 
on the issue at hand.  So we see another aspect of the project—namely that political 
debate is an intrinsic part of constitutional interpretation and processes. Our Constitution 
creates a framework for the interpretive structure of statutory law that expands or 
contracts the scope of vague constitutional provisions.  It also provides for a high Court 
that provides the room for the judicial opinions that declare pieces of that legislation 
unconstitutional.  There are also the executive opinions that ignore the Court or 
reinterpret statute.  In these modes, the American project is constantly unfolding.  
Without a Constitution that specifies these tasks to branches of the government it 
establishes, the American project would be impossible, because the Constitution does not 
interpret and enforce itself.  It requires human actors to put it into motion, and for the 
Constitution’s structures to work properly, all of the branches and departments must be in 
the business of constitutional interpretation when they enact law, enforce law, or judge 
based upon law. 
But when I declare the American Constitution to be a project, I mean something 
that is larger than any of the possibilities I have sketched thus far.  The American 
Constitution becomes a project because its citizens relate to it, a relation that we should 
label veneration, as James Madison originally labeled it in the American founding. 
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Constitutional veneration is a reverence that people have towards their Constitution.  We 
learn that Americans venerate the Constitution—and by extension the entire 
constitutional order through political tradition—by observing them engaging within their 
constitutional order.  Congress fights for flag burning amendments.  Schoolchildren 
memorize the Preamble to the Constitution.  Lines of people who are waiting to see the 
actual Constitution wrap around the National Archives building in Washington, D.C.  
People protest in front of the Supreme Court building. This is not to say that all of these 
actions are equally good for our country, or that any constitutional officer is necessarily 
correct in attributing constitutionality to her particular view, but that these attempts most 
definitely count as engaging within a constitutional order, engaging the process without 
questioning its foundational authority.2  This sort of behavior is likely either to derive 
from veneration or encourage us to venerate our Constitution.  Furthermore—and he was 
right in this statement—James Madison warned us in Federalist #49 that our Constitution 
would not survive without veneration, veneration that would seem to need to be both a 
baseline for civic engagement and a way of learning to be a member of American society. 
Constitutional veneration is a reverence not towards all constitutions, but towards 
a particular constitution—in this case the American Constitution.  It is an attachment to, a 
bond with, a dedication to, protectiveness towards, and a devotion to the Constitution of 
the United States.  But not all veneration is alike.  There are three types of constitutional 
veneration—blind veneration, cautious veneration, and critical veneration.  Blind 
veneration is defined by James Madison as an unthinking reverence for persons or 
institutions, including constitutions.3 Cautious veneration is still very much tied to a 
                                                
2 For one example in the press of this phenomenon, see Dionne Jr., E. J. “The Founders True Spirit.” The 
Washington Post. 4 July 2012. 
3 Madison, Federalist 14 in Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers. 
New York: Signet Classic, 2003. 
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people’s constitution, but is more open to potential changes, a stance James Madison 
takes in the period of 1790-1792 when he was writing his National Gazette essays.  In 
this period, Madison sketched out a more robust idea of veneration that calls for a rational 
yet emotionally-involved citizenry.  As he writes, “‘The people…ought to be enlightened, 
to be awakened, to be united, that after establishing a government they should watch over 
it, as well as obey it.’”4  I call this cautious veneration because it involves more active 
and critical thought than blind veneration, but it falls short of what I will define as critical 
veneration, for it is more closely tethered to governmental institutions than to aspirations 
in the Constitution.  Cautious veneration is necessary, especially in the beginning of a 
government, because it makes citizens think a bit about what is required for good 
government.  But in my view, cautious veneration is not enough. 
Rather, I advocate what I call critical veneration.  Critical veneration begins from 
the same point as cautious veneration: a thinking reverence for constitutions.  But critical 
veneration is more rebellious.  It moves, as we will see in Chapter 1, beyond a 
Madisonian interpretation of government to add in a touch of Jeffersonian rebellion.  
These men are especially important to study, as I will note later in the Introduction, 
because they adapted these concepts for the American people.  It is not that no one had 
ever though of veneration before, but their discussion in letters and in more public 
venues, like the newspaper articles called the Federalist Papers, made these concepts 
accessible to a new nation when it needed a grounding in veneration and was in the 
process of rebelling against the Crown.  Critical veneration is a term I use to encapsulate 
the thinking reverence of the American Constitution that attaches itself most strongly to 
our constitutional aspirations.  Constitutional aspirations are goals that people have for 
                                                
4 Gibson, Alan. 2005. “Veneration and Vigilance: James Madison and Public Opinion, 1785-1800.” The 
Review of Politics 67 2005, 19.  
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the Constitution, and in order to advance the American project, it is necessary to have 
those goals always in sight.  Operating in the mode of critical veneration, a citizen 
admires the Constitution and simultaneously sees the places where it is weak or deeply 
problematic and advocates change in that constitution.  For example, in Chapter 2, I 
discuss Frederick Douglass, whose liminal status as an ex-slave renders him an 
instructive example for understanding how veneration and rebellion can be combined.  
Douglass was a slave before escaping: why should he partake in constitutional 
veneration, as I argue he does?  He does so for two reasons.  First, he does not believe 
that the Constitution is inherently a pro-slavery document.  Second, he believes in the 
aspiration of freedom that the American project contains and from there argues that the 
Constitution can be redeemed in order to keep its promises to the entire body politic, even 
those originally discriminated against for their race.  Had he been a Garrisonian 
permanently and kept with the tenets of that political position, Frederick Douglass would 
have considered the Constitution a suicide pact for slaves and stayed out of American 
politics.  It is important that he rebelled against this position not just because he was then 
able to be a model for blacks in his own time and in times to follow, but because he 
showed us how we should approach the Constitution, even as a society that has abolished 
slavery.  We must think about the Constitution lovingly, but not blindly.  There are still 
problems that, were he alive today, Douglass would urge us to confront in various ways.  
Ultimately, Frederick Douglass understood that America was a project and it is in 
precisely this way that I mean that the Constitution is a project: it can be, and indeed is 
meant to be, challenged and developed in order to more fully realize the aspirations 
contained within it.  
This project of critical veneration requires constitutional aspirations in order to 
function properly.  Constitutional aspirations, put more simply, are the goals that people 
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have for constitutions.  More specifically, there are particular goals or aspirations that 
citizens have for America, and it is for that reason that they continue to pursue the project 
of critical veneration of the peculiarly American Constitution.  As we will see in Chapter 
6, the American political tradition creates and encourages patriotic sentiments in its 
citizens.  One may venerate certain democratic ideals in the abstract, such as human 
rights; again, in Chapter 6 we will examine international human rights and note how 
America resembles—or does not resemble—other countries in its treatment of them.  But 
for a project like venerating a constitution, one must choose a particular constitution.  It is 
not possible to venerate a constitution in the abstract because as much as veneration is 
based on aspirations, it also must have institutions that work to realize those aspirations.  
After all, throwing away the institutions without replacing them would not yield a 
government that works.   
All venerators of the Constitution must see at least parts of the Constitution’s 
aspirational or institutional content as worth preserving for the next generation.  There 
must be a reason that we do not scrap constitutions every 19 years as Thomas Jefferson 
recommended.  Jefferson argued in a letter to James Madison that I will treat in Chapter 1 
that because the earth belongs to the living generation, not the past or the future 
generations who will live in the same country, only the present generation has the right to 
make laws for itself, including constitutional law.  However, in order for critical 
veneration to work—or really to have any veneration at all—we cannot quite be 
Jeffersonians.  We can want some of the changes Jeffersonians might want, such as 
keeping the Constitution tied mainly to the needs of the current generation rather than to 
generations ago, but ultimately critical venerators cannot condone a repetitive starting-
over movement that Jefferson advises.  They require a constitution be good enough so 
that they can make it better, or to use Jack Balkin’s terminology, so that they can redeem 
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it, so that they can cash the check and receive the goods promised by the nation’s most 
important founding document.  Constitutional redemption results from the change that 
comes out of applying constitutional veneration and aspiration.  Balkin5 defines 
constitutional redemption as 
not simply reform, but change that fulfills a promise of the past.  Redemption 
does not mean discarding the existing Constitution and substituting a new one, but 
returning the Constitution we have to its correct path, pushing it closer to what we 
take to be its true nature, and discarding the dross of past moral compromise.6   
Thus, as we argue according to our aspirations about how to get to where we are going, 
we make our decisions together as political actors for our Constitution.  We continually 
redeem our Constitution with each political action that brings it closer to reflecting what 
it ought to be. This system of redemption is ultimately one that relies on contestation 
within a democracy, for the arguments that bring about change are fueled by conflicting 
aspirations for the Constitution.   
We contest each other about our aspirations because we do not all share the same 
aspirations for where the Constitution might go.  In this vein, it is useful to examine 
constitutional identity and the relationship between identity and tradition.  Constitutional 
identity, according to Gary Jacobsohn, “emerges dialogically and represents a mix of 
political aspirations and commitments that are expressive of a nation’s past, as well as the 
determination of those within the society who seek in some ways to transcend that past.”7  
Constitutional identity needs to emerge dialogically because there are many aspirations 
contained in every society and so a dialogue among the various groups—and sometimes 
even factions—within society is needed.  This understanding of constitutional identity 
                                                
5 Balkin, Jack.  Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2011. 
6 Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, 5-6. 
7 Jacobsohn, Gary Jeffrey. Constitutional Identity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010, 7, italics 
Jacobsohn’s. 
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allows for a constitution to evolve and be shaped by constitutional aspirations as I define 
them in this dissertation: a set or several sets of shared principles and ideals that work at 
creating and recreating an ideal polity but which do not necessarily mesh easily together.  
Because aspirations can be very different or even opposed to each other, constitutional 
identity must be formed through the sort of dialogue that Jacobsohn refers to. 
How, one might ask, can this sort of dialogue be possible, especially dialogue that 
includes factional elements of society?  It would seem necessary for all groups to have a 
commitment to the basic principles enshrined in founding documents, not just an 
attachment to principles generally.  Interpreting these principles is difficult, however, and 
so we must wonder how a large democracy, rather than a small democracy or republic, 
can handle this much conflict between the people who are supposed to support the 
government.  It does not help to know that these conflicts are inevitable even among 
small groups: what we must attempt to understand is how to channel them into productive 
conversations. Deliberative democrats have done some work on this process,8 and I tend 
to agree with their conclusion that if people are sufficiently informed, they are able to 
have serious conversations with each other about political matters. Though, 
unfortunately, a sunny ending to these aspirational problems cannot always be 
guaranteed, much as we might hope it to be possible. 
And so here I establish the second-most important concept of this dissertation: 
aspirational conflict theory.  Throughout my main study of what I call critical veneration, 
I will interpret aspirational conflict as a theory that encapsulates the conflictual 
relationship between constitutional veneration, aspirations, and theories of redemption.  
Some people will venerate certain parts of our constitutional order more than others.  For 
                                                
8 See a variety of studies done by James Fishkin at his Center for Deliberative Democracy: 
<http://cdd.stanford.edu/> Accessed 6 September 2011.  
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example, I will show that Mark Graber is generally not an aspirationalist in Chapter 2, 
but he does place a high value on the promise our Preamble makes to “ensure domestic 
tranquility.”  He does not call it an aspiration per se, but rather a requirement, along with 
“provid[ing] for the common defense,” to govern people as a nation at all.9  I bring this 
distinction Graber points out here in order to contrast him with those he calls Lincolnians, 
who value “establish[ing] justice” above all else.  This valuing of certain parts of the 
Preamble over others can turn very controversial, and thus aspirational conflict is born.  
A further difficulty is added when we realize that just because a group of people value 
“justice” that they do not necessarily have the same definition of justice, potentially 
causing more conflict.  
This problem is particularly relevant if we consider the possibility of war.  I will 
examine this in more depth with relation to Graber’s work in Chapter 2, but in short, he 
argues that because conflicts about aspirations can build to war, aspirations become very 
dangerous and probably not salutary parts of political regimes.  I agree with Graber that 
war is possible as a form of aspirational conflict, and we both discuss the same war: the 
American Civil War.  However, like Frederick Douglass and unlike Mark Graber, I think 
war is justifiable and even necessary under certain circumstances.  This is the worst of 
what I call aspirational conflict theory—that which requires the loss of human life.  
Unfortunately, such conflict seems to be a part of politics if the compromises Graber 
would like to govern us forever (i.e. The Great Compromise), like those among slave and 
free states, are not compromises that we can sustain over the long haul.  This is not to say 
that we should enter wars indiscriminately, because we should only enter wars if they 
conflict with our deepest aspirations (for example, our aspirations to liberty and equality 
                                                
9 See the conclusion to Chapter 3 for more on Graber’s view. 
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made slavery deeply incompatible with our constitutional regime).  It is always preferable 
that we find solutions that do not require war to meet our aspirations with compatible 
constitutional arrangements. 
Critical constitutional veneration shows the way to constitutional aspirations and 
constitutional redemption and requires that people think seriously and creatively about 
their constitutional beliefs and values.  Constitutional aspiration, building off of rational 
discourse and patriotic sentiment, consists of the goals people have for a particular 
constitution.  Constitutional redemption aims to change bad or even evil parts of the 
constitution so to enable progress towards an ideal version of it.  Thus we can see how 
aspirational conflict comes together: out of different identities, some formed by the 
Constitution and some not, we learn to critically venerate our Constitution by aspiring to 
redeem its promise(s).  In life under the Constitution, learning to be critical venerators 
means that we must be able to identify parts of the Constitution that are not perfect.  In 
this dissertation, I will distinguish between two parts of the Constitution, the institutional 
or procedural pieces and the aspirational pieces.   The institutional pieces are simple to 
identify and to generally understand, though the Court certainly can twist them about if 
they so decide—as can, of course, the other branches of government.  Aspirational 
pieces, however, must be subject to interpretation by their nature.   
The Preamble is the ultimate aspirational piece of the Constitution.  It contains 
what we hope our law will do.  The ‘we’ that hope is certainly not univocal even as it 
represents the “we” in “we the people,” and so it is difficult to know what interpretation 
the Preamble will garner because “we” is not a fixed identity position.  In truth, it is very 
unusual for anyone to cite the Preamble besides academics—legal scholars and judges 
ignore the Preamble.  Fortunately, the principles contained in the Preamble are generally 
considered to be fundamental American values: justice, domestic tranquility, common 
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defense, general welfare, and the blessings of liberty.  One could also identify the 
republican form of government guarantee in the Constitution as aspirational, though this 
is another section of our Constitution that has never made it properly into case law or 
judicial decision-making.  This absence of these pieces of the Constitution from legal 
proceedings, however, does not condemn the Preamble to obscurity, as the other branches 
and sometimes even social movements can use those principles to advance their ends.  
Then there are parts of the Constitution that can be read to help along the aspirational 
cause but are law more than aspiration, such as the 9th and the 14th amendments.  From 
their relatively simple phrases comes a whole body of law, Court opinion, and the results 
of popular movements that discuss what sorts of rights we have and we aspire to have.  
This focus on rights will be continued in Chapters 5 and 6, because rights provisions are 
the easiest place to enshrine our aspirations for ourselves as a people in a way that can be 
legally enforced. 
So how can we critically venerate the aspirational pieces of our Constitution?  We 
start from agreeing with the principles enshrined in the document.  And, to assist us in 
more closely identifying America’s key principles, we must style ourselves Lincolnians 
and read the principles of the Constitution through the lens of the Declaration of 
Independence to understand the Constitution at its best.  After all, when Americans think 
of American principles, they do not forget life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, even 
if they do not immediately think of those principles as a part of American constitutional 
law.  So we take our principles and then consider how they are reflected in the 
constitutional design of our system.  In short, proper constitutional veneration requires an 
inclusive consideration of founding and other seminal American documents that must be 
interpreted both as they were intended and for our new problems today.   For example, if 
we aim to “form a more perfect Union,” then we ought to agree with Lincoln on the issue 
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of secession.  However, as simple as that example might seem, it proves not to be simple 
at all.  Another phrase in the Preamble, “insure domestic Tranquility,” does not fit with 
the Civil War Lincoln’s principle of union began.  This becomes even more complicated 
if we consider one American value found in the Declaration—to obtain the consent of the 
governed—because both sides of the Civil War were fighting with the consent of at least 
some of their governed.  This very brief examination of Lincolnian constitutionalism 
shows that one can have a coherent aspirational view, albeit never one unchallenged by 
others. 
That this governance is built upon critical veneration makes the project that much 
harder.  The difficulty of identifying the correct principle for the moment cannot be 
abandoned, however, because the soul of the nation rests on such impossible decisions.  
The most important question in our history was: Should we free the slaves?  The answer 
seems obvious now, and it is also obvious that it wasn’t obvious at the time.  Thus I 
return to my statement that critical veneration of the Constitution is a project.  This 
project is important because ultimately it determines, especially in the case of the Civil 
War, how the state decides who lives and who dies, how it decides whose life was in 
service of good and whose of evil, or at least whose life being lost was based on a gross 
miscalculation.  The state in these cases certainly uses the popular will to decide how to 
decide who live and dies, but the opinion of the people is largely determined by how they 
interpret law.  Interpreting the law, especially constitutional law, is the work of people 
with aspirations for what their polity will look like, and necessarily concerns what kind of 
actions the government is able to take.  As we will see in Chapter 2, Mark Graber is 
deeply concerned about the results of aspirationalism because aspirations can lead to war.  
For that reason he is highly skeptical of aspirational projects like Jack Balkin’s project of 
redemption.  Ultimately he would no doubt be skeptical of my project of critical 
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veneration as well.  And yet we cannot and should not demonize Graber as anti-
American—there are good, American reasons for being opposed to constitutional projects 
that lead to civil wars.   
Aspirations about how the state will conduct itself in matters of war and peace, 
life and death, do not immediately appear to come out of veneration the citizens have for 
the Constitution.  As I argued in the beginning of this Introduction, citizens see their law 
reflected through a strong veneration for the constitutional order.  Even people on the 
opposite ends of an argument—say, the death penalty—use the Constitution to make their 
arguments.  Some say that for the state to kill people is cruel and unusual, some say it is 
not and that such punishments are reasonable under the constitutional law of the polity 
we are trying to be.  Aspirations link to veneration, even blind veneration, because even 
in the case of the death penalty, though the citizens may be confused about what the 
government is allowed to do, they believe it serves their aspirations.  Preserving life can 
be just as much an aspiration as protecting citizens from criminals who may strike again.   
Making the jump to the practice of critical veneration exposes the fact taken for 
granted that our Constitution is not perfect and those aspirations can be better realized 
with some changes to the constitutional order. The aspirations themselves, however, need 
not change when one rejects blind in favor of critical veneration.  Only the people who 
interpret how the aspirations work within a venerated system can change their minds as to 
what kind of veneration they accept.  In the case of the death penalty, citizens must argue 
in courts, in Congressional sessions, during sessions of pardoning boards, and even in the 
contemporary equivalents of town meetings along with meetings of activists who take up 
the issue of punishment as their cause.  If ultimately capital punishment is decided to be 
the most just recourse in these cases, then our aspiration is met on the national level by 
continuing to sentence defendants to death.  If however, capital punishment is ruled to be 
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cruel and unusual, in accordance with most of the public opinion and legal opinion in the 
rest of the world, then the aspiration must be to change the structure of current American 
criminal law.  In this case, one side aspires to safety of most citizens, where the other side 
aspires to keep everyone alive.  There is not an obvious and careful answer to which of 
those aspirations should be held above the other, because it seems likely that even the 
strictest capital punishment supporters advocate citizens being protected in their right to 
life, and the strictest capital punishment opponents advocate safety for all.  Thus we can 
see how constitutional controversies arise from personal opinions that are a part of 
people’s extra-constitutional identities.  The government certainly did not tell any of 
these individuals to believe a certain way on the issue of capital punishment, but rather 
allowed for their intellectual development in either direction.   That development shapes 
people’s veneration of the Constitution and the aspirations they have for it.  Critical 
veneration relies on a basic trust in constitutional authority to settle disputes.  So the 
political debate is not only an inevitable result of critical veneration, but also creates the 
conditions under which citizens can venerate. 
Ultimately, despite all of our differences, veneration is what binds us to the 
Constitution.  Without veneration, there is no reason not to follow Jefferson and scrap the 
document altogether in favor of a new one that helps us aspire to better principles.  What 
does this mean?  It means that our Constitution provides the space where certain kinds of 
aspirations are enshrined, described in the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to 
the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights and other constitutional amendments, are 
enshrined as fundamental American values that the nation attempts to enact.  If those 
aspirations are no longer what we want for ourselves as a people, we should create a 
totally different government that helps us realize different aspirations.  This is not to say 
our present Constitution perfectly realizes our aspirations at the moment; it certainly does 
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not.  But according to our body of founding documents is made for certain kinds of work 
and not for other sorts of work.  This theme of constitutional work will be taken up in 
part in Chapter 3, where we will discuss the illegal transition from the Articles of 
Confederation to the Constitution.  The Articles of Confederation had a particular vision 
of America that it was aiming to protect, but James Madison and his contemporaries 
decided that that path was not acceptable for a nation, only for a loose confederation of 
states that was not sufficing for their confederation.  And yet both constitutions managed 
to aim at one of the same results: perpetual union.  The Articles make that clear from the 
opening lines; the Constitution does not make that clear but Abraham Lincoln assumes it.  
Thus the Constitution’s goal of Union is only made perfectly explicit by what the winners 
of the Civil War decided would be the aspiration of the nation.   
That a core value of the Constitution—namely, slavery—needed to be settled 
through a war and major dispute to settle core values is characteristic of the American 
project—and that people resorted to violence is indicative of the urgency with which 
individuals are attached to their constitutional aspirations.  Although we have principles 
in our Preamble and Declaration, they become constitutive through great struggle, not as 
a result of being written down.  This great struggle, as we will see in the Conclusion, 
however, need not always be physically violent.  For example, the Reverend Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr. was able to build a more successful movement out of non-violence than 
his contemporary Malcolm X was with his call to violent resistance to racial inequality.    
But the Civil Rights Movement was certainly a struggle, one that required what will later 
be defined as metaphorical violence, which, in short, is the change in laws that unsettles 
lives and precedents in order to bring about novel things.  For example, the Voting Rights 
Act of 1964 made it illegal for racist southerners to dominate elections, thereby taking 
away part of their influence and giving it to African Americans.  Change is always 
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disruptive and can sometimes be ruinous to particular individuals or groups.  But in 
retrospect, supporters and opponents of Jim Crow segregation were not justified in 
having the rights they once held as a matter of course over slaves and people of different 
races. 
A constitution must be more than a written document, at least as Americans 
practice constitutionalism as truly constitutive of a people with a coherent national 
identity.  There have been constitutions—for example, the Soviet Constitution—that were 
not meant to be implemented, but rather created as a fiction for outsiders.  The American 
Constitution, by contrast, is taken very seriously as the law of the land for everyone 
living in America.  The Constitution’s aspirational pieces—along with those of the 
Declaration—are constitutive of us as a people.  Thus, aspirations are created from 
differences in moral views among smaller communities, but also work to mediate those 
different communities into a coherent—albeit complicated and messy—national 
community.  Now, putting the Constitution and the Declaration in the same breath is 
dangerous, because, as we will see in Chapter 1, Jeffersonian theory would become very 
different if we are to argue that he venerates the Declaration.  If all that was needed to 
venerate the Constitution was to adopt its principles, Jefferson would be a strong 
venerator of the system, rather than the rebel he will be portrayed as during this 
dissertation.  However, as I will argue in Chapter 1, using principles to justify the right to 
revolution is not enough to be a venerative act.  Critical veneration is between the pole of 
blind veneration and rebellious aspirationalism, where the former teaches us to love our 
Constitution and the latter teaches us to think about our love critically.  It is possible that 
that love leads us to rebel against the Constitution, but here rebellion is inflected as a less 
serious break than a revolutionary would make from the Constitution, meaning instead a 
rebellion that keeps our principles alive and allows us to discuss them critically with 
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reference to the institutions that we have inherited from the past.  Having moderated 
rebellion in this dissertation is an act consonant with constitutional veneration.  
My work takes several cues from Sanford Levinson’s book, Constitutional Faith, 
which usefully employs religious terminology to explain redemption in political terms.  
His particular religious delineations—Catholicism and Protestantism—fall outside of 
traditional legal or academic discourse and thus make comprehending the main stances I 
will take in this work more understandable.  My dissertation is an exercise in 
constitutional Protestantism and Catholicism at once, albeit on different dimensions from 
Levinson’s scale.  It is Catholic insofar as “the source of the doctrine is the text of the 
Constitution plus unwritten tradition.”10  In other words, my view of constitutional 
interpretation includes more than just the Constitution, which is here the scholarly and 
secular equivalent of the written text of the Bible.  Just as Catholics include the teachings 
of the Popes and bishops over the centuries, stories of Saints, and writings of influential 
theologians to properly interpret the Bible, the Constitution needs the Declaration of 
Independence and constitutional amendments as already mentioned, but also the 
Congressional Record, Presidential speeches, and Supreme Court decisions to be 
adequately interpreted.  However, this dissertation is also Protestant insofar as “the 
ultimate authority to interpret the source of doctrine…is based on the legitimacy of 
individualized (or at least nonhierarchical communal) interpretation.”11  Protestants, 
taking their example from Martin Luther, do not rely on Popes for authority, much in the 
same way that the Constitution need not rely only on the Supreme Court for authoritative 
interpretation.  Protestant constitutionalism, in this paradigm, allows every citizen, group 
                                                
10 Levinson, Sanford.  Constitutional Faith. Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1988, 29. 
11 Levinson,  Constitutional Faith, 29. 
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of citizens, level of government, and branch of government to interpret the text of the 
Constitution for themselves.   
Thus it is easy to see how Protestant and Catholic modes of interpretation conflict 
and require different modes of political interpretation.  The Catholic dimension of this 
dissertation would seem to conflict with Douglass’ stated Protestant view, but I will argue 
here that the difficulty is not as big as it may seem.  Frederick Douglass wanted to 
interpret the Constitution in a very Protestant way, using “‘the mere text, and only the 
text, and not any commentaries or creeds written by those who wished to give the text a 
meaning apart from its plain reading was adopted as the Constitution of the United 
States.’”12  As much as I agree with Douglass on many constitutional issues, in the matter 
of interpreting the Constitution, the bare text of the Constitution is not enough.  The 
principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence add to American goals listed in 
the Preamble in an important way.  Furthermore, it seems essential to constitutional 
veneration that more than just the text is available to citizens, even those such as 
Frederick Douglass who wish to reinterpret the Constitution.  In fact, I would argue that 
Douglass did in fact use elements of constitutional Catholicism in his interpretations: he 
invoked the founding zeitgeist of liberty never mentioned in the Constitution when he 
made his arguments for the Constitution being read as an anti-slavery document.  
Obviously, Douglass was a man who respected the Declaration of Independence, and I 
think it likely that his emphasis on liberty may have come from that source.  
This work’s Protestantism is also essential to critical veneration, as it is based on 
the argument that the Supreme Court is not the sole arbiter of constitutionality.  Andrew 
                                                
12 Levinson, Constitutional Faith, 31. 
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Jackson set us off on the path of disagreeing with the Court,13 but most germane to this 
dissertation is Lincoln’s refusal to allow Dred Scott to become a precedent set for all 
time.  Lincoln refused the idea of the Court’s constitutional supremacy.  The founders, 
namely James Madison and Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers, made an 
argument for coequal branches of government, which means that the Supreme Court was 
not endowed with extra authority to interpret the Constitution.  The founders also helped 
to draft a Constitution wherein all constitutional officers must take oaths to “preserve, 
protect and defend” or “support” this Constitution.  Therefore, it is not necessary to take a 
Court-centered view of constitutionalism,14 even if the principles the Court chooses to 
elevate to constitutional stature fit with the principles of the American project.  From 
time to time, it may even fall to Protestant-interpreters to do what FDR encouraged in 
1937, where he declares we have “‘reached the point as a Nation where we must take 
action to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself…We want a 
Supreme Court which will do justice under the Constitution—not over it.”  Of course this 
was a political program designed to garner support for the Court-packing program,15 but 
it is a view that should be considered in its basic form: is the Court acting as a coequal 
branch under the Constitution, or is it trying to usurp the mantle of authority from the 
Constitution? 
                                                
13 “I have also found, however, a countervailing inclination among informed Americans, regardless of their 
ideological persuasion, to differentiate between the Constitution and the Court.  Sometimes this inclination 
has been propelled by political expediency: that was true of Andrew Jackson’s veto in 1832, when 
Congress and the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States; or of Lincoln in 1861, 
explaining his prospective policies; or of FDR in 1937, during the ‘Court-packing’ controversy..." 
Kammen, Michael. A Machine That Would Go Of Itself. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, 2006, 9. 
14 One such “Court-centered” view is that of Ronald Dworkin, where Hercules the Judge rules over 
constitutional decisionmaking.  See Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously. Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, 1977. 
15 Kammen, A Machine, 9. 
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To talk about these principles, this dissertation will spend a great deal of time on 
constitutional aspirationalism.  Returning again to Lincoln and his disapproval of Dred 
Scott, Gary Jacobsohn argues that “It has been persuasively and correctly argued that 
Lincoln’s reaction to Dred Scott was consistent with ‘The animating genius of the 
Founders’ vision [which] was that each and every institution could be…’active’—
because the activity of each branch could, within the internal structure of power, be 
watched, balanced, and checked.’”16  This interpretation of Lincoln embodies a theory of 
constitutional aspirationalism, as “Lincoln saw the Constitution as both a legal code and a 
statement of the ideas which we as a people chose ‘in the end to live by.’”17  As stated in 
the beginning of this Introduction, this sort of aspirationalism—combining ideals and 
institutions—is a necessary tool of critical veneration, as the ideals raise our sights to 
what our institutions ought to be and ought to be doing.   
Moving out of the Levinsonian ambit a bit, it seems that it is necessary to describe 
further what mode of constitutional interpretation this dissertation is suggesting.  I am not 
making an argument for pure constitutional democracy, constitutional populism, or 
whatever phrase one chooses, though it does include elements of those theories.18  But 
this project is also profoundly influenced by James Madison, whose skepticism about the 
capacity of the people to interpret the Constitution properly caused him to write such 
Federalist Papers as #51.  There, ambition is made to counter ambition by making our 
government officials attached to their branches as a source of pride and rivalry.  The 
                                                
16 Jacobsohn, Gary. The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration.  Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc: Totawa, 1986, 109 
17 Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court, 109. 
18 For democratic constitutionalism, see later in this dissertation: Post, Robert and Reva Siegel. “Roe Rage: 
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash.” 43 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L L.Rev 373, 374.  For popular 
constitutionalism, see Tushnet, Mark. Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts. Princeton University 
Press: Princeton, 1999. 
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people are not asked to do much in that particular articulation of Madisonian 
constitutional theory, besides relying on their representatives to interpret and debate the 
Constitution for them.      
Ultimately, what is most important to the American project is that the 
Constitution constitutes the people.  As Aristotle notes in his Politics, “Whoever is 
entitled to participate in an office involving deliberation or decision is…a citizen in this 
city; and the city is the multitude of such persons that is adequate with a view to a self-
sufficient life, to speak simply.”19  If we leave aside Greek rules of the time concerning 
slaves, women, etc., this becomes a good starting point for learning what constitutes a 
people.  It is not a coincidence that Madison, Jefferson, and the rest of the founders were 
familiar with the writings of these ancient men.  These people, as Aristotle argues,20 must 
be able to rule and be ruled at once.  What is best is if citizens are able to rule in high 
office and then still be content under another’s rule once they are done, as Machiavelli 
suggests.  They should also have the same education.21  But how can a constitution 
educate people?  
First they must have a tradition.  But as time progresses, there is a group of 
(Catholic) documents that will accrue to that constitution.  As Ahkil Amar argues, 
Americans have a written Constitution and an unwritten Constitution: “Neither…stands 
alone.  Rather, the two stand together and support each other.  The unwritten 
Constitution, properly understood, helps make sense of the written text.  In turn, the 
written text presupposes and invites certain forms of interpretation that go beyond clause-
                                                
19 Aristotle, Politics, trans. Carnes Lord. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1984. 87 (1275bl) 
20 Aristotle, Politics, 183, (1317bl) 
21 Aristotle, Politics, 229 (1337al) 
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bound literalism.”22  Documents such as the Declaration of Independence, the Federalist 
Papers, the Northwest Ordinance, the Gettysburg Address, Brown v. Board, and King’s 
“I Have a Dream” speech are Amar’s beginning examples.  Some of these, especially the 
Declaration of Independence and the Federalist Papers will be major examples in this 
dissertation.  More examples could certainly be added to this pantheon, but they all 
contribute to how we see ourselves as a constitutional people.  From youth teachers tell 
us about the great feats and characters of our leaders, in particular George Washington 
and Abraham Lincoln.  We memorize speeches, we salute the flag, we are trained to 
recite the Pledge of Allegiance, no matter where we are originally from, we are taught to 
be Americans.  As we grow older, we are encouraged to vote, and Congress has made 
registering as easy as going to the Motor Vehicles Administration to register.  We join 
groups, political, social, religious, or otherwise, and assimilate certain values, which we 
then teach to our children as aspirations for how our polity will develop.   
How are these newly constituted people to learn to venerate their Constitution?  
From Federalist 49 it would seem that opinion is the only force that could quickly sweep 
in and convince a large body of people of a single opinion about politics.  It seems 
strange that opinion would cause a people to have opinions.  But it is intentional that this 
be somewhat circular because these opinions are supposed to be held without thinking, at 
least until they are held firmly, and then it is safe to introduce something like critical 
veneration.  It is likely, despite his doubts about enlightened statesmen being available to 
guide the people, that Madison thought early leadership from men like George 
Washington would, in the American case, provide enough similarity of opinion to get the 
Constitution through its early period without strong veneration having yet developed.  
                                                
22 Amar, Ahkil Reed. America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live By. Basic 
Books: New York, 2012, 20. 
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But how long does veneration take to develop?  In the United States, it may have taken 
far longer than we tend to think.  As Michael Kammen notes “compared with the years 
1875 to 1900, when Constitution worship was very strong indeed, overt criticism of the 
Constitution seems more common between 1788 and 1860 than after that date.”23 His 
historical account buttresses my claim that there is a thing called “veneration” that people 
actually feel, and is determined by the various people who live at certain times—that is to 
say, it is historically conditioned.  This leads me to be confident that veneration—even 
critical veneration—can be made to flourish, even when it appears to be missing from the 
contemporary American spirit.   
The problem of knowing how veneration will develop over time is a problem for 
practicing critical veneration.  How can we know if, over time, our critical veneration is 
justified?  What’s more, if our veneration is critical, will it continue to exist?  In short, 
how is this dissertation’s defense of critical veneration not a profoundly Jeffersonian 
exercise that acts in a similar way to Jefferson’s suggested conventions: as a tool of 
disservice to the stability of the nation? This is a question that should continue to be 
examined as the dissertation unfolds, but as a preliminary treatment of the issue, we must 
consider that veneration is not only of principles, but also of the institutions and 
processes—the procedural part of the Constitution—that continues to exist while we 
question it.  Kammen summarizes the impetus behind the aspirational component of my 
project well when he states “Progress in history is rarely easy, however, and veneration 
has often become most intense as part of the process whereby controversies are resolved 
and issues resolved.”24  This claim expresses another aspect of aspirational conflict: 
veneration for the old system becomes stronger as changes take hold.  This means that it 
                                                
23 Kammen, A Machine, 22. 
24 Kammen, A Machine, 38 
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will never be easy to convince staunch blind venerators of the Constitution to change 
anything about their beloved document.  But those who truly love and trust the 
Constitution are the critical venerators, who allow the document to change in accordance 
with its own principles as we come to know what its principles entail over time.  
Moreover, the moving parts of the constitutional order continue to order our lives while 
we consider changes to it.  Thus we are keenly aware that in order to change those 
fundamental parts, be they institutions or rights, we must put something in their place.  
We cannot be Wilsonians in practice without dismantling our presidential order and 
creating a parliamentary one.  We cannot abandon the Electoral College because it is 
unrepresentative of the people and not think carefully about how a recount would work in 
a solely popular election.  These are examples that are unlikely to come to fruition, and 
one reason that is true is because they would require wholesale change.  In short, when 
we criticize we must be aware that our criticisms are of practical institutions that do 
certain things for us—even when most Americans are not specifically aware of what they 
do—and that to change them is a gargantuan undertaking.  Moreover, in the specific 
Protestant mode in which this dissertation is written, we the people are responsible for 
creating anew if we destroy anew—or at the very least, for choosing the people who 
choose for us.  Yet that is not always good enough, to choose who will choose.  
Sometimes the people must choose for themselves, as they do in social movements. 
This returns us to the debates over Protestantism and Catholicism.  Most people 
believe, like good Catholics, that the Supreme Court is also the supreme arbiter of what is 
constitutional and what is not.  However, this dissertation argues that the people can do 
more, and if they knew that they could do more, they would, at least when it is 
monumentally important.  That is the substance of critical veneration—that the blind, 
Catholic veneration of the Court is not enough to create good citizens who would indeed 
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know how to rule themselves under our Constitution.  Now, to be sure, the American 
Constitution does not require excessively much of its citizenry—certainly not what 
Aristotle would require.  Rather, the people are both the problem and the solution: they 
can be harnessed to protect rights and permanent interests of the community, if properly 
prepared to take on this task.  “Madison placed his hopes for republican government in 
the acceptance of the citizenry of constitutional design,” a design which would then 
create incentives for politicians to live inside the bounds of that design.25   
From antiquity to modernity, a variety of thinkers argued for veneration of 
constitutional orders.  To Aristotle’s man who is constituted by politics to Madison’s 
people who gain veneration through right opinion, from Rousseauian lawgiving 
indoctrinarians of the general will and civic religion to Burkean fealty to one’s 
forefathers, there is no lack of talk of veneration or conceptions like it in our historical 
record of philosophy.  The problem today is that most scholars are unconcerned with 
veneration unless they think it at least somewhat dangerous.26  Veneration, especially in 
its blindest form, is dangerous if what you prize is an active constitutional people.  It is 
very easy for people to be sucked into a void of complacency with their government, and 
care only about their family and friends, as Tocqueville predicted. The task of a 
government that sees itself as the product of critical veneration and wishes to remain that 
way is to activate the people, or, at the very least, to provide avenues for the people to be 
active and involved.  One reason that so many legal and political theorists are flummoxed 
by Sanford Levinson’s Our Undemocratic Constitution is that they—and the citizenry 
generally—have no conception of being actively involved in their government, much less 
                                                
25 Elkin, Stephen. Reconstructing the Commercial Republic.  University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2006, 
48-50. 
26 Levinson, Sanford. Our Undemocratic Constitution. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006; Sabato, 
Larry. Walker Publishing Company: New York, 2007. 
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of what kind of work it would take to have a popularly sanctioned—or perhaps even 
popular—convention to decide on new institutions for our government.  This is not an 
easy problem to solve.  Deliberative democrats, communitarians, and republicans are 
trying to solve this problem—which is not truly the subject of this dissertation—and they 
have come up with a variety of solutions to make the people more involved.  But what 
they all have in common is that they ask people to think about their government on a 
regular basis. 
Even Madison required some thought out of the citizenry to insist on the kind of 
veneration I call his cautious veneration.  He needs the people to be constitutionally 
literate in order for them “‘to be enlightened, to be awakened, to be united, that after 
establishing a government they should watch over it, as well as obey it.’”27  This is a high 
bar, and it is possible that the people cannot be this way all of the time.  Perhaps Bruce 
Ackerman is correct and there are specific times when the people, in what he calls a 
“dualist democracy,” 28 are to be awakened from their slumber of ordinary times in order 
to become involved in the government.  Perhaps that is all that we can hope for from a 
massive people not trained in ancient republican ways.  But it would be an improvement 
from now if we could have Madisonian veneration, so much the more for critical 
veneration.  Thus, this dissertation is not meant to signify that there is not good 
Madisonian veneration and that there are not good suggestions for improvement on our 
Constitution.   
                                                
27 Gibson, Alan. 2005. “Veneration and Vigilance: James Madison and Public Opinion, 1785-1800.” The 
Review of Politics 67 2005, 19. 
28 Ackerman, Bruce.  We the People I: Foundations. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1991.  I will treat this idea of Ackerman’s, along with others of his writings and conceptual creations 
in Chapter 4. 
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Unfortunately, unlike the problem of civic involvement, which has many theorists 
working to fix, the problem of veneration is understudied.  Most of the accounts of 
veneration—and they are few and far between—are historical.29  This dissertation, and its 
use of Madison, intends to be at least minimally prescriptive—namely, it prescribes 
critical veneration as a good path for the American citizenry to follow.  Historical 
accounts, by contrast, provide a basis for understanding veneration as an American 
political tradition—particularly Madisonian veneration.  But this dissertation will not be a 
history of cycles of adulation for the Constitution, nor a sociological understanding of 
how we can to our system and began to venerate it—though pieces of each will be woven 
through specific parts of the text.  Rather, it is to explain why critical veneration is 
necessary to the American project. 
One scholar in whose tracks I follow on veneration is Alan Gibson.30  He in fact 
does pay some attention to Madison as “a prescient democratic theorist.”31  Gibson notes 
“In general, both Madison's defenders and critics have failed to grasp how in the 1780s 
and the 1790s he conceived of the relationship of the people to their government as a 
process of mutual influence, censorship, and judgment.”32  Although my take on Madison 
is far closer to what Gibson calls Colleen Sheehan’s interpretation of Madison—that 
public opinion should be understood as “statecraft as soulcraft”33—Gibson’s focus on 
opinion in Madisonian thought, particularly during the Federalist and National Gazette 
                                                
29 Sheehan, Colleen A. “Public Opinion and the Formation of Civic Character in Madison’s Republican 
Theory.” The Review of Politics. 67:1, 2005; Rosen, Gary. “James Madison and the Problem of Founding.” 
58, 1996; Howe, Daniel W. “The Political Psychology of the Federalist.” The William and Mary Quarterly. 
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30 Gibson, Alan. “The Madisonian Madison and the Question of Consistency: The Significance and 
Challenge of Recent Research.” The Review of Politics. 64:2. 2002; Gibson, Alan. “Veneration and 
Vigilance: James Madison and Public Opinion, 1785-1800.” The Review of Politics. 67:1, 2005. 
31 Gibson, “Veneration and Vigilance,” 9. 
32 Gibson, “Veneration and Vigilance,” 30. 
33 Gibson, “Veneration and Vigilance,” 32. 
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periods, is essential to understanding Madisonian political theory.  Gibson’s painting of 
Madison as a scholar of public opinion is well supported, and points us in the direction of 
taking Madison as a guide on such matters: “The irony that one of the most perceptive 
early analysts and defenders of this concept [of public opinion] is most often 
characterized as an opponent of democracy will not be lost on contemporary political 
scientists.”34  Despite my disagreement with Gibson that Madison is truly a democrat 
himself, I would argue that he does pave the way for democrats in the future.  By 
advocating a cautious veneration by the people, he makes the people able to participate 
better in their government, which eventually led America from espousing republican 
sensibilities to democratic ones.   
But ultimately Gibson is a scholar of the founding who throws in some 
contemporary reflections about the founding at the end of his article.  On the contrary, 
this dissertation aims to discuss theoretical stances, in the thought of the founders—
specifically James Madison and Thomas Jefferson—and political scientists and legal 
scholars of the day.  Madison was not wrong.  Veneration is necessary.  But, as I will 
explain in Chapter 1, neither was Jefferson wrong to denigrate certain sorts of veneration.  
Madison and Jefferson are the first theorists of the American project.  There are many 
who follow in their footsteps, but because they are practical politicians, political theorists, 
and even enlightened statesmen, they should be more interesting to us than contemporary 
theorists who have little acquaintance with the art of governance.  Furthermore, they 
began anew.  Large portions of the Federalist Papers are devoted to laying out how 
precisely we Americans will differ in our republic than those who came before us.  This 
is beyond the scope of inquiry here, but all discovering that takes is a careful reading of 
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the Federalist.  And everyone would agree that the Declaration of Independence was 
doing something new.  So in Madison and Jefferson we have philosopher statesmen who 
come down from the heavens?  Certainly not.  They were not Rousseauian lawgivers, 
and, like George Washington, never intended to take the reins of government 
permanently for themselves.  They understood what transfers of power were necessary 
for the new American experiment, even as each acted as President. 
Jeremy Bailey has recently argued that Madison was not as much a fan of 
veneration as is often argued by scholars, given his advice on drafting a constitution to 
lawmakers in Kentucky.  He notes that Federalist 49 was written at a very important 
historical time when the Constitution was under deep questioning, and that making 
arguments for veneration may have strengthened the Constitution’s shot at being ratified.    
Though I would not go as far as Bailey does, I do agree with his statement: “for Madison, 
the benefits of constitutional veneration are mixed.  Even if constitutional veneration can 
sometimes provide what deliberation cannot, there are serious reasons to be wary of it.”35  
Furthermore, Madison was trying to please two constituencies: “Because Madison knew 
he could not close the discussion of republicanism that would answer the most scrupulous 
republicans (Jefferson), while at the same time relieving those most concerned with the 
deliberation of their constituent, Madison had to warn both sets of men against the 
excesses of the argument from deliberation.”  This leads Madison to a less stringent 
veneration, very close to what I call cautious veneration in this dissertation.36 
Therefore, this dissertation will be presented in three parts of two chapters each, 
the first of which will be devoted to Madison and Jefferson, and one to contemporary 
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scholars who write on the same themes.  Part one will discuss how critical veneration is 
born of the conflict between veneration and rebellion within our aspirations, dyad two 
will discuss potential dangerous exigencies in constitutional orders, and dyad three will 
discuss rights.  These three concepts are essential to understanding critical veneration 
because they illuminate how it works: it is born out of our aspirations for certain rights in 
order to deal with the exigencies of the moment.  Critical veneration is then fluid, as it 
moves according to the demands of the rulers and the ruled in order to best serve 
individual rights and the “permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”37 
Chapter 1 of the first Part features James Madison’s writings on the importance of 
veneration, the kind of veneration I have defined as cautious veneration.  He dismisses 
blind veneration as dangerous, but does not adopt a suitably critical, or Jeffersonian, 
stance toward constitutionalism.  Thomas Jefferson’s writings discussed in this chapter 
focus on the need for rebellion among the citizenry fairly frequently, and the changes in 
constitutional order that should accompany such rebellions—or the mere passage of a 19 
year generation.  I argue that had Madison and Jefferson truly understood each other, they 
would have come to a middle ground.  Both men are somewhat open to a middle road, 
between Madison’s focus on dialogic communities supporting the government and 
Jefferson’s understanding of the need people have for constitutions (even if they do 
change with relative frequency).  I then suggest that together they could have come to a 
position of critical veneration, or at the very least, we should come to that position by 
studying each man’s political theory.   
Chapter 2 of the first Part presents aspirational conflict in the context of critical 
veneration, and is, as such, the most important chapter of the dissertation.  In order to 
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show what a critical venerator of the Constitution could actually look like, I use Frederick 
Douglass as an example.  He was born into a system of what Mark Graber would call 
constitutional evil, but he found hope by interpreting the Constitution as an anti-slavery 
document.  However, this evil system still needed to be replaced, so Douglass advocated 
slave rebellions that used violence.  Once the Civil War was over, he ended his advocacy 
for violence and turned to writing to convince the public of his opinions about equality.  
This chapter, through introducing aspirational conflict, or the necessary violence needed 
to bring our aspirations into this world of constitutional evil, introduces a concept of Jack 
Balkin’s: constitutional redemption.  Constitutional redemption takes note of the evils 
maintained in the Constitution due to compromises that the founders made in order for 
the constitutional order to come into being, and attempts to ameliorate those situations.  
Balkin’s constitutional redemption is a deeply aspirational system.  In that respect, I 
identify as a Balkinian.  But Balkin does not go far enough when he analyses 
constitutional systems—namely, he does not mention the violence that accompanies the 
creation and maintenance of those systems.  Mark Graber’s awareness of this violence, in 
fact, is what leads him away from an aspirationalist position.  My concession to Graber’s 
theory is aspirational conflict theory, which aims to use as little violence as necessary to 
accomplish aspirational goals.  Finally, it is important to note that there are two types of 
violence described in this chapter: physical violence and aspirational violence.  Here I 
return to Frederick Douglass and note that he only supported physical violence to end 
slavery, but was a proponent of what Robert Cover and Beau Breslin call metaphorical 
violence.  Metaphorical violence is violence done by stopping some law or legal system 
from its normal operation, which does violence to those who benefited from that system.  
Thus, most of the violence condoned by the system of aspirational conflict is 
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metaphorical violence that comes out of realizing some aspirations of some groups of 
people over others (for example, favoring blacks over Jim Crow whites). 
The second Part focuses on illegalities created by the evolution of a system of 
critical veneration combined with aspirational conflict.  In Chapter 3, I show Madison 
and Jefferson’s agreement on the importance of illegal acts to create and protect the 
Union.  In the case of Madison, this involves a close textual analysis of Federalist 40 and 
the reasons it gives for abandoning the Articles of Confederation in favor of the 
Constitution.  Madison concludes that popular approbation is the only recourse to make 
this transition legal, though it was still the right decision.  Here we should note that the 
seeming difficulty Madison appeared to have with change in Federalist 49 is gone.  He 
appears to argue that America is better off having no veneration for the Articles of 
Confederation.  Moving to Jefferson’s letters to Colvin, among others, we note that the 
same comfort with illegality is present.  This is less surprising coming from Jefferson 
who supported rebellions in the documents used in Chapter 1.   
In Chapter 4, I interrogate Bruce Ackerman’s mode of constitutional 
interpretation and find it does not explain constitutional change through illegality as well 
as the work of Herbert Storing and Jeffrey Tulis.  Ackerman argues that the American 
constitutional order is filled with breaks called constitutional moments (either 3 in his We 
the People volumes or potentially 8 in his Holmes lectures).  These constitutional 
moments are unique opportunities for particular people in a particular time to engage 
with the constitutional order and change it in dramatic ways.  Ackerman’s main 
constitutional moments occur at the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal.  He 
argues that the Article V procedure set up for changing the system was ignored in favor 
of innovating according to the circumstances.  In contrast to Ackerman, Storing, Tulis, 
and myself argue that American constitutional development, though it contains 
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illegalities from time to time, was not fundamentally broken at certain points, that the 
order is fundamentally of one piece.  Furthermore, this piece was the one imagined by 
some of the founders—not in specifics of course—but in the major growth of the 
American political system and the eventual abolition of slavery. 
The third Part concerns rights in the context of our aspirations.  As in Chapter 1, 
we find Madison and Jefferson opposed on what the dangers are to government: too 
many enumerated rights or too few?  Madison was concerned about the presence of too 
many enumerated rights in part because future generations will imagine that only those 
rights exist, but mainly because he saw too stringent rights provisions as ways for the 
government to usurp power where it was not supposed to encroach.  By contrast, 
Jefferson envisioned the people being trampled by the government if they were not 
granted extensive rights protections.   
Chapter 6 also focuses upon rights, though from a number of angles.  Patriotism 
becomes a topic of study from the perspective of a debate between two Supreme Court 
Justices—Scalia and Breyer—over the use of foreign jurisprudence in our own 
jurisprudence.  This is expanded to discuss constitutional patriotism.  In accordance with 
the focus of this dissertation, constructive patriotism is preferable to blind patriotism.  
This rights talk is another way into our discussion of aspirations, because rights are the 
clearest formulations of our aspirations.  It is also fairly easy to see when rights are not 
being fully extended to all people, which is the promise of our constitutional democracy.  
Finally, I discuss how we should talk about rights in order to incorporate responsibilities 
in our constitutional order.  
The focus of this dissertation on critical veneration is clarified by having two sets 
of lenses—the founders’ and our contemporaries’—because the former can illuminate 
why our constitutional order was created in certain ways and the latter can analyze 
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whether or not that order works.  Ultimately, I aim to show how and why we should be 
critical venerators of the Constitution.  With the background of critical veneration of the 
Constitution established in our minds, and, more importantly, in the minds of the 
citizenry, aspirational conflict is possible.  I think it is even possible that a society of 
critical venerators could avoid physical violence and stick mainly to metaphorical 
violence.  For this supposition to be explained, I use the example of Martin Luther King 
Jr. in the Conclusion to the dissertation.  For King, physical violence was no longer 
necessary because the Civil War’s violence of Frederick Douglass’s time had already 
settled the biggest compromise in the American order: slavery was to be unconstitutional. 
As a result, King had a smaller—albeit very important—problem to deal with: Jim Crow.  
Physical violence was not even a justifiable means by King’s time, as we can see from 
Malcolm X’s less important movement.  King’s metaphorical violence towards Jim Crow 
in protests, sit-ins, and other social movement techniques was ultimately more valuable to 
his cause, and ultimately to making the government care about his cause, which, happily, 
ended with an extension of new civil and constitutional rights to African Americans.  
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Chapter 1: Veneration and Rebellion in James Madison and Thomas 
Jefferson’s Thought 
 
In thinking of tensions in constitutions, one might think that there must be an 
opposition between aspirations for what constitutionalism can create, and what 
veneration can solidify.  That is, aspirations, which essentially move constitutions 
towards change and reform, would seem to be inherently in tension with veneration, 
which honors the constitution as it is and tends to resist change.  This dichotomy 
appears—at least at first glance—to be alive and well in the relationship between Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison.  A typical view of the two goes as follows: Jefferson 
aspired; Madison stabilized.  Jefferson dreamt of new generations recreating the world; 
Madison prayed for the work of the old to remain in place.  Thus Jeffersonian 
constitutionalism was an effort to engage everyone in constitution making, while 
Madisonian constitutionalism was an effort to limit constitutional change.   
In this dissertation I will challenge this view of a dichotomous Madison v. 
Jefferson story and instead tell a story about the project they both shared.  To be sure, 
there are differences between the political philosophies of the two men.  In this chapter 
we will read of Madison’s exhortations towards stability of opinion and Jefferson’s calls 
for new revolutions every 19 years.  But in the background of this study should be the 
idea of critical veneration that allows Madison and Jefferson to join together in the 
middle.  As we shall see, a sincere effort to learn from both of these American founders 
can and will lead us to a stance of critical veneration, rather than to understanding each of 
their ideas in a polarized way.  Critical veneration requires a habit of mind that allows us 
to integrate faith and doubt together, and that is precisely the attitude we must adopt in 
order to form a constitutional stance that includes both Jefferson and Madison.  Jefferson 
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held faith in the people to reinvent themselves through new constitutions, but had doubt 
that the constitutional orders that they would inaugurate could, would, or should survive.  
Madison, on the other hand, had doubt about the people’s capacity to create new 
constitutions, but had faith that once under a constitutional order, those same people 
could sustain their governments.  Thus, combining Madison and Jefferson can lead to 
critical veneration of government.  Such veneration cannot be a blind acceptance of 
everything the government is and does or a blind fury against the government just 
because it is not of one’s own making.  Combining Madison and Jefferson can make for 
critical veneration of the people’s capacity, whether it is always tethered to a government 
or not.  
However, this is a scholarly view.  If they had the benefit of thinking 
retrospectively about the Constitution from the viewpoint of the early twenty-first 
century, I think Madison and Jefferson would agree with me about taking a middle 
ground.  I believe that Madison’s statements in the 1790s about the abilities of the people 
to govern and be governed, as well as Jefferson’s eventual acceptance of the Constitution, 
is good proof that both had the capacity to think deeply and to compromise, even if they 
saw the flaws in the compromises.   
I am concerned in this dissertation with the scholarly project that creates this 
compromise, to be sure, but I am also well aware that the constitutional project as we live 
it exists only in real time, where people are less likely to compromise in the moment on 
theoretical issues, thinking instead of the deeply practical issues that all people must 
confront and making their compromises in the practical world.  More so in the later 
chapters on Madison and Jefferson (3 and 5), we will examine what each though about 
political issues of the time, be they exigencies that confront the Union or rights 
provisions.  But even here in this more theoretical chapter, we will be using materials 
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from public and private statements that show why it is important that we study these 
particular men in trying to understand critical veneration and aspirationalism.   
For example, for Madison, stability is essential to the strength and longevity of 
government.  This is not merely an academic statement: Madison uses his experiences in 
government during the 1780s to inform his judgment that the various rebellions that took 
place were truly dangerous to the American experiment under the Articles of 
Confederation.  Later when he talks about public opinion, it is important to that 
discussion to know that Madison himself was an opinion-shaper, both in his Federalist 
Papers in the 1788-89 and in his National Gazette essays of 1791-92.  Madison knew 
how public opinion was supposed to work and how it did actually work in practice.  The 
same is true with ambition: the reason that Madisonian ambition should ultimately work 
is because it relies on a theory of political people as they will be, not as they should be.  
To create a theory that ambition will counter ambition, Madison had to rely on more than 
just theoretical knowledge—he needed to see how a real solution to men’s ambition 
toppling governments would look like. 
As for Jefferson, it seems initially in this chapter as if he focuses simply on ways 
to evade the government, both in revolutions and with rights provisions.  But this too is a 
result of his practical political experience.  Jefferson was writing from France as 
America’s ambassador, and he had witnessed many revolts and difficulties with the 
government that were far greater than the small rebellions in America.  Therefore, he was 
more inclined to protect the people from the government rather than to strengthen the 
government to educate the people in stability, public opinion, and eventually veneration.  
It is not that Jefferson couldn’t see the value in those principles, but he was more worried 
about what a government might take away than what it could give.   
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Thus I hope to replicate, particularly in the conclusion to this chapter, the kind of 
debate that faith and doubt might have with each other.  As I noted at the beginning of 
this chapter, Madison and Jefferson have faith and doubt in different aspects of 
governing.  Without this combination of faith and doubt, it is unlikely that critical 
veneration would be possible.  Thus, this chapter in particular will focus on Madisonian 
veneration first as an independent phenomenon, and then upon Jeffersonian rebellion as 
independent, before seeing both together in conversation.  The conclusion will elaborate 
the scholarly view that allows me to extrapolate from their thought to show how both 
lend support to my theory of critical veneration. 
 
MADISONIAN VENERATION 
A combination of veneration with some aspect of change exists in Madison’s 
writings. I will call this cautious veneration.  It does not require fealty to forefathers, as 
Burkean veneration does.  It should be contrasted with blind veneration, which Madison 
warns against in Federalist 14, where he rhetorically asks:  
Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that the form of government 
recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world; that it has 
never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors; that it rashly 
attempts what it is impossible to accomplish…But why is the experiment of an 
extended republic to be rejected merely because it is new?  Is it not the glory of 
the people of America that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions 
of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for 
antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good 
sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own 
experience?”38 
Here Madison praises the American people for resisting the temptation to blindly 
venerate the customs of the past without also considering the realities of the present.  This 
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is not to say that Madison advocates radical change, of course, for he also honors 
America’s attitude of due respect for “the opinions of former times.”  Because he 
advocates a basic respect for the past combined with an openness to the present and some 
view of the future, he is a proponent of cautious veneration. But he would not advocate 
what I call critical veneration.   
The essential approach of critical veneration—attempting to reform a revered 
constitution based on one’s own aspirations for it and for the nation—is too radical for 
Madison.  In a Madisonian world the Constitution is revered: therefore we continue to 
abide by its strictures and it increases in our minds as an object worthy of reverence, as a 
time-honored carrier of tradition and American political values.  Even in conflict, we 
affirm the Constitution: “For when people argue over the correct meaning of a 
constitution and refer back to it in political and social conflicts, they are basically 
affirming the constitution through these very conflicts.”39  In a way, cautious veneration 
means that we continue to fight new battles with the same tools that come with our 
veneration for our Constitution.  For example, and this will be discussed in more depth 
later in this section, people are and have always been ambitious.  In a system of cautious 
veneration, fights become about constitutional issues, perhaps even new constitutional 
issues that crop up, but the Constitution continues to be affirmed because the people in 
government fight on behalf of their particular positions and branches.  Thus, as they 
argue over novel constitutional issues, they rebuild the structure of the government as it 
was meant to be seen: as an arena for political people who will continually confront 
politics in old and new forms. 
                                                
39 Grimm, “Keynote,” 203. 
 40 
Today we see an attitude of Madisonian cautious veneration in public political 
discourse.  Americans argue about rights not through categorical human rights talk, but 
through Bill of Rights talk.  Americans argue about government sometimes through the 
lens of a government of limited and enumerated powers.  Americans argue over judicial 
philosophies on the Supreme Court by invoking fidelity to the Constitution.  These 
arguments, much as they seem to embroil our nation in conflict, actually contribute both 
to a Madisonian cautious veneration and to constitutional stability by consistently going 
back to our founding texts and thinking carefully about what we inherit from them, using 
our “own good sense, the knowledge of [our] own situation, and the lessons of [our] own 
experience.”   
The stability required for cautious veneration is also preserved by the power of 
opinion.40  Thus Robert Morgan writes “The stability of the republic cannot rest upon 
enlightened opinion alone; it requires a sentimental attachment as well.” Such “affection” 
can only be “developed over time.”  Moreover, it “must be so widely shared as to be 
rooted in sentiment rather than pure reason alone.  The strength of every individual’s 
opinions, and ‘its practical influence on his conduct,’ depends on both the number of 
persons one believes to have shared them and the long duration of time over which they 
have been held.”41    
However, stability, especially that which needs longstanding opinion to buttress 
it, cannot be the source of safety in government when a new government is just being 
established, as the United States was after abandoning the Articles of Confederation.  
Thus, in arguing for the importance of stability in the new system, Madison also had to 
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make room for a large element of novelty coming into play.  These novel forms of 
government had to immediately help Americans form opinions of the Constitution.  
According to Colleen Sheehan, Madison’s idea of public opinion works in four ways.  It 
teaches the people how to govern and be governed. It creates a “standard of public 
conduct.” It “express[es]…the opinion of the national majority, which can censor acts of 
the government.  This censorship does not carry the force of law, but it may well ‘lead to 
a change in the legislative expression’ of the public will or even to a change in judicial 
opinion.”42  It protects rights to elections, representation, and political speech, among 
other things.   
Now, it would seem that teaching the people to govern and be governed would 
take time, as would forming a national majority with the same opinion.  But the people 
certainly knew enough from the start—especially as they had been partially socialized by 
the Articles of Confederation—to have the new Constitution fix standards of public 
conduct and protect basic political rights.  These latter forms of opinion can help in the 
transition from the Articles to the Constitution.   
Via these forms of opinion, Madison’s worry that opinion takes too long to 
cultivate stability (and thus veneration) becomes less problematic.  The new Constitution 
is generated by and generates opinion, so the American people can be more settled.  
Because opinion becomes settled through practice, veneration can develop first, and then 
from within that cautious veneration Americans usefully can critique the government. 
And finally, opinion can be a form of expression by the people.  Thus Madison’s model 
of cautious veneration based on popular opinion is viable even in moments of transition, 
at least if the transition is from a government with similar enough aspirations and values. 
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Madison writes of two kinds of institutional stability: that of those elected for 
terms of office and that of the government itself.  Constitutional forms that delineate the 
length of terms in office maintain the first kind of stability.  The second type is more 
difficult to maintain, for it involves the minds and opinions of the American people.  A 
stable constitutional government leads to veneration of that government according to 
Madison.  Without veneration by the people of the United States the first type of 
stability—that of the constitutional structure—cannot exist.  James Madison explains the 
role of veneration in Federalist 49 as he dismisses Jefferson’s idea “’that whenever any 
two of the three branches of government shall concur in opinion, each by the voices of 
two thirds of their whole number, that a convention is necessary for altering the 
Constitution, or correcting breaches of it, a convention shall be called for the purpose.’”43  
This is unacceptable to Madison because it undermines the constitutional structure itself, 
and leaves open the possibility that greater changes in the aspirational character of the 
document are possible.  After the proper encomium to his friend’s talents and greatness 
of mind, Madison turns to voicing his strong opposition to this idea.   
First, he opposes the conventions with a familiar complaint: the legislature is too 
strong and might be able to weaken the other branches, or at least two thirds of another 
branch to change the constitution to the legislature’s will.  This is problematic because 
the three branches are to be perfectly coordinate, not able to lord their increased power 
over the others.   
His second complaint is central to our purpose in examining Madison’s Federalist 
49—namely that frequent appeals to change the government in form and structure will 
limit the veneration the people have for the constitutional order.  As Madison argues, 
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governments rest on veneration and opinion, and both need strong support.  For 
veneration to take hold in the minds of the people, one must either allow governments to 
receive the benefits of longevity, or there must be philosopher kings on a league with 
Plato’s to convince the people of the goodness of the order.  As he says in different words 
in Federalist 10, to expect these enlightened statesmen to be at the helm of government 
will not always work, for it takes a lot of work to find those people—if they even exist—
and incorporate them into the government.  Therefore the people must become convinced 
of the goodness of the constitutional order through the shared opinion of others, the 
longevity of the government, or both.  Madison argues that for people generally, in order 
to make the good opinion of individuals about their government fight of their natural 
tendency towards timidity and cautiousness, the people must join in one opinion with 
many other men.  And, of course, should long lasting veneration and numbers of men 
convinced combine, the government lies in even better stead: “When the examples which 
fortify opinion are ancient as well as numerous, they are known to have a double 
effect.”44  
Third, Madison worries about disrupting public tranquility with public passions 
ignited by new constitutional conventions and discussions. The formation of the 
American constitutional order, says Madison, was accompanied by a dangerous climate 
that created an unusual coherence of public opinion.  The demands placed on Americans 
by the Revolutionary War ultimately united the people around the idea of a new 
governmental order.  This political climate, Madison says, encouraged stifling “the 
passions most unfriendly to order and concord,”45 led the people to follow true patriots as 
leaders, joined the people in similar opinions, and made them desire novelty in 
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governmental forms.  As we cannot expect this danger to recur each time a constitutional 
convention would be called, we cannot expect the people to act in the reasonable way 
they did during this convention.  The sentiments of the people this time were correct and 
salutary, but we cannot guarantee similar results for the future.   
Fourth, and most importantly to Madison—though very similar to his first point 
against this measure, having branches levy power against each other is likely to lead to 
constitutional equilibrium.  The branches are not made to be judges in their own cases 
against each other.  They are meant to serve the people, and guard against each other’s 
usurpations of power, as we will see more clearly in Federalist 51.  Moreover, the people 
in this situation are likely to form parties for and against the attempted usurpation by the 
branches, and this leads to having the passions of the people, rather than their reason, 
judge the rightness of any cause.   
In short, Madison has one main major concern about the possibility of new 
conventions: the role passions will play in creating new governments.  Veneration would 
be harmed by passions taking away the stability of government by having repeated 
conventions.  Stability, which supports veneration, would not be present if conventions 
were called too often.  Either the three branches together or the legislature mainly (as the 
most powerful branch) might try to accrue more power to themselves than they were 
allowed in the Philadelphia Convention.  The American system was designed to be stable 
and, if not passion-free—as that is impossible—free of the constant passion to innovate in 
government to serve one’s own special interest.  After all, Madison’s main worry in 
Federalist 10—factions—are created by misdirected passions. 
In addition to being passionate, Madison declares that all men are ambitious.  
Some have the right position to vent their ambitions through a political process, and some 
do not.  The people who work inside the political process are required to harness their 
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ambition in service not only of the immediate polity and its ongoing fight against 
factional strife, but also in the service of being reelected for doing well.  However, 
ambition can be handled in better and worse ways, as Randall Strahan notes, in Federalist 
57, Madison writes: “The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to 
obtain for rulers men who posses the most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, 
the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual 
precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold the public trust.”  
Strahan draws two conclusions from this passage: that Madisonian political science seeks 
to create political institutions that “evoke and reinforce the motivations” that propel 
“properly motivated officeholders” “to seek out and act on the public good.”46 
People who are ambitious without any outlet, whether it is the support of a 
candidate or seeking candidacy for themselves may have the tendency to create factions 
that tend towards ruining the constitutional order.  Of course, it is also the case that 
people with strong interests who are unrepresented are also likely to create factions.  If 
someone has strong opinions and ideas, and some are left unheard and unnoticed, her 
tendency towards faction might erupt.  In Federalist 10, Madison uses the example of the 
conflict between the propertied and the property-less to demonstrate what factions might 
exist among people.  The propertied are the minority and the property-less are the 
majority.  Madison sees this conflict as a great temptation towards faction, as the majority 
could easily deprive the minority and take away their individual rights to own property.  
This faction then, unrestrained and acting against the will of the minority, likely would 
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continue by upsetting other aspects of the constitutional order, perhaps even the mode of 
and candidates for election.   
For the sake of preserving the constitutional order, then, American leaders must 
learn to balance ambition against ambition.  This is important for two reasons.  First, if 
the elected leaders of the country pay attention to potential factional disputes, then they 
are much more likely to be able to meliorate difficulties before they turn into factional 
strife.  They may be able to compromise with the people instead of offending them, and 
the people may begin to see them as their people inside the government, as those who can 
help them from the inside.  Second, and more importantly to Madison, ambition in public 
officials serves to keep the branches in check against each other, maintaining the correct 
constitutional balance through institutional battle.  This competition is healthy because it 
keeps all of the branches in line.  Branches of government could also slip into factional 
disputes, but if they are forced to fight on the level of constitutionalism both by their 
constituents and their ambitions to win, faction is less likely to sweep through the halls of 
government.  What’s more, Madison expects the people not only to depend on the 
government, but to help it as well: as Colleen Sheehan notes, “When the assertions in 
Federalist 51 are attended to in the context of the two preceding Federalist Papers, a 
nascent idea beats in the ear of Publius’ audience.  It is reason, not passion, which ought 
to prevail over legislative decisions.  Specifically, it is the reason of the public that ought 
to control the government.”47  
Madison tells us at what the new government aims: “Among the difficulties 
encountered by the convention, a very important one must have lain in combining the 
requisite stability and energy in government with the inviolable attention due to liberty 
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and the republican form.”48 These factors are supposed to create an environment suitable 
for preserving self-interest and the public good.  It protects and promotes the public good 
while simultaneously allowing Americans the freedom to seek their own interests.  It is 
easy to see why the founders would want to protect the public good, but why self 
interest?  In Federalist 10 and 51, Madison saw the necessity of protecting self-interest 
partially because he saw no way to eliminate it without tyranny, and partially because the 
actions of members of government must be fueled by ambitious self-interest in order to 
make the government work well.  And, if reason is to prevail, then the people must 
understand that the members of government pursue their self-interest and then force 
government officials to make their self-interest the same as the people’s in order to be 
reelected. 
Madison speaks directly to this issue in the early 1790s, when he writes, “‘The 
people…ought to be enlightened, to be awakened, to be united, that after establishing a 
government they should watch over it, as well as obey it.’”49  It is difficult to reconcile 
people that vigilant with the people who were to venerate the Constitution so deeply in 
the Federalist, unless we see that the Madisonian public cautiously—not blindly— 
venerates the Constitution.  Their veneration is not blind because they watch over the 
government and take care to make the public officials’ self-interest the same as their own 
self-interest.  But it is indeed veneration, because we have seen how deeply Madison 
desired for the constitutional order to be preserved.   
However, the above analysis also reveals that the Madisonian people never quite 
make it to critical veneration.  Critical veneration is only possible by looking at the 
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Constitution more critically than even 1790s Madisonian veneration can produce.  Most 
of all, it seems that Madisonian veneration contains some amount of group-think, as 
individual members of the political unit rely on each others’ opinions in order to form 
their cautious veneration.  By contrast, in practicing critical veneration, one must be 
prepared to be one alone in an opinion until one has convinced others of its rightness.   
Nonetheless, it is essential to note that the Madisonian public has robust 
discussions and debates over the constitutional order.  Then democratic legitimacy comes 
from being a part of what Bradley Kent Carter and Joseph F. Kobylka call “a dialogic 
community.”  This community exists “by building political and educational institutions, 
both formal and informal, that promoted a virtuous and politically conscious community 
of citizens and checked its excesses if it became temporarily corrupt [creating…] an 
active dialogic enterprise of self-governing citizens united by common allegiance to 
shared political truths.”50  This is useful to keep in mind as we turn to Jefferson, for 
despite being too anxious to create a new constitutional order, he does have more 
confidence in the people generally, and adds critical component of thinking in my 
scholarly combination of criticism and veneration. 
 
JEFFERSONIAN REBELLIONS  
In a letter to Madison, Jefferson condones turbulence as necessary to man’s 
flourishing.  He notes that he “would rather have a disturbed liberty than a quiet slavery” 
and that this turbulence actually has a good effect on government by keeping government 
close to the people who live under it.  The government remains close because the people 
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are naturally suspicious, and they pay “a general attention to public affairs.” 51As he 
states, “I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in 
the political world as storms in the physical.  Unsuccessful rebellions indeed generally 
establish the incroachments on the rights of the people which have produced them.”52  He 
follows this by suggesting that governors of people be admonished not to punish the 
rebellious people too harshly, as rebellions are “medecine [sic] necessary for the sound 
health of government.”53 
What should we make of these sorts of rebellious statements?  First, Jefferson 
sees rebellion as healthy and productive government.  Even rebellions for rebellion’s sake 
encourage the people to engage with government in a way that they would not without 
rebellions.  Most importantly, for the most part, rebellions are rights protecting.  The idea 
that rights would result from rebellions that happen rather often is, counterintuitive as it 
might seem, conducive to broad aspirations for a people.  If people see that their 
governments are responsive to their rebellions, they can aspire to new rights and possibly 
even new forms of government.  When new rights come with new rebellions, the people 
are able to advance their aspirational causes. 
In a letter to Edward Carrington, Jefferson argues that “‘the people are the only 
censors of their governors…and even their errors will tend to keep these to the true 
principles of their institution.  To punish these errors too severely would be to suppress 
the only safeguard of the public liberty.’”54  This is a rather odd statement when we 
consider that the English did establish certain rights for themselves, as did the French 
when Jefferson was living in Paris.  So how can the people be the only safeguard of 
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public liberty?  It would follow from Jefferson’s earlier points if he means that the 
people’s rebellions are the safeguard of liberty, and their rights the result of that liberty.  
Additionally, we should note that Jefferson writes of the “true principles of their 
institution,” indicating, I would argue, that the government has aspirational purposes.   
Furthermore, as Peter Onuf states, “The citizen’s participation in affairs of state was not 
an end itself for Jefferson but a means of curbing state power”55—the majority acting is 
not an end in itself.  However, he was for political freedom, and argues, “a bill of rights is 
what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, 
and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference.”56  Without a bill of 
rights, which was exactly the situation that Jefferson worried about with the new 
Constitution, we can assume that he would find rebellions even more necessary to the 
cause of freedom.   
Jefferson noted to Abigail Adams “‘The spirit of resistance to government is so 
valuable on certain occasions, that I wish it to be always kept alive.  It will often be 
exercised when wrong, but better so than not to be exercised at all.  I like a little rebellion 
now and then.  It is like a storm in the atmosphere.’”57  Thus resisting the government 
becomes not just a means to an end of rights, but also an exercise in learning how to think 
for their selves as a people.  The fact that the people might be wrong in exercising their 
liberty should serve to them as a caution, but it should not extinguish the existence of 
rebellion.  This will become especially important in the conclusion of this chapter, for 
this is the doubtful and rebellious part of critical veneration. 
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The most famous Jeffersonian quotation to this end he made to W.S. Smith, 
wherein he states  
What country ever existed a century & a half without a rebellion? & what country 
can preserve it’s [sic] liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that 
their people preserve the spirit of resistance.  Let them take arms.  The remedy is 
to set them right as to facts, pardon & pacify them.  What signify a few lives lost 
in a century or two?  The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with 
the blood of patriots & tyrants.  It is it’s [sic] natural manure.58 
In attempting to justify these statements by Jefferson, his biographer Dumas Malone 
argues that his statement on the tree of liberty “is true enough…but what he was really 
emphasizing was the greater social peace of republican America than despotic 
Europe…[and] his philosophical justification of political revolution in the Declaration of 
Independence was far more sweeping than anything he was saying here.”59  This 
explanation would seem more justly made were it not that Jefferson seems to be saying in 
the passage preceding what is quoted that America has not had enough rebellions and 
needs to have more than one every century and a half.  This seems especially true given 
Jefferson’s statement within this quotation that “The remedy is to set them right as to 
facts, pardon & pacify them.”60  Such statements justify my argument that Jefferson 
means for rebellions to be teaching tools, certainly not of veneration as Madison would 
have argued, but of rebellion against unfit established orders.   
 
MADISON AND JEFFERSON: VENERATION AND REBELLION  
In Jefferson’s famous letter to Madison of September 6, 1789, he rhetorically 
asks, “Whether one generation of men has a right to bind another,”61 declaring as his 
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conclusion on the matter ‘that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living.’62  His first 
foray into examining this principle occurs when he treats the ownership of land.  Like 
Locke before him, he argues that all property rights are based on societal contracts and 
that natural right does not give one man land over another.  He is also concerned for the 
rights of those who might go after him—namely his concern is that property rights 
established by one generation might be inherited to the next and that property rights thus 
would be forever unfair.  Locke’s famous dictum that man can take as much and as good 
as he can use for himself in the state of nature is taken further by Jefferson, as he is 
concerned not only with the proverbial stockpile of apples that one man might waste that 
others in his own generation could have consumed, but also for the wasting of resources 
that could be left to the next generation who could make good use of them.   
Jefferson continued on this theme of generational change when applying the 
theories of a genealogical scientist of his day, Buffon.  According to Buffon’s 
calculations, Jefferson estimated the amount of time that men would need to form a 
generation and die off, and from there makes his assessment that “19. years is the term 
beyond which neither the representatives of a nation, nor even the whole nation itself 
assembled, can validly extend a debt.”63  Applying his majoritarian theories to the 
national debt, Jefferson argues that men cannot put future generations into debt without 
their consent, and as no consent can be gotten from people who are not yet born, no 
extension of debt in money can be countenanced.  Society does not exist as a continuous 
organism for Jefferson, but rather as a discrete collection of persons still living who share 
particular views.  He does not allow for majorities to make decisions for future majorities 
they might expect to follow them, and does not intend for the current majorities to be 
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bound by any decision that might have been made in the past.  This independence he 
thinks to be a part of “the law of nature, that succeeding generations are not responsible 
for the preceding.”64 
Jefferson argued that the following constitutional conclusion followed from his 
arguments on the use of land and the national debt.  He declares, “no society can make a 
perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law…Every constitution then, and every law, 
naturally expires at the end of 19 years.  If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force, and 
not of right.”65  This means that constitutional conventions, like the one that had been 
held in Philadelphia only two years before in his home country, could not create the 
stabilizing force that Madison had hoped.  Without the continuity in government Madison 
so highly prized, stability, and thus veneration, becomes impossible 
Jefferson worries in a letter66 to Madison that having a power of repeal of 
constitutions is not enough.  He far prefers the 19-year constitutional change prompted by 
Buffon’s theories, where there could very well be a complete overhaul of the 
constitutional order every 19 years.  Thus, instead of the people expecting their 
Constitution to last forever, they would expect that in their lifetimes they could become 
constitutional drafters.  It would take the option being pre-built into the system, in 
Jefferson’s opinion, for future generations to continually redo their predecessors’ work. 
For a repeal to work the way its proponents would want it to, the people would have to be 
able to assemble themselves, to rid themselves of factions, and to rise above their 
personal interests to view the permanent interests of the community more broadly.  This 
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is far more optimistic about the people’s capacities than Madison was in the first section, 
particularly on the subject of faction. 
When James Madison replies to Jefferson’s letter in February of 1790, he deems 
Jefferson’s theories interesting but an altogether unworkable scheme of governance.  
Madison was a great fan of the security of governance produced by veneration, and here 
he makes that point against Jefferson’s ideas.  He also notes that the dead make 
improvements upon the land and the safety of the future inhabitants, so why should those 
future generations not be bound by those improvements in some way?  The best example 
is that of war: if a nation goes into debt because of a war of self-defense, it is securing its 
lands for the future.  However, if the nation is not allowed to secure those lands, for fear 
of raising a debt, there may not be a future country for the descendents of the potential 
patriotic warriors to inhabit.  For that reason going into debt might be a “mutual good.”  
As Madison states, “There seems to be a foundation in the nature of things, in the relation 
which one generation bears to another, for the descent of obligation from one to 
another.”67 
Madison finally questions whether this theory that undermines tacit consent might 
undermine the entire foundation of civil society.  He declares that the “principle” on 
which “the voice of the majority bind[s] the minority” is based not on “the law of nature, 
but from compact founded on conveniency.”68  He notes that unanimity was required to 
begin any social compact, and that majoritarianism was a result of that compact, not of 
some right of nature that the majority has to bind the minority.  Therefore, Jefferson’s 
own principles of relying on the laws of nature would require unanimous consent every 
19 years to form a new constitution, not majoritarian consent.  This problem of principle 
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was, of course, also a problem for the Philadelphia Convention in moving from the 
unanimous consent rule to the 9/13 states consent rule for ratification, thus making 




Theoretical difficulties of the sort just mentioned aside, this chapter has aimed to 
show how Madison and Jefferson understood the problem of constitutional change, 
particularly as regards veneration and rebellion.  Madison hoped for a cautious veneration 
that allows Americans to be a part of active constitutional orders but not frequently 
changing those orders.  Jefferson was more radical, hoping instead for frequent 
constitutional change, though not necessarily complete changes.  He saw the people’s 
constant interactions with the government in rebellions or in constitution drafting to be 
tools to keep the government as close to the people as possible.  Madison was not 
categorically opposed to the people being involved in government, to be sure, but he is 
not as sure of the goodness of majority rule, as we can see from his discussion of faction 
in Federalist 10.  For Madison, passions are necessary to life and politics.  But they also 
can become nefarious if not checked by the best representatives a society can find—even 
if those representatives are not enlightened statesmen.  Jefferson had more faith in the 
people and believed that they would not necessarily form factions.   
Yet neither the historical Madison nor the historical Jefferson alone holds the key 
to being able to adapt constitutions to span the test of time.  Madison is too cautious; 
Jefferson too rash.  A combination of this caution and rashness would form what I term 
critical veneration if applied to constitutionalism, and would be an improvement on both.  
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Madisonian cautious veneration is important for the constitutional order because it 
provides the stability necessary for people to form reasonable opinions of their 
government, both in its positive and negative aspects.  Cautious constitutional veneration 
allows for careful constitutional change, but aims to leave its aspirational content to 
future generations to hold.  On the contrary, Jeffersonian rebelliousness causes people not 
just to discuss government amongst themselves, but also to actually interact with the 
government through rebellions that for the most part will not be very dangerous (though 
we must always think of the possibility of violence breaking out).  Jeffersonian rebellion 
can provide none of the necessary veneration, but it can provide the habit of mind to go 
beyond a particular constitutional order to think about what kind of constitution suits 
Americans best.  
In a world where Madison critically venerated the Constitution, for example, he 
would make more of the dialogic community among the citizenry so that they could 
better influence the ambitious office-holders.  As Madison is not a believer in enlightened 
statesmen being at the helm of government—or at least not as a surety—he needs a 
counterbalance to individual politicians.  Now, the checks and balances system, as well as 
ambition being joined to the interest of the place, are both good mechanisms.  But both 
would be more effective if joined by a third consideration: the ability of the people to 
spot constitutionally problematic laws, or, more reasonably, their ability to elect those 
who will care about constitutionality and then monitor them.  A dialogic community 
among citizens would allow them to do this in a more informed and effective way and 
thus allow them to participate in critical constitutional veneration. 
Jefferson here is very different inasmuch as he does not venerate the Constitution.  
But might he venerate the Declaration of Independence (leaving aside his role in its 
creation)?  He certainly values the principles that came out of the Declaration; perhaps 
 57 
that is where his veneration lies.  This was a question raised in the Introduction that now 
seems necessary to bring back, because it raises a more fundamental question: Are people 
able to venerate aspirations or must they only venerate the institutions that, one hopes, 
elicit from those principles?  It is not enough, according to the argument being made here 
for critical veneration, to venerate principles.  The veneration of principles is necessary 
but not sufficient.  Principles are necessary to influence the procedural parts of 
government, but they cannot replace them; only through an institution with its concrete 
modes of operation can principles be put into action.  To venerate a principle is also very 
complicated.  Different people embrace different principles in varying ways, and as time 
changes principles may change as well—something which is unlikely to happen with the 
procedural pieces of the Constitution.  If principles cannot be uniformly venerated, then 
they do not carry with them the stability that Madisonian veneration can provide, because 
they produce such different opinions in different people.   
Thus I argue that Jeffersonian veneration of rights or aspirations is not enough; a 
nation needs Madisonian-like veneration in order to actually function in a constitutional 
order.  Madisonian cautious veneration is incredibly important for stability and opinion as 
we noted before, but it is does not include the kind of revision of constitutional orders 
that grows out of the people’s desire to make the Constitution better.  In other words, it is 
only cautious veneration, and we are aiming for critical veneration.  Jefferson’s emphasis 
on rebellions for the rights they produce is essential to an order of critical veneration.  
Rights, after all, are the tools that critical venerators use to push the procedural pieces of 
the Constitution closer to constitutional goodness.  Rights, which are often linked to 
aspirations, are necessary for constitutional redemption, as I noted in the Introduction, 
and as I will discuss in more detail in the Balkin section of Chapter 2.   
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Thus the principles, or rights, behind the constitutional order, including those 
included in the Declaration of Independence, should be seen as an important part of 
veneration but not the whole of it.  The Constitution, which contains the seed of 
veneration, should be seen as a growing organism that needs self-conscious critique to 
survive and thrive.  Although it would be problematic for the United States to undergo 
periodic constitutional revisions every 19 years, we as Americans should be reexamining 
how we apply our principles to our constitutional institutions far more often than that.  As 
critical venerators of a constitutional document we should be using the carefully 
considered opinion that we and our fellow citizens hold in order to constantly make our 




Chapter 2: The Case for Veneration Within a System of Aspirational 
Conflict 
To combine veneration and rebellion seems impossible at first: how can anyone 
have deep respect and admiration for the constitutional order while wanting to change it 
in fundamental ways?  This can only occur if people are willing to question the premises 
of their constitutional order without rejecting it outright.  It is necessary to be able to take 
a step back from our Constitution and be able to imagine it as a better form of itself.  At 
the same time, people must be able to see the good in the constitutional order.  This 
approach can be explained in Jack Balkin’s terms as practicing the mindset of 
constitutional redemption.  To redeem a constitutional order means at once to believe in 
its merits and be attached to it (veneration) while realizing that the project must be 
carried far further (rebellion) in order to realize the best version of itself.  This sort of 
rebellion is best defined as Jeffersonian rebellion because it focuses on the distance 
between our aspirations and what our Constitution actually says and does for us.  
But how can anyone learn to venerate and rebel at once?  Here, we can learn from 
Balkin’s examples of William Lloyd Garrison and Frederick Douglass.  Garrison revolted 
against the Constitution because he declared that the Constitution’s pact with slavery 
made it ‘a covenant with death and an agreement with hell.’69  This seems like a 
reasonable position for someone simply opposed to the Constitution.  However, what if a 
person’s position is less clear—if perhaps it has the aspects of veneration and rebellion 
within it?  Frederick Douglass at one time styled himself a Garrisonian, but upon further 
analysis of the situation of slavery and constitutional law, he decided that despite being a 
free black man discriminated against by Supreme Court decisions like Dred Scott, 
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“abolitionists should not treat the Constitution as incorrigible.  Instead, he argued that the 
Constitution, rightly understood was not proslavery.”70  Now, of course Douglass took a 
leap of faith in order to hold this “optimistic” view.  And, as Balkin notes here, this leap 
was not necessarily justified in Douglass’s time or even ours: we are still making our way 
towards racial equality, among other kinds of equality.71  But the main point is that 
Douglass was able to see the flaws in our Constitution and continue to venerate it enough 
to think it not incorrigible—that is, to imagine that it could be changed to right the 
wrongs of slavery. 
Thus, Douglass is able to be a key figure for understanding veneration and 
rebellion as they mix together.  To be sure, Douglass did not find the American system 
unflawed.  To be sure, he wanted massive changes both in the constitutional structure and 
in the related structure of the society.  But at the same time he advocated change, he 
continued to think within the framework of the Constitution.  This is the way that 
veneration and rebellion can be combined.   
Balkin labels this combination of seemingly disparate concepts residing together 
in one person or constitution as “nested opposition.”72  He defines nested opposition as a 
situation in “each” of the disparate concepts “incorporates the other and depends on the 
other”73 despite being seeming opposites.  It is under that paradigm of nested opposition 
between stasis, or veneration, and dynamism, or rebellion, that we shall examine 
Douglass’s stance as well as Balkin’s work. 
The previous chapter’s study of Madison and Jefferson leaves us with three types 
of veneration: blind veneration, which Madison despises, cautious veneration, which 
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Madison espouses (though “cautious” is my explanatory term for how Madison describes 
veneration), and critical veneration, which is a middle ground between Madisonian 
veneration and Jeffersonian rebellion.  Critical veneration is inspired by our aspirations as 
a polity to force ourselves to grow into the promises we have made to ourselves—or 
aspirations we make for ourselves—in the Preamble and the Declaration of 
Independence.   
However, there is a difficulty with aspirationalism, or goal-oriented 
constitutionalism: it often leads to violence of various sorts.  My two main interlocutors 
within this chapter, Jack Balkin and Mark Graber, represent two ways to deal with this 
problem.  Balkin is an aspirationalist, albeit one who does not really deal with the 
problem of violence.  Thus the type of aspirationalism that Balkin proposes is not fully an 
option, because constitutional violence, like the Civil War, is included in the aspirational 
model.  Graber, on the other hand, spends so much time thinking about the dangers of 
violence that he opts for a non-aspirational approach to constitutional interpretation, 
preferring the safer status quo to the difficult redemptive project Balkin sets forth.  In this 
chapter I will take Graber very seriously, but ultimately decide against his pessimistic 
approach for a more optimistic one, albeit an approach that is prepared for violence that 
grows out of conflicting aspirations.   
In contrast to Mark Graber’s criticism of aspirational approaches, my theory of 
aspirational conflict does not despair at the fact that there are many different sorts of 
aspirations in one polity: Fear of conflict should not prevent us from engaging with them 
in order to make ourselves better citizens, both of America and of the world community, 
and to make our Constitution a better one.  Graber’s response to this would be that this 
aspirational conflict process cannot lead to anything except incredibly damaging political 
effects—war, and especially civil war, among them.  I agree with Graber that a principle-
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based approach, or an aspirational approach, may lead to war and I agree, as would most 
sane people, that war is an evil we should avoid if possible.  What I argue, however, is 
that it is necessary for a society to defend its key goals and principles, even when those 
principles conflict, and that war may be necessary when such conflicts occur.  Or, in the 
case of recent wars for humanitarian intervention, it may be necessary for Americans to 
defend key goals and values around the world.   
In order to reach this point in my argument, I will rely on first on my key example 
of an aspirationalist: Frederick Douglass.  Then I will further flesh out my version of 
aspirational conflict theory, composed of constitutional veneration, aspirationalism, and 
redemption.  This theory is in part inspired by the work of Balkin, especially in my use of 
his term redemption.  I will argue much more strongly than Balkin that making the 
progression from veneration to aspiration to redemption will not only be conflictual, but 
also progressive.74  My discussion of Balkin will make it clear that this aspirational 
conflict theory that encompasses the three terms and their progressive orientation is a 
serious alternative to Mark Graber’s non-conflictual constitutional theory.  I will also 
show aspirational conflict theory to be a necessary expansion of Jack Balkin’s 
redemption theory, particularly when we consider the seemingly necessary result of some 
conflicts, like civil war.   
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A CASE STUDY OF AMERICAN REDEMPTIVE NARRATIVES: FREDERICK DOUGLASS  
Frederick Douglass’ earliest awakening to the fact that it was a “delusion that God 
requires [slaves] to submit to slavery, and to wear their chains with meekness and 
humility”75 came when he was thirteen and reading The Columbian Orator for the first 
time.  This was his first real attempt to read a book using the literacy he had obtained in 
bits and pieces first from his master’s wife, and then from schoolchildren in his area of 
Baltimore.  As he became literate and consciously no longer happy with his station as a 
slave Douglass himself thus came to agree with the master who had forbidden his wife to 
continue instructing Douglass in his letters: once he was educated, he would become no 
longer a pliant slave, unthinkingly accepting his servitude without question—even, as 
Douglass describes himself before his awakening, as a “light-hearted, gleesome boy” 
under slavery.76  He sometimes regretted leaving the “stupid contentment” of his fellow 
slaves, because he became “too thoughtful to be happy…Once awakened by the sliver 
trump of knowledge, my spirit was roused to eternal wakefulness.  Liberty! the 
inestimable birthright of every man, had, for me, converted every object into an asserter 
of this great right.”77 
Some while after he escaped slavery, Douglass met William Lloyd Garrison, an 
abolitionist in the North.  He calls himself, “on the anti-slavery question, a faithful 
disciple of William Lloyd Garrison, and fully committed to his doctrine touching the pro-
slavery character of the constitution of the United States, and the non-voting 
principle…With Mr. Garrison, I held it to be the first duty of the non-slaveholding states 
to dissolve the union with the slaveholding states…”78 As a Garrisonian, Douglass 
                                                
75 Douglass, Frederick. Autobiographies. New York: Library of America, 1994, 226. 
76 Douglass, Autobiography, 227. 
77 Douglass, Autobiography, 227. 
78 Douglass, Autobiography, 391. 
 64 
believed that the Constitution must be seen as a proslavery document, and that no amount 
of political action could change that brute fact.  However, his “gradual conversion to the 
idea that the Constitution could be a radical antislavery instrument serves as an 
interesting barometer of his espousal of political abolitionism.”  He moved from the 
Garrisonian position of seeing “the Constitution as a proslavery compact with evil.  In a 
letter to Salmon Chase, Douglass declared himself ‘satisfied that if strictly construed 
according to its reading’ the Constitution was ‘not a pro-slavery instrument,’ although the 
‘original intent’ of the founders and the meaning given it by the Supreme Court had made 
it so.”79 
Although he does not elaborate very much of the thinking behind his conversion 
in his autobiography “My Bondage and My Freedom,” Douglass shows the reasons for 
his change of mind: he no longer thought that the North and South must be separated, no 
longer insisted upon the non-voting principle as a symbol of oppression and complicity 
with an evil regime, and came to believe “that the constitution of the United States not 
only contained no guarantees in favor of slavery, but, on the contrary, it is, in its letter 
and spirit, an anti-slavery instrument, demanding the abolition of slavery as a condition 
of its own existence, as the supreme law of the land.”80  Furthermore, Douglass made a 
study of the Constitution, particularly the Preamble, and concluded, “if the declared 
purposes of an instrument are to govern the meaning of all its parts and details, as they 
clearly should, the constitution of our country is our warrant for the abolition of slavery 
in every state in the American Union.”81   
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Douglass continued to evolve along this line of thought throughout the late 1840s.  
According to Philip S. Foner, “it required two years of study and discussion for Douglass 
to change his attitude toward the Constitution.”82 Eventually, by 1851, he  
declared that he too believed that the framers saw slavery as ‘an expiring 
institution’ and sought ‘to make the Constitution a permanent liberty document.  
His reasoning came from an admixture of selective historical perception and 
moral outlook.  Douglass always garnered hope from America’s founding creeds, 
and in his view the Constitution—its republicanism and protection of individual 
rights—provided a legal foundation for the earlier promise in the Declaration of 
Independence.  Without this promise and foundation, Douglass’ vision of a future 
for blacks in America would have crumbled.83 
In “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro” address of 1852, he not only states that 
the Constitution must not be a slave-holding document because it does not mention slaves 
or slave-holding, but he also encourages his listeners to think carefully about the 
Constitution.  Douglass speaks of the men of the founding in glowing terms:  
They were peace men; but they preferred revolution to peaceful submission to 
bondage.  They were quiet men; but they did not shrink from agitating against 
oppression.  They showed forbearance; but that they knew its limits.  They 
believed in order; but not in the order of tyranny.  With them, nothing was 
‘settled’ that was not right.  With them, justice, liberty, and humanity were ‘final’; 
not slavery and oppression.  You may well cherish the memory of such men.  
They were great in their day and their generation.  Their solid manhood stands out 
the more as we contrast it with these degenerate times.84 
In order to correct these “degenerate times,” therefore, he declares: “I hold that every 
American citizen has a right to form an opinion of the constitution, and to propagate that 
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opinion, and to use all honorable means to make his opinion the prevailing one.”85  
Furthermore, he cites “Ex-Vice-President Dallas” as saying that “the Constitution, in its 
words, is plain and intelligible, and is meant for the home-bred, unsophisticated 
understandings of our fellow citizens” and Senator Berrien who “tells us that the 
Constitution is the fundamental law, that which controls all others.  The charter of our 
liberties, which every citizen has a personal interest in understanding thoroughly.”86 
Douglass shows himself to be an aspirational figure in his speeches, letters, and 
especially autobiographies: “Douglass wrote about his life, at least in part, as a public 
man, wishing to use his own example to the fullest possible good for his people.  
Inherently, his autobiographies were political acts.”87   These political ends make his 
work archetypal in the later work of Richard Wright, James Baldwin, and Malcolm X.  It 
is important to note Robert F. Sayre’s argument here, that Douglass’ example and success 
as an autobiographer “shows why autobiography has been the major kind of literature for 
blacks and most other oppressed Americans.  The person who can write one’s own story 
can rise from the status of the unknown and inarticulate.  He and she can thus relate story 
to others and to the stories of others.”88  As a former slave, Douglass’ story is particularly 
inspirational, for his reading, not to mention his writing, was pursued against the 
regulations of the time.  The ability to read and write, and especially to give names to the 
objects, persons, and ideas that surround us is particularly important.  As Thomas 
Jefferson stated:  
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‘Certainly so great growing a population…spread over such an extent of country, 
with such a variety of arts, must enlarge their language to make it answer its 
purpose of expressing all ideas, the new as well as the old.’  
Furthermore, 
A transformation of status, such as the one all Americans experienced through the 
Revolution, required new names; as Jefferson saw it, ‘The new circumstances in 
which we are placed call for new words, new phrases, and for the transfer of old 
words to new objects.’89  
This transformation would be just as important in the transition after the Civil War in this 
Jeffersonian logic, for a large class of African Americans were transformed in status from 
slaves to freed people after the war.   
The context of Douglass’s writing as a critical venerator of the Constitution also 
must have been inspirational and persuasive to the black population of his time.  His 
ability to write then was not just powerful as an example of a self-made black man in a 
nation that at once praised self-made men and ignored or punished the black population 
for attempting to live by that standard themselves.  Douglass understood the historical 
significance of his own writing, and his existence through his writing.  He knew that at 
once he was writing for the America he dreamed of and against the America that 
discriminated against him.   
To make an address like “Fourth of July and the Negro” is meant by Douglass not 
only to show the problem with excluding the black man from the celebratory thoughts 
that go through the heads of white Americans who have the freedom to enjoy America, 
but also to show one example of what it means to rebel in thought through a re-creation 
of what memory of the past might mean to African Americans in the future.  In this 
speech, he celebrates the youth of America as a country, for perhaps it is still “in the 
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impressible stage of her existence.”90  But he emphasizes that despite the respect he has 
for the founders and the youth of the country, that “we have to do with the past only as 
we can make it useful to the present and to the future”91—a past, present, and future that 
he calls “false” because of the distance from the ideals of America concerning slavery.92    
In this way, Douglass’s aspirations for his country showed him how far America was in 
practice from living up to its own ideals. 
However, he is also able to use American ideals to have his spirit “cheered by the 
obvious tendencies of the age,” which he sees as moving inexorably toward progress, as 
“there are forces in operation which must inevitably work the downfall of slavery.”93  It is 
in moments like this that Douglass’ aspirationalism shines through most clearly.  When 
he writes of the future, he imagines resolution of the current disputes through an almost 
Hegelian movement of progress.  David Blight describes Douglass’ historical aspiration 
as follows:  
He deeply understood that peoples and nations are shaped and defined by history, 
which he knew was a primary source of identity, meaning, and motivation.  He 
seemed acutely aware that history was both burden and inspiration, something to 
be both cherished and overcome.  Douglass also understood that winning battles 
over policy or justice in the present often required an effective use of the past.  He 
came to a realization that in the late nineteenth-century America blacks especially 
needed a usable past.  ‘It is not well to forget the past,’ Douglass warned in an 
1884 speech.  ‘Memory was given to man for some wise purpose.  The past 
is…the mirror in which we may discern the dim outlines of the future and by 
which we may make them more symmetrical.’”94   
Although the past may not contain good memories, memory is essential to a people to 
understand themselves in the present, against past history and the future.  Having what 
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Douglass called “a useable past”95 allows, in his mind, for the possibility of redeeming 
the future.  A useable past is also quite powerful in determining how aspirations should 
be developed and implemented. 
However, Douglass did not stop at making speeches in his efforts to bring about 
change in the American system: he embraced violence against the old order. “As 
Douglass moved away from the Garrisonians in their support for non-violence, he was 
also moving away from their essential tenet—a revolutionary rejection of the American 
Constitution.”96  However, Douglass made what we might think of now as an unusual 
shift: “That is, Douglass moved from the position of a revolutionary who opposed 
violence to that of a reformer who favored violence.”97  What does it mean that he 
“favored violence?”  By 1854 he was encouraging slave revolts and declaring that slaves 
were in the “state of nature” with their masters, and therefore slaves were required to 
defend themselves against their masters.98  After the Civil War he stopped advising 
insurrections, as the state of war was over—at that point he advised that “they should turn 
to what was now their government and demand that its armed force be put to work in 
defense of their lives, limbs, liberties, and properties.”99  In doing so, it seems unlikely 
that Douglass was truly optimistic that peaceful means would work for blacks, that would 
allow them to demand government protection of their “lives, limbs, liberties, and 
properties.”  What we should note are his reflections on how persuasive the spoken and 
written word had been in ending slavery: “He recalled that the years of moral suasion had 
reached only the elite of society, but not the masses.  The latter, he said, are guided not by 
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‘the voice of reason, but [by] the force of events.  ‘The American public…discovered and 
accepted more truth in our four years of war than they learned in forty years of 
peace.’”100  
In the end, however, we should balance this statement against Leslie Goldstein’s 
analysis of Douglass, that “He personally was a man of speech and pen, and he 
recognized the unquestionable significance in a republic of that target at which his 
weapons were aimed—public opinion.”  However, despite the fact that “He chose for his 
own contributions the weapons of moral persuasion, moral example, and political 
action…he welcomed to his army moral allies who could use those weapons of force 
which are a necessary part of political life.”101  In short, Douglass’s aspirationalism led 
him to choose violent revolution when it was needed, but peaceful—yet persistent—
agitation when it was not.  Douglass strongly believed that the American system needed 
to be redeemed, and so to better understand what that redemption would look like, we 
move to Jack Balkin’s work, some of which treats Douglass. 
 
JACK BALKIN: CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE 
When Balkin speaks of Americans as being on a trajectory of constitutional 
redemption, he means redemption in a particular way.  It is “not simply reform, but 
change that fulfills a promise of the past.  Redemption does not mean discarding the 
existing Constitution and substituting a new one, but returning the Constitution we have 
to its correct path, pushing it closer to what we take to be its true nature, and discarding 
the dross of past moral compromise.”102  Balkin is an aspirationalist, which means that 
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this definition has certain content that is not immediately obvious.  Returning the 
Constitution to its correct path means that we must put the Constitution on a trajectory 
towards whatever aspirations were promised in the Constitution.  Though different people 
will interpret the goals of the Constitution in different ways, it is important to remember 
from the discussion of Madisonian cautious veneration that no people exist in a bubble of 
their own opinions.  Constitutional interpretation, which is required to figure out what 
actually needs to be redeemed within a constitutional order, is a joint enterprise under 
critical veneration, because we all must live together under similar aspirations or face the 
terrible consequences inherent in conflict or even war.   
But why does this require religious language, in words like “redemption?”  First, 
religious beliefs and constitutional beliefs both have key texts for interpretation, so there 
are parallels there.  His main point, however, in consciously using religious language, is 
that “We must have a way to talk about the commitments of a people in a creedal 
tradition spanning many years, involving the work of many generations, constantly 
subject to change and circumstances that are sometimes recognized and sometimes not, 
and organized around the maintenance and interpretation of an ancient creedal text.”103  
This is primarily a religious way of seeing the world, and so Balkin adopts that language, 
without adopting the religious messages that certain words convey immediately to 
religious people.  There is another religious parallel in what he says about the 
Constitution being revealed: “One might say that the meaning of the Constitution is 
revealed to us as we take upon ourselves the burden of redemption.  But it is more correct 
to say that we reveal it to ourselves through our actions.  Its meaning is not foreordained, 
meeting new and unexpected circumstances as they arise.”104  
                                                
103 Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, 7. 
104 Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, 29. 
 72 
Taking the project, or “burden,” of redemption upon ourselves links back to what 
was said about the constitutional interpretation and debate that must go on in order to 
understand our aspirations—both in Madisonian cautious veneration and in critical 
veneration.  We act together to redeem a Constitution whose purposes are not always 
entirely clear to us.  Change and progress “reveal” themselves differently over time.  For 
example, Douglass would never have guessed that less than 200 years after the Civil War, 
we would have a black President.  However, he probably also did not anticipate the 
despair of the Jim Crow era.  Thus, he would have needed to—just like we need to—
move to redeem the parts of the Constitution that appear most problematic to us, and not 
get too focused on past problems that have been fixed or future problems that are too far 
away yet for us to fix.  We must be realistic critical venerators and work with the material 
of our Constitution and our aspirations for it. 
This politics of redemption starts from a similar place as critical veneration 
because both see the problems in the present constitutional order and aim to fix them with 
an eye to our initial aspirations from when we came together as a people.  Redeeming the 
Constitution then requires what Balkin calls constitutional faith, which he defines as 
“simultaneously faith in a text, an institution, and a people.”105  This faith consists of 
believing that the people can restore and improve upon the Constitution to redeem its 
promise.  Faith is important at a foundational level for Balkin, for it is only by 
constitutional faith that we can support political systems that are flawed, believe that 
changes can be made in deeply problematic regimes, understand deviations from 
democracy in these regimes, and, most importantly, argue that progress is possible.106 
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Balkin disavows what he calls the Great Progressive Narrative, which he defines 
as the story that “America began with a break from tyranny, established a free 
government under a wise Constitution, and ever since then has been getting better and 
better, more just and more free…the story of America is a story of progress: more rights 
for more people, more inclusion, more liberty, more justice for all.”107  However, 
particularly because he uses words like revelation to discuss working out the 
Constitution’s bad parts into better parts, it is hard to distinguish his redemptive vision 
from what he entitles the Great Progressive Narrative.  To be sure, he adds a caveat to his 
redemption theory—that “The story is contingent in another way as well.  A narrative 
justification does not claim that the eventual redemption is assured.  It claims only that 
we should strive to achieve it.”108  In other words, we may not be successful in redeeming 
the Constitution.  But at the same time, the entire book ends up being devoted to the 
progress we have made, halting progress perhaps, but clearly the kind of progress the 
Great Progressive Narrative has in mind, more so than Balkin himself seems to have 
intended.   
This is important to my argument because here I distance my redemptive 
argument from Balkin’s.  It is probably partially because he does not understand the role 
that violence might play that his account of redemption seems like such a smooth road.  
But here I want to emphasize how rocky that road necessarily must be.  As I note in 
Chapter 1, Michael Kammen states: “Progress in history is rarely easy, however, and 
veneration has often become most intense as part of the process whereby controversies 
are resolved and issues resolved.”109  This makes for difficult circumstances to redeem 
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any Constitution.  Thus, when I discuss redemption in my own words, I mean for this 
extra difficulty to be attached to it.  Balkin’s term “redemption” is incredibly useful, but 
his analysis is, in places, unhelpfully sunny. 
Balkin then shows readers how constitutional faith links to fidelity in the 
constitutional system, which we are interested in because it is an argument about how to 
interpret the Constitution using constitutional redemption.  Although as the chapter 
progresses he uses the terms interchangeably, which makes interpretation more difficult, 
at the beginning it seems that faith is linked more to legitimacy and fidelity to doing 
interpretive justice to the text.  Perhaps, as he previously defined constitutional faith as 
faith in “simultaneously faith in a text, an institution, and a people,” fidelity can be seen 
as a subsection of faith.  This seems like a just interpretation particularly because fidelity 
requires a particular habit of mind to preserve, or, in Balkin’s words, fidelity “is not 
simply a property of an interpretation [but also…] a feature of a self who is socialized in 
a certain way and who disciplines him- or herself to think and argue in a certain way.”110  
So the people who we have faith in are the people we are socialized to have faith in, and 
the same with institutions and text.  We are faithful in a Balkinian sense in almost the 
same way we are naturally venerative in a Madisonian sense.  This makes sense 
especially after Balkin declares that fidelity in constitutional interpretation “can actually 
skew and limit our understandings about justice, because not all claims are equally easy 
to state in the language of that tradition.  We might call this phenomenon the stunting of 
political imagination.”111  If this is the case, then fidelity looks like blind veneration. 
Both fidelity and blind veneration lead to the same sort of understandings of our 
political system.  Balkin’s three concerns about fidelity seem to apply equally well to 
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blind veneration: it makes us “see the Constitution as standing for whatever we believe is 
just, whether it does or not,” it requires that “we conform our beliefs about justice to our 
sense of what the Constitution means, and not the other way around,” and, as already 
noted, “the practice of constitutional interpretation can actually skew and limit our 
understandings about justice.”112 
What effect might complete fidelity to or blind veneration of the Constitution 
have?  It might blind us to the greatest of dangers present in Balkin’s work: ignoring 
constitutional evil and thus failing to redeem the constitutional order.  At the same time, 
Balkin recognizes that some amount of fidelity is inevitably a part of our legal 
consciousness.  In fact, as he states, “even when we criticize the Constitution, we are in 
some sense offering what we believe to be a faithful interpretation of it.”113  Thus we 
must learn to live with this fidelity and correct for it, particularly if we are to take an 
aspirationalist view of the Constitution.  In such a view, we accept the reality of 
constitutional evil as a “basic condition of politics that must perpetually be overcome” 
through our efforts towards constitutional redemption.”114  Without this perpetual 
overcoming, constitutional evil, which “is the possibility that the Constitution, as it 
operates in practice, permits or even requires great injustices,”115 might never be 
redeemed.   
Balkinian constitutional theory makes use of Levinson’s distinctions between 
constitutional Protestantism and Catholicism by combining them. He sees those modes of 
interpretation as intertwined in what he calls a “nested opposition.”116  A nested 
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opposition takes two terms that are seemingly opposites and shows how they are 
inextricably linked.  In the case of this particular nested opposition, the Protestant and 
Catholic ways of interpreting the Constitution are seen together rather than separately.  
This opposition can be seen only when the Constitution is viewed dynamically instead of 
statically.  
The Catholic/Protestant dualism of the making of law leads Balkin to declare that 
“Changes in constitutional doctrine do not occur because judges randomly change their 
minds; they occur because people with particular constitutional views organize to 
promote those views, and, if successful, eventually influence the political culture, elected 
officials, and the sorts of people who are appointed to be judges and justices.”117  That is 
both a mode of constitutional Catholicism and Protestantism at once.  It is Catholic 
because it assumes the primacy of the Supreme Court in making the actual legal decisions 
for the polity; it is Protestant because the battles over the issues take place at all levels of 
government and non-governmental associations.  By contrast, constitutional Protestants, 
viewed as dissenters, are constantly trying to convince others, and ultimately, to convince 
those in power to give them the Catholic power to make the rules for the country from the 
bench. 
In part because of his reliance on specific examples to explain concepts like 
constitutional Catholicism and Protestantism, Balkin becomes a legal historian as well as 
a legal theorist.  This character of his work is best explained in a quotation about 
Frederick Douglass.   Because of their focus on the problem of constitutional evil and 
what might elicit from it, no matter how constitutional law is interpreted, what Blight said 
of Douglass in the previous section is just as valid to apply first to Jack Balkin’s 
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constitutional theory, and then in the next section to Mark Graber’s very different 
constitutional theory:  
[Douglass] seemed acutely aware that history was both burden and inspiration, 
something to be both cherished and overcome.  Douglass also understood that 
winning battles over policy or justice in the present often required an effective use 
of the past.   ‘The past is…the mirror in which we may discern the dim outlines of 
the future and by which we may make them more symmetrical.’118 
The burden in Balkinian—and Graberian—terms is the presence of constitutional evil.  
They differ, however, in how to deal with this problem, as it is not merely an historical 
legacy.  Constitutional evil continues, in forms less serious than slavery, but the 
Constitution has not yet been redeemed.   
Balkin is an optimist who truly believes that redemption is possible and even a 
good course of action; Graber, as we will see, is at the very least a realist, if not a 
pessimist, about not charting a new theoretical course in constitutionalism, but rather 
relying on compromises hammered out long ago that allow us to live together.  The 
section on Graber that follows next will show this divergence by first examining Graber’s 
nemesis of sorts—Lincolnian constitutional theory—and then his proposals for a politics 
of compromise. 
 
MARK GRABER: CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL, CONSTITUTIONAL PEACE 
As Mark Graber writes, liberty is not the only organizing principle of American 
constitutional theory or development, even Lincolnian theory.  From the Preamble we 
learn that we ought to “establish justice.”  Here Graber uses Lincoln to classify 
contemporary scholars and show how complicated principle-based constitutional theory 
can be just on the standard of justice: 
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Lincoln’s constitution commits Americans to work together for justice.  The 
‘more perfect union’ envisioned by the preamble is a good political order.  ‘The 
job of American constitutional theory,’ Eisgruber declares, ‘is to describe how 
Americans should conceive and inhabit their institutions so that they can govern 
themselves on the basis of their best judgments about justice.’  Abraham Lincoln 
believed that Americans were constitutionally committed to the eventual abolition 
of slavery.  Today Lincolnians insist the Constitution commits Americans to 
liberal egalitarianism [Ronald Dworkin], libertarianism [Randy Barnett], 
populism [Mark Tushnet], deliberative democracy [Cass Sunstein], or the rule of 
law [Antonin Scalia].”119  
Although these theorists have different specific interpretations of what it would mean to 
live in a Lincolnian society, they all agree that our Constitution is a force for justice and 
for good.  They would all side with Lincoln against John Bell, “stealth candidate in the 
1860 presidential election,” who supported constitutional peace rather than constitutional 
justice, the latter of which paths was Lincoln’s.120  Constitutional justice in this context 
should be associated with a principle-based approach, where justice according to 
principle is more important than stability of the regime.  After all, the Lincolnian position 
did lead to war.  On the other side, constitutional peace, which we will associate with 
Mark Graber’s constitutional theory, encourages its supporters to preserve stability and 
peace above being as true as possible to principle.  In Lincolnian theory, then, 
“constitutional theory helps limit and eventually eradicate constitutional evil”121 because 
evil is unjust, even if the mechanism of eradicating that evil is war.   
Thus Lincolnian constitutional theory, as described by Graber, is compatible with 
my theory of aspirational conflict, taking constitutional evils and using American 
aspirational principles to rectify them, by war, if necessary.  War is one area that Balkin 
does not really touch upon in his description of constitutional redemption, probably 
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because there is a serious intellectual problem with solving these disputes by war (in 
addition of course to the moral objections to war): war may not always lead to the 
aspirational result that Balkin or I would want.  This problem may be insoluble.    
Mark Graber, however, in his anti-Lincolnian analysis,122 makes it clear that not 
only do constitutions not settle this battle of competing visions of justice adequately, but 
that we would not want them to settle which competing vision of justice ought to win if 
they could.  He notes, “constitutional theory is about how political regimes are 
maintained as well as how they are improved or perfected.”123  This statement is meant to 
emphasize maintenance over perfection, as we all know that perfection is impossible.  He 
insists that having a political regime committed to perfection lessens the chance that 
ordinary citizens will be able to maintain it with any sort of peaceful settlement.  As 
Graber states, “Constitutionalism…mediates the controversies that arise among citizens 
who hold clashing political aspirations.”124  Graber elaborates: “The constitutional task is 
better described as finding settlements that everyone perceives as ‘not bad enough’ to 
justify secession and civil war than as making the Constitution ‘the best that it can be’ 
from some contestable normative perspective.”125  These “contestable normative 
perspective[s]” are the places from which progressive constitutional aspirationalism 
begins.  Graber’s non-aspirationalism is most obvious here, when he dismisses 
contestable normative perspectives.    
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For Graber, constitutional evil appears when “the problem of when and whether 
citizens should accommodate more injustice than constitutionally necessary by providing 
protections for heinous practices [is] not clearly mandated by the constitutional text or 
history.”126  The definition of constitutionally necessary seems to be the way the 
injustices were settled in the beginning in the constitution-making process.   That process 
was meant to provide stability and a large measure of constitutional peace.  But we must 
ask ourselves how much the principles enshrined in the Constitution might matter when 
determining what “heinous practices” must be tolerated for stability and which, at some 
point in the constitutional life of the polity, appear far too heinous according to those 
principles to continue to be followed for the sake of constitutional peace.  Graber’s 
constitutionalism seems far more static than aspirationalist constitutionalist theories, as it 
only uses text and history to determine heinousness of crimes in constitutional law.  
Aspirations, in theories like Balkin's and mine, are what keep the Constitution fluid.  
Without aspirations, it is entirely possible to rely on original principles and pre-
constitutional history to establish what sorts of practices are heinous.   
Graber introduces his reasoning for going along with the constitutional peace 
theory by emphasizing the differences there are among members of a political community 
rather than the similarities.   
Constitutional evil, stupidity, and tragedy are consequences of human diversity.  
Citizens of heterogeneous polities secure their fundamental interests in part by 
cooperating with others [and…] the constitutional bargains they strike are 
deficient from perspectives offered by any coherent theory of justice.127   
These deficiencies are truly problematic, even in Graber’s theory, because they are more 
likely to lead to disruption in the carefully crafted constitutional peace. 
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In an article about Balkin’s work on redemption, Graber makes a distinction 
between rotten constitutional bargains and really rotten constitutional bargains, where the 
latter represents slavery.  In that latter schematic,  
Really rotten constitutional bargains when A and B agree that B will be permitted 
to deny what A regards as some of C’s fundamental rights if B makes other 
concessions to A.  The Constitution of 1787 was a really rotten constitutional 
compromise.  Many Americans who recognized that slavery was an inhuman 
practice nevertheless agreed to tolerate African-American slavery in order to 
secure the ‘blessings’ of union…128 
To conspire to deprive one segment of the people this dramatically is among the worst 
things that can be done to that subset of people—or, in the case of the American Civil 
War, those people who were not acknowledged by the state as full people.  This is an 
insoluble difficulty for Graberian constitutional theory.  Thus, the problem of 
constitutional evil and constitutional democracy’s inability to solve it seems to be at the 
root of Graber’s skepticism about constitutionalism to deliver the best results, much less 
results aimed at justice that take many more lives than they save in service to a justice-
oriented ideal.129  Of course, Balkin and Douglass, if they were to compare our founding 
constitution with what we have today, would argue that we have alleviated a good deal of 
constitutional evil.   
There is merit to Graber’s argument.  As ideally homogenous as we may imagine 
the founding generation to have been—though it certainly was not—we can no longer 
hold that view of America.  It was somewhat ludicrous even in the founding era, when 
John Jay wrote Federalist Paper #2.  At the same time, the more we aim as a society at 
principles of justice, even ones that are defined broadly to create a coalition able to effect 
change, we see that at some times, we succeed in making the American order more just.  
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This justice unfortunately often succeeds civil strife—say, the Civil War or to a much 
lesser extent the Civil Rights Movement—but even Balkin does not say that redemption 
is easy.  And, if we return to Graber’s citation of Christopher Eisgruber a few pages ago, 
we remember that Lincolnian Americans are not looking for a philosophically rigorous 
sort of justice, but rather a government based on ‘their best judgments about justice.’  
This is not a semantic difference for a reason Graber himself gives in that passage: 
informed Americans (like Dworkin, Barnett, Tushnet, Sunstein, and Scalia) are able to 
argue about true justice in the Constitution without pistols or warplanes.  At the same 
time, it would be naïve to assume that no wars will be fought over principles.  We must, 
especially in a Lincolnian analysis, always remember that two percent of the American 
population was killed in the Civil War. 
To hold such a view, we must, with Balkin, accept the reality of constitutional 
evil as a “basic condition of politics that must perpetually be overcome” through our 
efforts towards constitutional redemption.130  Without this perpetual overcoming, 
constitutional evil, which “is the possibility that the Constitution, as it operates in 
practice, permits or even requires great injustices”131 might never be redeemed. 
 
FORCE, VIOLENCE AND CONTESTATION AS ACTS OF LAW 
There are two types of violence pertinent to this dissertation.  The first, physical 
violence, is familiar to everyone.  It is the kind of violence that war is filled with, the kind 
of violence that Graber worries about in aspirationalist constitutional systems.  This kind 
of force literally kills.   
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However, there is another kind of violence that we do not think of so much, 
because it does not (usually) physically harm anyone.  However, this sort of violence, 
termed metaphorical violence, is an important component of some understandings of law.  
One good definition is what Beau Breslin would call metaphorical violence, “that marks a 
paradigmatic shift in political identity.  To put it simply: new constitutional orders 
destroy—or do violence to—old constitutional orders at the precise moment of 
constitutional adoption.”132 These shifts in constitutional identity that characterize the 
constant motion of an aspirationalist constitutional system kills old constitutional 
practices.   
Why should we worry about this second sort of violence?  If all it kills are 
individual laws, or at the most, legal systems, what sort of mourning would even be 
appropriate?  Collapse of political systems happens rather frequently; in fact, Zachary 
Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton have studied the length of constitutions around 
the world and come up with the figure that mean lifespan of a constitution is 19 years.133  
So in our American case, the death of the constitution would seem to have been a long 
time coming.  What’s more, if we are Balkinians, we probably could embrace the death 
of a constitutional system so that we can improve upon its replacement, so long as the 
aspirations remain basically the same for the new constitutional construct.  
However, we should not be so cavalier about losing a constitution, because of all 
of the things that it kills in its dying wake.  Jobs in the government are major casualties in 
this time and should be a subject of great worry in this eventuality of the death of a 
constitution.  What we should worry about more, however, is the death of the aspirations 
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that make constitutions worthwhile.  Who is to say that we will get the same aspirational 
content from a new set of framers?  Will people necessarily think to put in suitably strict 
guarantees for freedom and equality, given that those people are so used to living with 
such guarantees that they think them inevitable and irrevocable?  Worse than losing those 
values would be lose the bases for democratic liberal constitutionalism, most importantly 
the rule of law and the various provisions that go with having a non-arbitrary 
government. 
Using this framework of metaphorical violence we can now understand Robert 
Cover’s formulation of the violence involved in law:   
Judges are people of violence.  Because of the violence they command, judges 
characteristically do not create law, but kill it…Confronting the luxuriant growth 
of a hundred legal traditions, they assert that this one is law and destroy or try to 
destroy the rest. 
But judges are also people of peace.  Among warring sects, each of which wraps 
itself in the mantle of a law of its own, they assert a regulative function that 
permits a life of law rather than violence.  The range of violence they could 
command (but generally do not) measures the range of the peace and law they 
constitute.134 
 
This definition should be aimed at physical and metaphorical violence: judges allow 
defendants to be killed along with legal ideals, sometimes even in the same case.  One 
example of these things occurring in the same case occurs when the court actually 
sentences someone to death.  Considering for a moment the international consensus that 
the death penalty is barbaric, we would kill the idea of adopting that ideal in America by 
killing someone by the mechanisms of the state.   
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But just as many would argue that physical violence, or even war, is sometimes 
necessary, there are means to justify metaphorical violence, especially for 
aspirationalists.  The theory of aspirational conflict using force even goes back to James 
Madison when he states in Federalist 51 that ambition must counter ambition.  In that 
situation, someone wins and someone loses.  And as those battles are ones in 
government, except in rare cases in America, it is metaphorical violence that is done.  
One law gets passed over another, or one action is taken over another, and the loser in 
these battles usually must give up the aspiration she had held previously.  An even better 
example of how the government does violence is highlighted by our weak federal 
arrangement in America.  The supremacy clause of the Constitution kills state laws that 
are contrary to federal law, thus limiting the choices of the states and the people who 
administer and live within those states.  
This metaphorical violence also can be understood as the driving force the 
founders utilized in moving America from life under the Articles of Confederation to the 
Constitution. This may seem to be the wrong moment in American history to identify 
violence—after all, there was a quite violent revolution for American independence that 
predates either constitution of the United States.  But that is not the metaphorical violence 
we are attempting to identify, unless we mean the shift between the Articles of 
Confederation and the Constitution.  What remains to be seen is how the new laws 
created after this violence can form an identity that remains constant to preserve critical 
veneration. 
We also must ask ourselves how correct Weber might be in having only the state 
possess a monopoly on the means of violence, especially if violence is a broader term 
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than Weber recognized.135  Which state has that power in the middle of a revolution, like 
that physical one of 1775 or constitutional one of 1787—the state under siege or the state 
attempting to become the new standard?  In the cases I name, the rebels are the actors of 
the violence we would like to think legitimate today.  And, it is only when problems at 
the level of revolutions are solved that Cover’s judges matter at all.  
Furthermore, who decides what violence is justified?  The officials of the old 
order?  Those of the new one?  Or, as James Madison determined the viability of the 
1787 Constitution, is the ratification of the people, the popular approbation for the 
violence they have suffered—in whatever means necessary—the true judge of violence?  
This issue becomes even more complicated when we move from the Revolutionary War 
to the Civil War, when the people certainly are a difficult arbiter, with about half of “we 
the people” on each side.  
To put it differently, is the violence of critical veneration more acceptable than the 
non-violence of the sometimes-heinous status quo?  In short, is a Balkinian analysis plus 
violence the way to go, or the Graberian notion of peace more acceptable?  This 
dissertation argues in favor of understanding politics in a violence-conscious—and 
occasionally a physical violence-supporting, often a metaphorical violence-supporting—
way.  The Civil War was simply worth it because it led to redemption of our aspiration 
for liberty for a large segment of our population.  The American Constitution was also 
simply worth it, as the Articles of Confederation were woefully inadequate to govern the 
kind of polity the founders were attempting to establish and did not contain the necessary 
aspirational principles to be adequate for the American people. 
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But do aspirations justify violent force?  The last paragraph condones violence, 
but it does not justify it, except according to our aspirations.  But this does not justify 
force; it merely explains why aspirationalists favor change.  Unfortunately, the best 
justification for force is that it is necessary to promote difficult changes, because both 
political systems and individual persons generally resist change, and as Michael Kammen 
suggests, people tend to resist change even more the more they see changes in their 
political order coming.  It is at that point that those who advocate changing the system to 
support our greatest aspirations must work hardest to convince other people that these 
sorts of changes are worthwhile.   
To take the example of constitutional amendments, we should note that in the case 
of what we now call the Bill of Rights, the framers of the Constitution who were opposed 
to the amendments were forced to promise to add them as a condition of ratifying the 
Constitution.  Even more force was used with the Reconstruction amendments: the South 
was literally forced into adopting those amendments as a condition of rejoining the 
Union.  As Jon Elster reminds us 
When Ulysses bound himself to the mast and had his rowers put wax in their ears, 
it was to make it impossible for him to succumb to the song of the Sirens.  
Constitutions are usually designed to make it difficult to change their provisions, 
compared to ordinary legislation, but not impossible…extraconstitutional action 
always remains possible.136 
Why would constitutions be designed to limit their change?  It would seem that this must 
be done for a Graberian reason: once compromises are struck, it is safer for a constitution 
not to try to change its provisions for fear of losing the consent of the polity.  American 
constitutional law is nearly Ulyssean constitutional law.  Our Constitution is the hardest 
to amend in the world.  
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Over the span of our constitutional project, there have been areas of our 
constitutional order that needed fixing, but like Ulysses’ binding, were almost impossible 
to remove from our order—namely, slavery.  In this analogy, Lincoln is a rogue rower, 
and he brought with him what Karl Loewenstein would later call militant democracy.137  
As Loewenstein warned, one of the greatest dangers to democracy was its inability to use 
the right methodology to defeat fascism in Europe.  Perhaps surprisingly to us now, 
Loewenstein recommends fascism as a technique for democracies to employ:138 
concluding, “democracy has to be redefined.  It should be…the application of disciplined 
authority, by liberal minded men, for the ultimate ends of liberal government: human 
dignity and freedom.”139  In Loewenstein’s model, that means that democracy must 
appropriate certain methods of fascism in order to sustain itself, particularly the 
emotional bonds fascism can bring and the ways in which fascist orders—as opposed to 
democracies—protect themselves from interlopers.  Now, Loewenstein only uses 
European examples to discuss this need for fascism, and he certainly writes in a different 
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context: the year 1937 in Europe.  But his basic point is correct.  Sometimes “the 
application of disciplined authority” to protect democracy does not mean that that 
authority will be democratic, just as the desire to create a good peace may require a 
terrible war first.  This describes the way Lincoln operated opposed to law during the 
Civil War to create a better country without slavery.  Replicating the emotional bonds 
that Loewenstein does not think are characteristic of a democratic order is also important 
for veneration, because they are very similar emotions.  If you ask a random person why 
they venerate the Constitution, they are unlikely to be able to tell you exactly why they 
are attached to the Constitution except in terms of broad aspirations like “freedom” or 
“justice.”  They are unlikely to deconstruct the Congress and the reasons that they 
approve of its specific structures.   
 But we have not yet solved the problem of the justification of violence.  Graber 
would most certainly ask the following question at the end of this section: what if the 
Civil War had not been successful in redeeming the aspirations Lincoln had for the 
Union, much less Frederick Douglass, whose life was more directly wrapped up in the 
crisis of the Civil War?  In other words, what if the redemptive project fails?  
Redemption may be a project of sifting through traditions, saving some and condemning 
others, but if the “wrong” ones are saved then there is a serious problem with redemptive 
projects.  As the failure of the Civil War is a counter-factual, I will only offer my opinion 
on what should have happened next.  First, no one ever said that redemption would be 
easy.  If the South had won the war, slavery may have lasted longer, but from the 
examples of slaves around the world, it seems that liberty tends to expand and leave 
slavery behind.  As I will argue in Chapter 6, there are two scales of constitutional 
goodness: what rights are protected and to how many people are those rights extended?  
So long as the aspirations did not die in the Civil War, I am confident that there would 
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have been another moment to abolish the evil institution of slavery.  After all, veneration 
for the Union in many people’s minds was joined inextricably with freedom for all, not 
just white men.  This veneration just had to hit a tipping point between discussing 
problems and actually putting one’s life on the line to make the Union something that 
was moving closer to being redeemed.   
 
SOME FINAL NOTES ON THE POTENTIAL USEFULNESS OF A THEORY OF ASPIRATIONAL 
CONFLICT 
Redemption and aspirationalism take a great deal of work.  First, people must see 
themselves and their lives as a part of a bigger project.  But, as Alexis de Tocqueville 
suggested, Americans tend towards individualism and not thinking beyond their 
immediate families, neighbors, and friends as democracy spreads.  This is not a good 
breeding ground for aspirational progressive change.  Second, people must be willing to 
participate in government due to a shared vision of change.  These days it is difficult to 
imagine a large group of Americans seeing anything beyond sheer party politics, which 
does not make for the kind of contemplation and critical veneration leading to 
mobilization that redemption requires.  Third, everyone, including public officials, must 
be able to look beyond the status quo.  That is exceptionally difficult even for the most 
committed political aficionados, much less a general public that is far less engaged.  
Fourth, the officials who gained their power through the status quo that portrays them as 
the main deciders of constitutional policy would have to give away that power to the 
demos.  Without the people, neither redemption nor aspirationalism will work because 
there will be no changes in social and cultural views, in addition to the political changes 
that we have already identified.  Fifth, both redemption and aspirationalism—especially 
as they are articulated by Balkin—require a large portion of stability in government to 
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accompany their change-making elements.  Without this stability, as emphasized in 
Chapter 1, critical veneration is impossible.   
Balkin’s democratic legitimacy explains what must be another aspect of critical 
veneration: the people must “be able to subject their system of government to democratic 
processes of deliberation, protest, and critique.”140  This is different than the dialogic 
community proposed by Madison in his cautious veneration because it includes the aspect 
of critical protest.  Madisonian cautious veneration requires that people stay within their 
governments; Balkinian democratic legitimacy goes an extra step.  Thus fundamentally, 
we decide through our “democratic culture” how to create and recreate our society.  As 
our Constitution is incredibly difficult to amend, citizen participation takes other routes—
namely that of political parties and social movements.  Balkin takes these avenues as 
enough to make the people feel involved, that “people feel that they have the right to 
assert their own views about the Constitution’s meaning, and the fact that the political 
system regularly manifests dissensus and disagreement about important constitutional 
questions are not defects of the system; they are features of the system that help it both 
evolve and achieve democratic legitimacy over time.”141   
Therefore, the people should be able to feel at once that their current government 
is not legitimate in the best democratic way, but that they themselves can change it.  As 
Robert Post and Reva Siegel put it, 
The premise of democratic constitutionalism is that the authority of the 
Constitution depends on its democratic legitimacy, upon the Constitution’s ability 
to inspire Americans to recognize it as their Constitution.  This belief is sustained 
by traditions of popular engagement that authorize citizens to make claims about 
the Constitution’s meaning and to oppose their government—through 
constitutional lawmaking, electoral politics, and the institutions of civil society---
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when they believe that it is not respecting the Constitution.  Government officials, 
in turn, both resist and respond to these citizen claims.  These complex patterns of 
exchange have historically shaped the meaning of our Constitution.”142 
This arrangement would likely be very attractive to Frederick Douglass: but would it be 
possible?   Douglass thought it possible after slavery had ended; for he moved from 
justifying slave rebellions to writing in order to change public opinion.  Violence was 
also not the strategy employed later by the Civil Rights Movement led by Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr.  However if the end to having a very bloody war is simply to keep the 
Union together—not really to abolish slavery, even if that is what happened and that is 
how abolitionists saw the nature of the Civil War—we must ask: What is so great about 
keeping the Union together?   
There are many arguments for Union, from somewhat thin conceptions of a 
security-focused state to thicker conceptions of states granting and protecting rights to the 
thickest conceptions of deliberative democratic states.  I believe all of these arguments 
obtain here.  The first, security-based argument is instrumentally true: the North is more 
likely to be safe with a South that is a component part of the Union.  The second, rights-
bearing argument, is valuable insofar as my theory of aspirational conflict obtains.  
Rights-oriented regimes require the kind of principled arguments that must exist for 
leaders like Lincoln to elevate liberty, or for preambles or bills of rights to extol the rule 
of justice over our joint lives together.  The third, deliberative democracy argument is 
wrapped up in Balkin’s conception of democratic legitimacy than stems from a full 
version of a Madisonian-type critical veneration.  All three of these levels of argument 
for the Union’s continued presence rely on a scary proposition ultimately: people must 
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also be willing to die and to kill for this Union on the basis of their veneration.  Douglass 
was willing—are we? 
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Chapter 3: Illegality for James Madison and Thomas Jefferson 
Aspirational conflict can prompt illegal acts.  Illegalities committed in the name 
of aspirations often later seem less problematic than illegalities committed for some other 
end.  Early in the American republic, one need only think of Thomas Jefferson’s 
Declaration of Independence against the rightful government of the colonies, of General 
Washington’s war against that government, and of Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase to 
understand how illegalities formed some of the most important political events of the late 
18th and early 19th centuries.  However, it is not the case that any illegal act is justified on 
any basis whatsoever. Madison and Jefferson aim at a particularly interesting and creative 
definition of law for both the rulers and the ruled.  But neither seems to think that his 
excursion into illegalities should invalidate what they declare to be unchanging 
principles.  To be sure, Jefferson wants the Declaration of Independence to change 
American society, just as Madison wants the new Constitution to radically alter the 
American world once ruled by the Articles of Confederation.  But the fundamental 
American principles remain the same through these changes.  The final American 
authority also remains in charge—the people.  
 
JAMES MADISON: FEDERALIST 40, OR, VENERATING THE ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION? 
Federalist 40’s stated purpose was to see “whether the convention [was] 
authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitution.”143  Madison cites both the 
decision at the Annapolis Convention to have a future convention and the Congressional 
decision to have another convention.  His analysis is less than straightforward, however, 
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inasmuch as he announces that these decisions mean that a strong national government 
was called for—no such language exists in the passages he quotes.  But when he returns 
to the text, we should focus particularly on the language about exigencies that does 
appear in both of the quoted texts.  As Madison rephrases it—this time with less 
emphasis on the “firm[ness]” necessary for the national government—“they were to 
frame a national government, adequate to the exigencies of government and of the Union; 
and to reduce the articles of Confederation into such form as to accomplish these 
purposes.”144   
We should first note that nowhere in either quotation of the original language by 
Madison at the beginning of Federalist 40 can we find language about reducing the 
Articles of Confederation.  But more importantly, here Madison introduces both of the 
main themes of this Federalist Paper.  Federalist Paper 40 apparently will address both 
the justification for the Philadelphia Convention itself and the exigencies that sometimes 
plague men, sometimes even drawing them into constitutional conventions.  Now, if we 
stop reading at the end of the second page, wherein Madison declares that the Convention 
was charged with forming a national government, it is possible to imagine a reader not 
knowing why the rest of Federalist 40 was written.  After all, if the instructions from the 
Annapolis Convention and the Congress were as definitive as Madison states in that 
paragraph, there is no reason to think that he would need to further justify the project.  
However, as 85 Federalist Papers were written to convince the people of New York that 
the Philadelphia Convention was an enterprise meant to serve their interests, it seems 
very unlikely that Madison really thought that a few paragraphs would suffice to justify 
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the entire endeavor being legal, particularly as others in the New York political arena 
were writing counter Anti-Federalist Papers to refute his, Hamilton, and Jay’s claims. 
So, it seems that Madison’s two tasks will take a bit more time: he must justify 
the Constitution and the role that exigencies might play in what seem like present and 
future eras.  The Constitution, it would seem, should be justified not according to extant 
law, but to the principles it is meant to serve.  Yet immediately after stating the goals of 
the convention, he overtly introduces the principle of legality into the conversation.  This 
seems like a bad idea if the people you are trying to convince believe that the Convention 
was not a proper exercise of law—particularly as it directly contravened the law of the 
land, the Articles of Confederation.  But perhaps in the end it is a brilliant exercise—or 
rather, trick—for the casual reader; for in that next paragraph, Madison explains how 
important law and legality are to him.  If the reader does not think carefully about 
whether that gels with everything else Madison writes in this Paper, he might think this is 
to be an argument that will be faithful to law: that is, after all, what Madison claims he is 
doing.  As he writes: 
There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason as well as founded on 
legal axioms.  The one is that every part of the expression ought, if possible, to 
allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to some common end.  The other 
is that where the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less important parts 
should give way to the more important part; the means should be sacrificed to the 
end, rather than the end to the means.145 
I am not sure what legal axioms Madison has in mind, as means-ends justifications of this 
sort sound more like political philosophy than legal theory.  But this does not make this 
paragraph less interesting.  Without reading ahead, the reader living under the Articles of 
Confederation might imagine that their improvement is the end.  She would not be stupid 
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for imagining this, as that was the stated, legal purpose for calling the Philadelphia 
Convention.   
 If we continue reading, it becomes quite clear that preservation of the Union in 
the manner that Madison sees fit is the end, not the preservation of the legal order.  Thus 
he uses the cloak of legal argument to make an argument for illegality—one that he will 
justify paragraphs later with the end of the people ratifying the Constitution justifying the 
means.  Understanding the rhetoric of this Federalist Paper, however, runs on not 
skipping ahead to the end, so we should note that in this paragraph Madison changes the 
argument from legality to what is “of most importance to the people of America,”146 
whether “the Articles of Confederation should be disregarded, and an adequate 
government be provided, and the Union preserved; or that an adequate government 
should be omitted, and the Articles of Confederation preserved.”147  Happiness is not a 
negligible end, but it was not in the original terms of engagement that Madison presents.  
However, in a means/end calculation, it makes sense that our casual reader of the 
Federalist will prioritize the nation’s happiness when it is not obvious that it is replacing 
legality.   
 In the next piece of the argument, Madison debates whether or not the changes to 
the Articles that the Convention was recommending could be reconciled with the original 
mandate to make changes to those Articles.  In the end, he concludes that “The truth is 
that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the convention may be 
considered less as absolutely new than as the expansion of principles which are found in 
the Articles of Confederation.”148  These principles are limited government and 
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independence and sovereignty for the states.  As Madison took up the issue of 
national/federal government in Federalist 39, it is understandable that he does not want to 
wade into that issue again and moves forward with another argument about the 
conjunction between the Constitution and law.  Here, Madison notes that there is a 
problem with the Constitution that people are largely ignoring when considering its 
legality—namely, that the amendment (and ratification) procedure for the new 
Constitution of 9/13 states differs substantially from the unanimity requirement contained 
in the Articles of Confederation.  He only can defend the Constitution by saying that it is 
possible that the 13th state might be perverse, corrupt, or entirely inflexible.  These are not 
legal arguments, of course, but Madison does not take them up any farther.  Finally, 
Madison takes up the issue of crises, though yet again he begins in a counter-intuitive 
way.  After spending several pages arguing that the Convention was acting legally, he 
reminds his readers that this presumption of legality has been merely a thought-
experiment.  Only the approbation of the people can actually make this legal.  Thus we 
have the shift mentioned earlier where the end of a good government can justify the 
means of illegality.  Here Madison turns around as the explicator of what the convention 
“must have thought,” and we are thus asked to pretend—at least as readers today—that 
Madison was not the father of the Constitution, one of the key players in making this 
illegal Convention possible.   
 Going along with Madison’s stance for the time being, we note that he indicates 
that the rest of what he will write in this Paper will be from a different perspective, 
probably from the perspective of citizens receiving “advisory and recommendatory” 
plans for a—greatly—revised constitutional structure.149  The men of the Convention are 
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grand in stature in Madison’s third person estimation, and used necessity to guide their 
actions.  They also learned from the lessons of American and American state history, 
lessons that one can only learn from observing an actually functioning government, rather 
than theorizing about one that someday might be.   
 This discussion of necessity dovetails nicely into Madison’s quotation of the 
Declaration of Independence.  This piece of the paragraph is particularly rich: 
They must have reflected that in all great changes of established governments 
forms ought to give way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the 
former would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of 
the people to ‘abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most 
likely to effect their safety and happiness…’150 
First, what does it mean for “forms to give way to substance?”  Basically it means that 
once again legal forms give way to the substantive necessities of the actual world.  But 
even to get to those words skips ahead.  First we must note that these enlightened citizens 
must have been intending to make a “great change” in the Articles of Confederation.  
This directly contradicts what Madison had said earlier in Federalist 40—namely that the 
principles of the two were similar enough that a massive change was not what readers 
should be contemplating.  But here in his third person view, he notes the true 
revolutionary nature of the project he and his friends were contemplating in Philadelphia 
and scheming to get ratified in New York.   
 Next we ought to note that if Madison had been speaking in the language of law, 
then a “rigid adherence” to “forms” would be an excellent idea.  This is just one more 
piece of evidence that he was not seriously focused—at least not in Federalist 40—on 
legality, or even, from time to time, the appearance of legality.  But more shocking is the 
lawlessness in this sentence when combined with what comes next.  If the law merely 
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restrains lawmakers from creating new constitutions, that is one thing.  But to state that 
the law impedes citizens’ natural rights to “abolish or alter” their governments might well 
mean that citizens can break the law.  Madison is very quiet about this possibility, as we 
will see Jefferson is as well in the next section, but he broaches it nevertheless.  To be 
sure, he follows this phrase saying that the people cannot truly change the government 
themselves in any organized way, but even the inclusion of that caveat is interesting, 
because it means that Madison probably contemplated that his words in the previous 
sentence might mean that the people could take matters into their own hands.   
 Finally, we should note again the presence of happiness as a standard rather than 
law as a standard.  Moving to the next part of the paragraph, we read that 
…since it is impossible for the people spontaneously and universally to move in 
concert towards their object; and it is therefore essential that such changes be 
instituted by some informal and unauthorized propositions, made by some 
patriotic and respectable citizen or number of citizens...151  
If we remain suspicious about whether or not citizens can disobey the law, this paragraph 
does not clarify matters entirely well.  Who are the patriotic and respectable citizens?  It 
seems unlikely that they are specially picked by the rest of the people, because it seems 
that Madison is saying that the great mass of the people will not be able to understand the 
means toward their end—the “object” mentioned in this passage.  Yet again Madison 
dismisses legality as a standard by adopting “informal and unauthorized provisions,” as 
those are two very clear ways of saying that their actions will not be legal, even if we 
would expect the “patriotic and respectable” citizen(s) to act in acceptable ways.   
 In fact, it would only make sense for the drafters of the work of the Philadelphia 
Convention to be these self-same patriots.  But if that is true, then Madison once again 
tips his hand: if Philadelphia was the place for these patriotic men to act, then the means 
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that they employed were informal and unauthorized at their core, or, in other words, their 
actions were illegal.  This is a fairly accurate depiction of what we know of the actual 
Convention, but is obviously not what Madison should be saying about the Convention in 
a work designed to convince people that the framers were not renegade law-breakers bent 
on fundamentally changing the nature of the Union. 
 Madison then explains the things he imagines the patriot-framers will understand 
about their project, and gives a quick and loose summary of the existence of the Union, 
oddly making the existence of the states out to be “ancient.”  Yet again he scoffs at the 
law, stating that “nor could it be forgotten that no little ill-timed scruples, no zeal for 
adhering to ordinary forms, were anywhere seen”152 except by those who truly did not 
support the project in the first place.  But the most important remaining part of this 
paragraph, and indeed this essay, reads as follows: “They must have borne in mind that as 
the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted to the people themselves, the 
disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it forever; its approbation blot out 
antecedent errors and irregularities.”153  Thus the people rectify the illegality and cleanse 
the document from any residual original sin.  And finally, Madison returns us to the 
world where apparently the Convention was not a thought-experiment, but a reaction to 
incredibly dangerous political circumstances, and encourages ratification on the basis that 
one should take good advice offered by either an enemy or a friend.   
 Now that all of the instances of illegality have been laid out, it is worth 
considering what import this might have for the theory of veneration that we laid out in 
the first chapter of this dissertation.  Can this be the same Madison, the same cautious 
man who thought stability was absolutely essential to law and thus to human flourishing 
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under a system of law that is constant and predictable?  Not once in Federalist 40 does 
Madison mention stability.  Stability would, however, be an excellent counterpoint to 
necessity forced by crisis that Madison champions in Federalist 40.  Both, as we will see 
in the conclusion to this chapter, are useful to a theory of critical veneration that relies on 
aspirational conflict. 
 
THOMAS JEFFERSON   
Later in his life, Jefferson decided that the Declaration of Independence needed to 
be defended.154  In a letter to Henry Lee of May 8, 1825, he writes “But with respect to 
our rights, and the acts of the British government contravening those rights, there was but 
one opinion on this side of the water…When forced, therefore, to resort to arms for 
redress, an appeal to the tribunal of the world was deemed proper for our justification.  
That was the object of the Declaration of Independence.” He deems the principles laid 
out in the Declaration to be common sense, “‘an expression of the American mind’” that 
did not aim “‘to find out new principles, or new arguments, never before thought of, nor 
merely to say things which had never been said before, but to place before mankind the 
common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent, and 
to justify ourselves in the independent stand we are compelled to take.’” 155 
In his last letter, on June 24, 1826 to Roger C. Weightman, Jefferson replies to 
Weightman’s invitation to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration with a 
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regretful decline, as he had fallen ill.  In this letter he is far more expansive about the 
nature of the Declaration, writing: 
May it be to the world, what I believe it will be…the signal of arousing men to 
burst the chains under which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded 
them to bind themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of self 
government.  That form which we have submitted, restores the free right to the 
unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of opinion.  All eyes are opened, or 
opening, to the rights of man…For ourselves, let the annual return of this day 
forever refresh our recollection of these rights, and an undiminished devotion to 
them.156 
In both his letters on the Declaration to Lee and Weightman and his letter to John Colvin, 
Jefferson lays out similar themes to those found in Federalist 40, though far more 
overtly.  Just as Federalist 40 justifies the illegal act of writing the new Constitution 
outside of the bounds of the Articles of Confederation with an appeal to principles rather 
than laws, so too do these three letters.  In his letter to Colvin, he not only justifies 
lawlessness—he calls it “easy of solution in principle.”157  He phrases this solution 
without any of the doubts that one might expect when advocating lawlessness to “officers 
of high trust”: “A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties 
of a good citizen, but it is not the highest.  The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of 
saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation.”158  To do this seems to 
fulfill Jefferson’s description of the Declaration of Independence in his letter to 
Weightman, wherein he states that men should unbind themselves for the blessings of 
liberty and security in self-government. 
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But what makes a constitutional system more secure when people break its laws? 
Jefferson justifies this in his next sentence, wherein he states “To lose our country by a 
scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, 
property and all those enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the 
means.”159  This means/ends discussion was also in Madison’s Federalist 40, and for 
much the same reason.  But we must extrapolate how adherence to law harms law for 
Jefferson more than for Madison.  For Madison in Federalist 40, adherence to the new 
law—the Constitution—is what trumps adherence to the old law—the Articles of 
Confederation.  But to what higher law is Jefferson referring?  It seems that principles are 
probably a greater source of law for Jefferson than actual written codes, as he states later 
in the letter: “the unwritten laws of necessity, of self-preservation, and of the public 
safety, control the written laws.”160 
Interestingly enough, however, in his example that follows the explication of his 
unwritten laws, he does not choose a situation he describes as being beset by extreme 
necessity or self-preservation.  Rather, he justifies the hypothetical purchase of Florida on 
“the public advantage.”  We will examine this more closely with regards to the Louisiana 
Purchase next, but this example hardly proves his point here in this letter.  His next 
example—that of Burr—is far closer to an example based on public safety, given the 
conspiracy he mentions.  What is most interesting about this example is his first mention 
of this letter of judgment of the officer who acts contrary to or outside of the law: “The 
officer who is called to act on this superior ground, does indeed risk himself on the 
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justice of the controlling powers of the constitution, and his station makes it his duty to 
incur that risk.”161 
That particular risk of breaking the law—namely, the constitutional judgment—
would seem to apply both to the officer of government who buys Florida and the one who 
saves us from a conspiracy.  But Jefferson goes farther and declares “But those 
controlling powers, and his fellow citizens generally, are bound to judge according to the 
circumstances under which he acted…to put themselves into his situation.”162  Thus, in 
their minds, the citizens too go outside of the law.  They must consider the officer not as 
a constitutional officer simply, but as a constitutional officer who has to make decisions 
that are outside of the Constitution in order to save it, or such is Jefferson’s implication.  
He notes that he does not mean for these powers to be used in “trifling” circumstances, 
but “The line of discrimination between cases may be difficult; but the good officer is 
bound to draw it at his own peril, and throw himself on the justice of his country and the 
rectitude of his motives.”163 
Now moving back in time from the letter to Colvin in 1810, we can compare how 
President Jefferson had dealt with these issues in a non-at-all theoretical way.  Jefferson 
himself, in a letter to John C. Brekinridge in 1803, anticipated the possibility of needing 
to go before the public in order to justify the Louisiana Purchase.  As he states 
preliminarily, “The treaty must of course be laid before both Houses, because both have 
important functions to exercise respecting it.  They, I presume, will see their duty to their 
country in ratifying & paying for it, so as to secure a good which would otherwise 
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probably be never again in their power.”164  This is benign enough and invites no specific 
constitutional questions.  It is almost as if there are no special issues with this purchase.  
This assumption is belied by Jefferson’s next sentence: “But I suppose they must then 
appeal to the nation for an additional article to the Constitution, approving and 
confirming an act which the nation had not previously authorized.  The constitution has 
made no provision for our holding foreign territory, still less for incorporating foreign 
nations into our Union.”165 
This is the precise reasoning that Madison uses to “blot out” the problems of 
adopting the Constitution in the first place.  The people will make these actions 
constitutional by ratifying them post facto.  Jefferson is confident that Congress will 
indeed ratify and pay for the Louisiana Territories, though it is odd that in that next part 
of the paragraph he does not again mention the people.  We must wonder if it is enough 
to have the people’s representatives ratify such a Union-changing development or if their 
duly elected representatives can act in their stead?  This question is not answered in this 
letter.  However, Jefferson does justify his own actions a bit more, framing himself as a 
guardian of a ward “in purchasing an important adjacent territory; & saying to him when 
of age, I did this for your good…I thought it my duty to risk myself for you.”166  But, 
again, an unanswered question: is the ward Congress or the people?  It makes a 
difference, because American republicanism of the time, less so Jeffersonian 
republicanism than Madisonian republicanism, was not fully confident in the people’s 
ability to make these sorts of decisions.  But Jefferson is confident that “we shall not be 
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disavowed by the nation, and their act of indemnity will confirm & not weaken the 
Constitution, by more strongly marking out its lines.”167 
Jefferson’s tone changes quite a bit in another letter about the Louisiana Purchase, 
this time to Wilson Cary Nicholas.  Rather than the Jefferson of the letter to John Colvin, 
who allowed breaking constitutional law in order to buy Florida, he declares in this letter 
that he wishes to keep strictly to the Constitution with precision.  He does again state that 
the best way to deal with the Louisiana Purchase is by amendment, but Jefferson here has 
decided against what he calls “broad construction,” a style of constitutional construction 
that seems far more germane to his previous opinions.  This is particularly strange given a 
letter written only a few months later that frames the acquisition of Louisiana as a 
necessity and “as a great achievement to the mass of happiness which is to ensue.”168 
As Jefferson frames the argument in this letter, a war between France and 
England seemed to be the only way America would be able to make the purchase and be 
safe.  But due to Napoleon’s ability to “see the course predicted as necessary & 
unavoidable,” “the dénouement has been happy.”169  What is most interesting about this 
letter is Jefferson’s dismissal of the people’s knowledge.  Yet again in this letter, unlike 
the letter written to Nicholas, he seems to place himself in the place of an oracle who is 
able to see what is necessary to do before it happens, and therefore is able to influence 
events for the better.  As Jefferson writes: “I very early saw that Louisiana was indeed a 
speck in our horizon which was to burst in a tornado; and the public are unapprized how 
near this catastrophe was.  Nothing but a frank & friendly development of causes & 
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effects on our part, and good sense enough in Bonaparte to see that the train was 
unavoidable, and would change the face of the world, saved us from that storm.”170  This 
storm seems to be in line with Jefferson’s overall view: that sometimes unconstitutional 
actions are necessary to preserve the Union.  At this point his constitutional amendment 
had been refused, and it seems that at the time of this letter in 1804, he had made his 
peace with the problem of unconstitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase.   
 
ILLEGAL FORMS MADE LEGAL? 
Both Madison and Jefferson justify serious changes in the Constitution made 
illegally in Federalist 40 and various letters respectively.  Although the Declaration of 
Independence will be treated in Chapter 5, it is also worthy of note here that it too was a 
justification of an illegal action by the colonies.  Today, the legality or illegality of these 
acts is unimportant to the average citizen, because the new constitutional law was 
inaugurated long ago, lost, perhaps, in the memory of the populace, in the Burkean sands 
of time.  But in the moment, declaring independence, drafting the new Constitution, and 
making the Louisiana Purchase were hotly debated topics that had citizens very worried.  
And their worries were just, under a certain interpretation of Madison and Jefferson’s 
actions.  In the case of independence and the Philadelphia Convention, these so-called 
founders were taking away the established government and putting in its place something 
untried, with little room for the people to actually be involved in the changes.  So why are 
they here held up as examples? 
In the case of the Declaration of Independence, it may be the case that Jefferson 
exaggerated the dire straits the colonists were experiencing.  But he was articulating 
                                                
170 Jefferson, “Jesus, Louisiana, and Malthus.” 
 109 
principles meant to constitute a new people, principles of life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness that we cherish to this day.  It was not just about King George III; it was about 
principle.  In these principles lay the seeds of Madison’s constitutional reforms.  Those 
reforms explicitly protected “form[ing] a more perfect union, establish[ing] justice, 
secur[ing] domestic tranquility, provid[ing] for the common defense, promot[ing] the 
general welfare, and secur[ing] the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,” 
among other rights.  (The Bill of Rights will also be covered in Chapter 5.)   
These principles mean different things to different people, just as Mark Graber 
stated they do.  But this does not mean that they are useless as aspirations.  These 
principles and their flexibility and interpretation over time are the reason that we do not 
have sharp breaks in our constitutional order the way Bruce Ackerman will argue that we 
do in Chapter 4.  From the beginning we have had waves of illegalities by our leaders—
and sometimes our ordinary citizens—that are based on these principles.  They fill in the 
gaps in our constitutional law, rather than changing it entirely.  Take for example the 
Civil Rights movement.  Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. used Abraham Lincoln’s use of 
Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence to justify the changes he wanted to make in civil 
rights legislation and the way African-Americans were treated in America.  He refers to 
the Declaration of Independence as a promissory note for freedom, and that is precisely 
how this dissertation interprets this document.  Principles are promises.  They guide our 
aspirations along the same paths that our ancestors used to guide their aspirations.  And 
they allow us to fight, if absolutely necessary.   
Not one of the aspirations held by those who made the kinds of changes 
Ackerman will discuss found making those changes easy.  The Founding was not easy, 
nor was the Civil War, nor was the New Deal.  There were opponents.  In two cases there 
was a war.  But in all cases, eventually, there was progress.  This progress was neither 
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automatic nor foreordained.  Madison hoped the Constitution would be ratified, just as 
Lincoln hoped to win the Civil War, and Roosevelt hoped his massive changes to federal 
bureaucracy and law would hold to save the country from destitution.  None had 
guarantees.  Each also acted in ways that their opponents considered unconstitutional.  
Most of all, each acted in ways they thought would save the Union.   
Now, saving the Union may seem like more of a Graberian value than a critical 
venerative view.  He, after all, wanted to save America from destroying itself in the Civil 
War, and is the theorist of peace in this dissertation.  But just as saving the Union could 
be construed as a move towards the common defense, fighting a civil war to prevent the 
country from splitting in two (at least) is also a fight for the common defense.  Balkin 
would likely agree with this line of reasoning, as his nested oppositions make a lot of 
sense here.  In terms of the principles of the Preamble, in the Civil War domestic 
tranquility and the common defense are not opposed: rather, they are partners.  To 
imagine them as a nested opposition it is useful to condense them into theories of war and 
peace, where domestic tranquility implies peace and the common defense war.  If we 
interpret the Preamble in this way, then we are making war in order to secure peace.  The 
common defense requires the continued union of the Union, and for that, we fight against 
those who would disrupt the Union and separate it into pieces.  Domestic tranquility 
requires a solution to the constant problem of slavery, and so it needs the war to regain its 
peaceful state.   
This, of course, is not the only way to interpret these two clauses of the Preamble; 
in fact, in a recent work, Graber has put the common defense into a key part of his peace 
argument on the other side from the argument we have just made.  As he states, “Unlike 
establishing justice, providing for the common defense is not an aspirational goal, a 
purpose the Constitution hopes to achieve gradually over time.  A constitution must 
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provide for the common defense immediately upon ratification.”171  This is true on its 
face.  But I disagree on a different level that sees the Union not just as needing defense 
from outsiders, as Graber provides for, but as needing defense from parts of itself.  Any 
system has need of aspirational common defense mechanisms, preferably ones that also 
embrace domestic tranquility.  This is even truer of federal systems, because they are split 
in different ways from the start of a union and need reasons to stay together.  Graber is 
aware of this, and thus he states “Faith in the constitutional commitment to ‘domestic 
tranquility’ seems more like faith in the constitutional commitment to the ‘common 
defense’ than faith in the constitutional commitment to establish justice.”172  But we must 
not only strive for justice as a high ideal: the common defense and domestic tranquility 
are also high principles.   
Defending one’s country exists not only on the battlefield, but also in the mind.  
Thus, contrary to Graber, if establishing justice is more than securing our legal system as 
it stands—a sentiment to which he would almost certainly agree—then defense and 
tranquility can be higher constitutional values as well.  This is not to say that they are not 
needed in an ordinary way, but American critical constitutional veneration requires that 
defense also mean defense of the values the country was founded upon and domestic 
tranquility a certain agreement among various portions of the society as to how things 
should be run, about how those principles should be realized.  Otherwise, what does 
redemption of our Constitution really mean?  Justice is important, but it requires a basic 
agreement among many or even most people to be realized.  This is difficult, to be sure.  
But it is either agreement or force that makes men and women concede to having changes 
in their constitutional orders.  Force cannot change someone’s mind, their soul.  There 
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was no way to force even political elites to ratify the Constitution unless most of the 
states had already agreed (forcing New Hampshire or Delaware at the end is not the same 
as forcing New York, a far more potent political and physical force).  A conscripted army 
in the North that had no attachment to the principles of Union surely would have lost.  
Even a packed Court would not have saved FDR’s program without political elites 
agreeing with the substance of the plan. 
Thus, as we move into a discussion of why America has not, as Bruce Ackerman 
argues, been through Union-breaking changes during the Founding, the Civil War, and 
the New Deal, we must remember how critical veneration allows for the same principles 
to exist through time.  The illegalities discussed in this chapter were all promoting the 
aspirations of the American people, rather than the text of the law.  Law is important, 
especially to the procedural pieces of the Constitution.   But in times of crisis when law 
does not suffice, aspirations can carry the weight of critical constitutional veneration by 
helping to redeem that constitutional order.  Aspirational principles are particularly 
helpful during crises like the American Revolution or the Civil War because they give us 
a compass to act by when our institutions may be going through rapid changes, or 
perhaps being ignored in parts (for example, President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas 
corpus).   
But how does this make sense with my previous argument that Jefferson 
venerating the principles of the Declaration of Independence is not enough?  Generally, 
that statement is right, but it has need of a more nuanced vision of law during crises.  To 
be sure, veneration must be connected to law most of the time.  But in order for 
veneration to be critical veneration, people must occasionally be able to detach 
themselves from their institutions in order to make them better.  These improvements, 
once made, then necessitate going back to the law that has been newly created according 
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to our aspirations.  After all, the protest and critique required of “democratic legitimacy” 
cannot work without some changes in institutions.  Ultimately, the fact that each time we 
have experienced a moving away from our laws only to come back to them with our faith 
in our constitutional democracy renewed gives us hope that the people can absorb 
aspirational values and act in the kinds of ways that Reva Siegel and Robert Post 
indicated with their discussion of constitutional democracy in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 4: Ackerman and Veneration? 
In his work, We the People, as well as in other stand-alone pieces, Bruce 
Ackerman argues both descriptively and normatively for the reality of breaks in 
American constitutionalism that are revolutionary in nature, breaks that split the history 
of our constitutional order into three distinct periods.  There are several questions that are 
immediately evident from this synopsis: Is Ackerman right that there have been these 
breaks in our constitutional order?  If such breaks did indeed happen, how did the 
constitutional order mend itself?  And if such breaks did not happen, what phenomenon 
was Ackerman incorrectly observing?  Ackerman summarizes the typical view of the 
American people scornfully when he states: 
The Americans: a restless and unruly people—yet remarkably restrained when it 
comes to playing by the rules of government.  The French Revolution provoked 
two centuries of upheaval in Europe, but the American Revolution had the 
opposite effect.  Two hundred years late, and only twenty-six amendments to the 
original Constitution—what a consensus!  Or so I have been told by many 
admiring foreigners and, less forgivably, by many Americans.173 
Why is Ackerman so scornful of this opinion?  Why is this opinion unforgivable?  
It is the standard opinion, which Ackerman believes does great injustice to the 
revolutionary nature of the American republic, mainly during Reconstruction and the 
New Deal, but also during other times.  I call his view revolutionary for two reasons: 
first, Ackerman’s views should be distinguished from Jefferson’s rebellious views 
advocated, at least partially, in this dissertation, and, second, Ackerman truly sees 
wholesale change during his constitutional moments that is aptly described as a 
revolution from what came before.  By contrast, my view—which in this chapter will 
align with the Federalists’ and Anti-Federalists’ notions of what the constitutional order 
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was to be, along with contemporary scholars such as Herbert Storing and Jeffrey Tulis—
defends the premise that Americans have been working on the same project from the 
beginning based on their aspirations set forth in the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution.  Thus the “changes” visible in the document are changes that conform to the 
purpose of the document, if we are moving in the correct direction in a general way.  
However, under critical veneration, it is difficult to tell in the moment whether the path is 
correct or whether it will need further redemption in the future.  By contrast, Ackerman 
holds, according to historian Joyce Appleby: 
In the absence of attention to how people in the United States have come to think 
about a higher law, Ackerman has fallen back on a Whiggish view where love of 
liberty and justice is assumed to be part of the human endowment, at least of 
American humans.  Fused convictions about democratic governance and liberal 
aspirations motivate Ackerman’s We the People.  His conception of their 
intentions resembles an ascending escalator, carrying the American public ever 
higher…174 
This is not the critical venerationist account because, as much as I will argue with Tulis 
and Storing that there was an initial plan, there is absolutely no evidence that it would be 
realized in a smooth manner, constantly ascending towards constitutional goodness.  
Rather, as even Balkin’s sunny war-less account suggests, we must stagger back and 
forth between constitutional progress and constitutional evil in order to reach the 
goodness that is promised by constitutional redemption. 
Dieter Grimm’s statement on the “integrative effect” of constitutions is far closer 
to what I will argue, and to what the Founders intended. As Grimm writes: “A 
constitution will have an integrative effect only if it embodies a society’s fundamental 
value system and aspirations, and if the society perceives that its constitution reflects 
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precisely those values with which it identifies and which are the source of its specific 
character.”175  This does not mean that the constitution will not change.  In fact, Grimm’s 
emphasis on the aspirations and values inherent in a society is telling: it seems likely that 
he would accept changes to the actual constitutional form if whatever replaced it, by 
amendment, law, or perhaps even illegal action, brought that constitutional order closer to 
those aspirations and values.   
As we saw in Chapter 3, Madison and Jefferson in particular saw the value in 
dismissing pieces of law as not useful to the values and aspirations of the American 
project.  But there is consistency in the project even as they break the law.  Illegalities 
well used can be fruitfully combined with an adherence to principles over time.  
Ackerman does emphasize illegal actions as important, but ultimately, as Rogers Smith 
points out that though Ackerman is  
reluctant to rest his case on claims of what is ultimately good, Ackerman also 
hopes to convince us that American constitutionalism, if recognized as the system 
of dualist democracy he defines, is the best system of government, at least for the 
American people.  Somewhat ironically, it is so good because it is justified 
primarily in terms of legality and popular consent, not substantive goodness.”176 
To justify a political regime based on legality means that ultimately Ackerman is being 
inconsistent if he sides with Smith’s version of Lincoln, a version very close to what is 
offered in this dissertation: Lincoln 
arguably went on to violate the Constitution more than any other President before 
or since.  Lincoln’s example suggests that although instilling reverence for the 
Constitution and the law may be a part of the political answer to generating stable 
support for the American regime, it cannot be the whole answer to the problem of 
legitimating the regime.  Indeed, his wartime actions imply that such reverence 
                                                
175 Grimm, Dieter. “Integration by Constitution.” I-CON 3: 2&3 Special Issue, May 2005, 193-208. 
176 Smith, Rogers M. “Legitimating Reconstruction: The Limits of Legalism.” The Yale Law Journal. 
108:8, June 1999, 2045. 
 117 
may sometimes inhibit efforts needed to maintain the nation and to strengthen its 
legitimacy.177 
Why is this contradictory for Ackerman—after all, Smith does point to Lincoln’s 
strengthening of the nation’s legitimacy?  Because, as Smith also points out, legitimacy 
“must ultimately rest on whether the basic principles and practices of the regime are 
substantively good.  If they are good, and if most people understand them to be good, 
then violations of the rule of law and popular consent will not matters so much insofar as 
they help establish those principles and practices.”178  This is a long way from 
Ackerman’s disregard of the good in favor of legitimacy.   
In order to better understand Ackerman’s arguments, I will first develop his 
arguments about dualist democracy and constitutional moments in conjunction with 
Andreas Kalyvas’s comparison of Ackerman and Carl Schmitt.  This will allow me to get 
to one of the most important types of illegality: popular movements that do not have the 
sanction of the regime.  Ackerman, in comparison to Schmitt, will be shown to be far less 
democratic than he announces, not that we should take Schmitt as an example for 
American politics due to the deeply problematic aspects of his theories.  I will then show 




In We the People I: Foundations, Ackerman introduces what he calls dualist 
democracy.  Dualist democracy requires quite a bit of coordination between the people 
and their representatives.  He explains it as follows: 
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Decisions by the People occur rarely, and under special constitutional conditions.  
Before gaining the authority to make supreme law in the name of the People, a 
movement’s political partisans must, first, convince an extraordinary number of 
their fellow citizens to take their proposed initiative with a seriousness that they 
do not normally accord to politics; second, they must allow their opponents a fair 
opportunity to organize their own forces; third, they must convince a majority of 
their fellow Americans to support their initiative as its merits are discussed, time 
and again, in the deliberative fora provided for ‘higher lawmaking.’  It is only 
then that a political movement earns the enhanced legitimacy the dualist 
Constitution accords to decisions made by the people.179 
In Ackerman’s We the People I: Foundations and II: Transformations, he argues that 
these conditions were met during the Founding, during Reconstruction, and during the 
New Deal, on the basis of his consolidation argument.  A movement is considered 
“consolidated” when serious questioning of the successes of the movement end, when 
there are “decisive moments at which deep changes in popular opinion gai[n] 
authoritative constitutional recognition.”180 
Andreas Kalyvas presents us with an interesting comparison between Ackerman 
and Carl Schmitt on the nature of forming and maintaining a political regime—and 
certainly this is not to compare the politics of the two men or how they might envision 
the ideal regime.  Kalyvas borrows Ackerman’s term, “higher lawmaking,” as an 
explanation for the first relationship Schmitt sees between a people and a constitution: 
“the extraordinary, instituting moment of democratic founding during which the principle 
of identity can be approximated.”  The second moment is also Ackermanian—that of 
“normal lawmaking.”  But it is the third that is most interesting and that I will show is 
missing from Ackerman’s account: the moment of a democratic people acting in the 
world, or, as Kalyvas puts it: “the moment of spontaneous forms of popular mobilization 
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and informal participatory intervention that exists side by side with the established 
political system.”181   
So, to return to Ackerman’s terminology, it would appear that most of the action 
occurs between the first two moments: the initial moment of constitution and the 
consolidating moment of normal lawmaking.  Kalyvas’s Schmitt also thought the latter 
moment to be important, as he “saw the constitution as offering the only possibility for 
democratic sovereignty to attain a concrete and secure institutional form…Through the 
making of a new constitution, it leaves its extralegal position for a juridical state of 
stability, that is of durability.”182  “It” that is extralegal in the previous sentence means 
the sovereign of the people, and it is essential to Schmitt’s schema that “In normal times, 
sovereignty becomes invisible…The people do not constantly need to be mobilized and 
activated.  With a constitution they can rest.”183   
In the paragraphs that will follow, we will see Ackerman’s movements between 
the original Founding moment of America, which must have existed before the 
Constitution (it is not clear when precisely we became a people for Ackerman) and the 
consolidation of the regime that has a Constitution and is constituted by it to a degree 
where the people “can rest.”  Although it will not be apparent when the ordinary people 
appear on the stage, they will be represented by Ackerman throughout the effort to create 
a new constitution by elites.  Although this elite theory does not work so well with 
Schmitt, the rest of Ackerman’s account does, and so we again turn to Kalyvas’ adept 
comparison: 
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Both Schmitt and Ackerman focus on legal disruptions and juridical 
discontinuities.  Despite his distinct phraseology, Ackerman acknowledges that 
genuine constitutional changes usually break with inherited forms of legality and 
disrupt the existing system of laws…This tension between popular power and the 
established legal order, legitimacy and legality, informs several of Ackerman’s 
most provocative suggestions.184 
This suggested comparison should also remain in our minds for the last section of this 
chapter, as it states strongly not only that democracy and legality are in tension, but also, 
between the lines, that power and legitimacy may be opposed.  If popular power becomes 
too strong during periods of change, what will happen to veneration, which rests on 
legitimacy?  I will leave this as an open question, but it should be clear by the end of the 
Chapter that I find Ackerman’s answer sorely lacking. 
Beginning with the founding, we see that instead of the opponents of the 
Federalists protesting “Federalist lawlessness by boycotting the elections [for the 
ratifying conventions], thereby depriving them of their legitimacy…Instead, they 
responded to the Convention’s appeal to the People by competing for support in a 
relatively fair and open contest,”185 allowing for what Ackerman calls “quasi-direct 
democracy.”186  As the Federalists moved from the Annapolis to the Philadelphia 
convention, from debating in Virginia to New York, they encountered a number of legal 
difficulties, and Ackerman emphasizes these difficulties in order to show that the people 
were there at each step to accept or deny the illegal proposals.187  They made these 
proposals during the procedural steps of signaling, proposing, triggering, ratifying, and 
consolidating their constitutional authority.”188  
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Signaling occurs when “the new movement ha[s] gained sufficient political 
authority to demand that others take its constitutional intentions seriously.”189  Proposing 
then moves into actual actions taken by a branch of the government that changes the rules 
of the game—for example, the Emancipation Proclamation.190  Triggering involves 
shifting reform into acceptance by the people as a constitutional fait accompli, or in the 
case of Andrew Johnson’s triggering after the death of Abraham Lincoln, he “shifted the 
constitutional baseline from the one established by Article V.”191  Finally, ratifying 
means acceptance by the people and consolidating means politicians of the future 
acquiesce in the new precedent created by this five-stage process.  These procedures are 
then repeated, according to Ackerman, after the Revolutionary period, during 
Reconstruction and the New Deal. 
When Ackerman moves to Reconstruction, he defines that period as 
just that—rebuilding the Union from the ground up.  The Reconstruction 
amendments—especially the Fourteenth—would never have been ratified if the 
Republicans had followed the rules laid down by Article Five of the original 
Constitution.  The Republicans were entirely aware of this fact, as were their 
conservative antagonists. The amendments gained recognition only because the 
Reconstruction Congress successfully challenged, with remarkable self-
consciousness, two basic premises of the system for constitutional revision 
handed down by the Founding Federalists.192 
These two premises, federalism and change through elected assemblies, Ackerman notes, 
are to be thrown out the window with the Reconstruction amendments—the processes by 
which consent was given in the founding era no longer holds. But though it is certainly 
right that in principle that those principles were important at the founding, we must ask 
ourselves how important.  After all, the founding innovation was illegality, and it is hard 
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not to see the initial railroading through of the Reconstruction amendments by the North 
onto the South for readmission to the Union as illegal by the standards explicitly laid out 
in the Constitution.  Interestingly enough though, when thinking about the Founding, we 
should consider William Forbath’s questioning of Ackerman’s account: 
Or, to pose the problem another way, does Ackerman’s account of the Founding 
events of 1787-1788 ironically treat as legally authoritative the one prior 
‘moment’ in our constitutional history that was arguably the most unconventional 
of all: the revolutionary transfer of authority from empire to republic that occurred 
during the months surrounding the decision for independence?193 
If Forbath is right and the moment of the Declaration of Independence must be 
considered a legal foundation, despite its actual illegality in throwing off the bounds of 
the Crown, where does that leave Reconstruction, with its use of the amendment 
procedure as an example of illegality?  Ackerman’s case here given Forbath’s 
questioning is not very strong.   
When he arrives at the New Deal, Ackerman notes that “The New Deal 
revolution, then, broke with Article Five in two different ways: (1) it substituted a model 
of Presidential leadership of national institutions for a model of the assembly leadership 
based on a dialogue between the nation and the states; (2) it used transformative opinions 
as amendment-analogues.”194  This then allowed another means to reach the end Article 
Five intends: “It simply provided the People with another, more nation-centered, 
alternative in which the Court responds pragmatically to the sustained demands for 
constitutional change voiced by the President and Congress on the basis of an escalating 
series of electoral mandates from the citizenry.”195  But what role did the people actually 
play?  Forbath again has an incisive vision of what Ackerman is actually doing: 
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Ackerman asserts rather than demonstrates an equivalence between the outlook of 
reform elites and those of popular movements.  The latter are the seedbed of new 
constitutional visions in Ackerman’s theory, yet we never glimpse them or their 
visions in his narratives.  To put it harshly, for Ackerman, the popular will was 
whatever the elites said it was, and this [1924] equation helps underpin the claim 
that popular deliberation and decisionmaking are at the heart of the Ackermanian 
higher-lawmaking process.196 
As we have already seen in the example of Frederick Douglass and the abolitionist 
movement and will see especially in the discussion of Martin Luther King Jr. in the 
Conclusion, popular movements are not controlled by the ruling elites.  In fact, returning 
to the motif of public opinion in Chapter 2, we should note with Eric Foner that the elites 
are not even the ones who provide the language in social movements.  That language is 
adopted later by the establishment, or as he writes: 
Abolitionists invented the concept of equality before the law regardless of race, 
one all but unknown in antebellum American jurisprudence.  Before the Civil 
War, the movement was thoroughly alienated from a succession of 
administrations that seemed firmly in the grasp of the ‘Slave Power’ (as 
antislavery Northerners came to call the planter class).   
It is also important to note how important the critical aspect of veneration was in the 
abolitionist movement, which, as Foner points out below, only makes sense in the 
rewritten language of Reconstruction that the abolitionists created: 
Yet, in the ideas of a national citizenship and of equal rights for all Americans, 
abolitionists developed a constitutional outlook that would flourish during and 
after the Civil War.  They glimpsed the possibility that the national state might 
become the guarantor of freedom, rather than the enemy, another idea written into 
the Constitution during Reconstruction.197 
Ackerman notes that in considering changes to the Constitution, we should begin 
by assessing Article Five change.  But his “more fundamental question” is “Should 
modern Americans read Article Five as if it described the only mechanisms they may 
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appropriately use for constitutional revision at the dawn of the twenty-first century?  The 
text does not provide an answer…”198 Ackerman himself argues for a pluralistic 
approach, one that can incorporate Reconstruction and the New Deal as amendments to 
the Constitution.  If Ackerman is to be consistent, then he must choose between the 
illegalities he describes proudly to be characteristic of the American project and the 
legalistic pluralism he argues makes the system coherent, that is, if the pluralism is as 
legal as he states it is.  As Rogers Smith notes: “In the end, Ackerman’s legalism leads 
him to underemphasize what the nation’s experience during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction teaches about the problem of political legitimacy”199—namely, as the 
second part of this quotation used earlier in this chapter shows, that legitimacy ultimately 
rests on goodness, not legality as Ackerman makes it out to seem.  
In order to sync Ackerman with himself in this theoretical difficulty, it is most 
helpful to view his arguments through the lens of illegality, as that is where he hangs his 
hat for most of the two volumes of We the People.  However, if adding the pluralist 
argument would make this illegality would be ameliorable illegality—meaning, the 
consent of the people at the end of the process can transform illegal actions and programs 
into legal ones, even if they were not initiated through Article Five procedure—his 
argument becomes a more coherent whole.200  Therefore, this is the way the Philadelphia 
Convention worked, so it seems quite reasonable to attribute the same rationale to an 
altered version of Ackermanian theory.   
But still, I do not agree that the recreation of the Union through constitutional 
moments was necessary to make it possible to justify illegal activities in the service of the 
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Union at large.  Certainly, Reconstruction and the New Deal were special times in 
American history, but the seeds of those movements existed at the time of the founding.  
Reconstruction through the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the conflicts 
those amendments caused were evident in founding debates over representation of slaves 
and the belief by some founders that slavery should not be tolerated in the American 
Union.  The Civil War was a realization of the founders’ worst fears, and, although 
Ackerman makes a good case for how aspects of the post-war Reconstruction era were 
illegal, I do not think illegality to be new—and for that matter, neither does Ackerman.  
The founding was illegal, at least until, as James Madison argued in Federalist 40, the 
people bestowed their approbation on the new Constitution.  In the case of the New Deal, 
I also accept Ackerman’s premise that new ways of non-Article Five change were 
important, but I am not sure that pioneering judicial opinions did not exist from the start, 
or that they maintain the model of illegality Ackerman wants to demonstrate.  John 
Marshall’s opinions in Marbury and McCullough both seem to me to be revolutionary, 
and they came at the start of the republic.  From Marbury’s statement of judicial 
review—not new to the founders, but new to how the Court system would work—
establishes justices as deciders of when political questions exist and when they do not, 
and leaves it to justices to justify those decisions.  In McCullough, the future extent of 
national power can be glimpsed.  In short, there are precedents from the beginning to 
show how national the system will probably become, contra Ackermanian theory. 
A propos of the power of judicial precedent, James Boyd White argues, Marshall 
was able to draw on the “mythic origins of the Constitution [which] not only place the 
power of exposition naturally in the hands of the Court, they inform us as to the spirit and 
manner in which that power should be exercised,” as well as reminding us that the 
original constitutive power of the people is gone.  Furthermore, White argues, because of 
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the style and content of the opinion, “Marshall’s opinion seems to be less an 
interpretation of the Constitution than an amendment to it.”201  Although I tend to agree 
that Marshall fundamentally changed parts of the Constitution, it is troubling, both for 
Ackerman and myself, to imagine the Constitution solely explicated by the Court.  
Nevertheless, one of Marshall’s “amendments” has to be seen as the increasing 
nationalization of America. 
Not only was the Constitution much more national than it was sold to the anxious 
states as in 1787, but it was designed to become more national over time.    If this 
analysis is correct, Ackerman is confronted with some difficulties.  Although he 
acknowledges the nationalism of the founders,202 he does not go far enough.  Men like 
Hamilton and later Chief Justice John Marshall were truly working towards nationalism 
from the beginning. The Anti-Federalists were aware of this strain in Federalist 
constitutional thought, and thus for good reason were quite suspicious of the project. 
Introducing a collection of Anti-Federalist works, Ralph Ketcham notes that according to 
the Anti-Federalists, 
The aspirations of the Federalists for commercial growth, westward expansion, 
increased national power, and effective world diplomacy were in some ways 
attractive and worthy, but they also fitted an ominous, all-too-familiar pattern of 
‘great, splendid…consolidated government’ and ‘Universal Empire’ that the 
American Revolution had been fought to eradicate.203 
I agree with the principle Ketcham elaborates here, if not the sentiments—regret and fear 
for the future—with which the Anti-Federalists would surround it.   
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HOW TO IDENTIFY ACKERMAN’S “CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS”  
Ackerman’s constitutional moments at first seem to only be identifiable post hoc.  
However, although he does not back this up with explanations of what other movements 
qualify under the “Federalist precedent” of constitutional moments, he does note that 
there are other “serious movements…entitled to sustained study” that he does not 
specifically identify (though from his first volume of We the People, we should assume 
that the civil rights movement is one of them, as he later confirms in his Holmes lectures 
in 2006).204  He justifies this lacuna by invoking the specter of partisanship: it is easier to 
identify movements that everyone will agree with as constitutional moments if everyone 
is now agreed that the end result was good, just, and—eventually—legal (although his 
use of the New Deal calls that particular motive into question given the Republican 
Party’s continued attack on some New Deal programs).   
But how can we identify these moments?  Ackerman would argue that the stages 
of “signaling, proposing, triggering, ratifying, and consolidating… constitutional 
authority”205 should alert us to the presence of a constitutional moment.  But waiting for 
the five stages to occur would mean that we can only distinguish these moments from 
other moments in history that were less fully formed or less in concert with the wishes of 
the people post hoc.  This is problematic.  Additionally, it seems difficult to go along 
with Ackerman’s theory as the only non-Article V means of change.  What of social 
movements that use far less of the establishment’s authority than Reconstruction and the 
New Deal did?  What if the movement appears from the ground up instead of relying on 
what I still believe—despite Ackerman’s objections—is a far too anthropomorphic notion 
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of “We the People” led by elected representatives?206  It is anthropomorphic because it is 
not clear, again, despite Ackerman’s objections, that actual individual people are doing 
much beyond voting in Ackerman’s general schematic.  In the paragraph I cite in the 
previous footnote, Ackerman does not focus so much on institutional power-models—
otherwise known as the Presidency, Congress, and Court as actors—as on citizen 
participation. Elsewhere in his books he minimizes the role of citizen participation by 
maximizing the role of institutional actors and using vague explanations for how the 
citizens would participate (for example, his use of the word “dialogue” without any 
explanation for how a dialogue might begin), a problem to which Forbath has already 
called our attention.   
For example, in his Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures at Harvard, Ackerman writes 
a great deal about the changes that came from the Civil Rights Movement, though it is 
unclear how social movement actions, rather than institutional actions, really affect the 
political arena.  This development of the literature surrounding the Civil Rights 
movement in his Holmes lectures should be contrasted with his quite minimal treatment 
of that movement in either We the People volume.  One interesting aspect of Ackerman’s 
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use of the Civil Rights movement in We the People I regards how important Court cases 
should be viewed in the context of their time.  There Ackerman discusses the “prophetic 
course of instruction” in Brown and Griswold by the Supreme Court.  He uses the Civil 
Rights movement as a benchmark for participation, which seems reasonable.  However, 
when Ackerman dismisses prophetic instruction by the Court in the name of dualist 
democracy, I admit I find his reasoning less than convincing.  Ackerman, much as he 
protests to the contrary, does not focus on ground-up initiatives, but rather on the actions 
of political figures who might interact with the people more during a constitutional 
moment than usual, but are hardly populist figures.  Although dismissing the prophetic 
may be wise, it is difficult to see how Ackerman makes the case he claims to make.207 
Another invocation of King in We the People I is curious, as he places him 
alongside Madison, Lincoln, and Roosevelt.  How does this make sense if the Civil 
Rights Movement was a constitutional moment not yet worthy of mention in We the 
People’s pantheon of 3 (Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal)?  From my view, 
it does not make sense, and it calls attention to the larger problem in Ackerman’s 
constitutional moment theory: by emphasizing only the biggest moments in American 
history, constitutional moments do not necessarily overlap with successful social 
movements.  This is problematic because social movements are usually ground-up 
movements that Ackerman should prize, though it is hard to say if he actually does or 
not.208   
This leads well into his next mention of King—this time alongside Jefferson—as 
an exemplar of what social movements should be.  But then two pages later Ackerman 
distinguishes political from social movements that are types of revolutionary reform.  
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Perhaps this is why the Civil Rights Movement is distinguished from the other “real” 
constitutional moments—constitutional moments could be political moments only?  But 
given how much of an effect the Civil Rights Movement had on politics, it seems that it 
would be very difficult to separate political from social movements.  Overall, this 
potential separation seems bizarre, but remains unexplained in Ackerman’s work.209 
The moments that appear as constitutional moments in Ackerman’s Holmes 
Lectures appear to be somewhat different from what he defines in We the People—
namely, there are eight of them.  He goes from the founding to the Jeffersonian 
revolution to the Jacksonian revolution to the Republican revolution to the Populist 
revolution to the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement to now (whatever that means, 
as it is not defined what moment we are in at present, or who is aiming to change the 
status quo).  But they are not always successful: as Ackerman notes: 
With each turn of the wheel, the oppositional movement proposes a revisionist 
diagnosis of the public and its problems - sometimes gaining massive support 
from the American people, sometimes falling short…The living Constitution is a 
product of these eight cycles of popular sovereignty, and its study requires careful 
attention to the themes and variations elaborated over the course of two centuries. 
History is full of surprises. No cycle is the exact replica of any other. But if we 
are to understand the real and existing American Constitution, we must put each 
cycle in the context of the others, summing up the constitutional conclusions 
reached by the American people over two centuries of struggle. We cannot 
blindly suppose that the formal constitutional text tells us all - or even most - of 
what we need to know.210 
Then, moving away from the eight cycles, some of which were successful, others not so 
much, Ackerman moves to his main example: the Civil Rights Movement, now 
considered a successful moment. Ackerman begins his discussion of the civil rights 
movement as one of his eight constitutional cycles by defining Brown as a signaling 
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event, one that was followed by not very much presidential action by President Kennedy.  
When he was assassinated, however, and Lyndon Johnson assumed the Presidency, he 
was able to enter the proposal stage with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Ackerman then 
argues that “the campaign of 1964 culminated in a triggering election, which legitimized 
the Act’s revolutionary reform in the name of We the People—authorizing further 
landmark statutes and pushing the institutional dynamic toward a fourth stage: 
ratification.”211  This process ended with the Nixon administration’s consolidation of key 
Civil Rights victories by statute and Supreme Court mandate.212   Where, besides voting, 
are the People-with-a-capital-P involved?  The short answer seems to be: they aren’t.  
What are potential reasons for this?  Ackerman could be worried that too much action by 
the People would prove problematic on a large scale because they might not properly 
channel their ambitions into the institutional process.  Beyond that, I simply cannot guess 
his reasoning, especially considering the fact that his two benchmarks for goodness of a 
political order are popular consent and legality—should not then popular consent and the 
popular action it takes to derive consent be far more important to Ackerman? 
 
CRITICAL VENERATION AND ACKERMAN’S MODEL: INCOMPATIBLE? 
At the start, it would seem that Ackerman does follow a sort of critical veneration 
theory, as he begins his first volume by stating 
Lest I be mistaken too quickly for Pangloss, let me say that, even if this project 
succeeded beyond my wildest hopes, it does not lead straightaway to Utopia.  As 
we discover the distinctive features of our Constitution, we will find much that is 
imperfect, mistaken, evil in its basic premises and historical development…We 
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cannot remain comfortable with the status quo; the challenge is to build a 
constitutional order that is more just and free than the one we inherited.213 
This sounds very much like critical veneration, but we know that Ackerman is missing 
the venerative part, and ends up mainly critical.  To venerate, especially to venerate 
beginning with the founders, is fundamentally a preservative enterprise, not a dismantling 
one.  Ackerman dismantles rather than preserves because he chops constitutional history 
in three, rather than seeing the constitutional order as a growing unit that allows 
revolution on the terms of the people and only the people—not by the government 
constituted according to dualist theory.   
Ackerman’s discussion of the Federalist period requires an understanding of the 
unique nature of the American Revolution.  He believes that this notion has been lost 
because of the modern take on what revolutions might mean.  According to Ackerman, 
“during the nineteenth century, Americans had no trouble recognizing Publius as a 
successful revolutionary.  Indeed, they endlessly contrasted their own successful 
Revolution with the sad failures of the Europeans to make a decisive break with 
entrenched despotisms.”214  These days, we apparently are more likely to consider the 
founders counter-revolutionary, under the tutelage of scholars like Charles Beard.  But it 
is unclear what exactly a revolution is for Ackerman by the end of his discussion in this 
book.  As noted earlier in this Chapter, Ackerman identifies moments sparingly (3), but 
seems to have a theory of constitutional cycles (8) that is far more extensive.  Thus his 
three main moments—the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal—are not 
complete benchmarks for where the American system breaks and must be revamped.  
Does this mean that the American system changes with every major election that changes 
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pieces of the political game?  It is unclear to me whether Ackerman would agree with that 
assessment or not.   
In We the People II, however, Ackerman returns much more strongly to his three 
phase revolutionary theory, discussing mainly Reconstruction and the New Deal.  Here it 
seems worthwhile to cite at length both one of Ackerman’s discussions of the 
revolutionary nature of the Thirteenth Amendment, and then a passage explaining why 
the Fourteenth Amendment was so revolutionary and what it did to the country.  The first 
passage is as follows: 
The present chapter begins with the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and 
how it operated as a signal for an intensive round of unconventional constitutional 
activity; it then proceeds to Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, and its use in 
the Presidential elections of 1864, to provide a mandate from the People that 
legitimated the Congressional proposal of the Thirteenth Amendment; then to the 
ways Andrew Johnson used Presidential power to trigger an unconventional 
process of ratification in the Southern states; then to describe how the President 
managed to win unconventional ratification from the Southern states; and finally 
to the role played by Seward’s proclamation of December 18, 1865, in 
consolidating the new amendment.215 
The explanatory passage reads as follows: 
As the next chapters suggest, the constitutional effort to define the grander Ideals 
of the Fourteenth Amendment catapulted the country into a profound 
constitutional crisis, generating a cycle of bitter disappointment, mass popular 
mobilization and institutional improvisation.  As this struggle threatened to spin 
out of control, the fact that Americans had already succeeded in hammering out a 
shared, if minimal, sense of constitutional meaning in enacting the Thirteenth 
Amendment was more important than it might seem on the surface.216 
These passages showcase Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments: they show the 
five stage process where Ackerman claims the people join the government in creating 
constitutional change and the extreme difficulty in making those changes stick.  Despite 
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my qualms about Ackerman’s argumentation generally on revolutionary reforms, it 
seems that with Reconstruction, his argument is strongest.  However, he also identifies 
“mass popular mobilization” as a piece of a dangerous cycle, something that is disturbing 
to advocates of democracy.  As we move on to the New Deal, I believe his argument 
weakens again; for how do transformative judicial opinions actually create a revolution?  
Is it merely a revolution in the thought patterns of elite Americans, or is it a revolution of 
the way government works?  Ackerman would probably argue that both are true, but the 
latter seems particularly tenuous.  It seems unlikely that it is a speedy revolution in what 
people think, because most people do not have access to Court opinions or the knowledge 
it takes to interpret them.  
In his treatment of the New Deal, Ackerman compares it to Reconstruction, 
stating that 
Just as the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment involved different dynamics 
from that of the Fourteenth, the Roosevelt revolution went through two cycles.  
During the 1930’s, the nation struggled with the constitutional implications of the 
Great Depression; during the 1940’s, with those of the Second World War.  In 
both cases, the basic thrust was the same—away from laissez-faire and toward 
activist government first at home and then abroad… 
The myth of rediscovery treats this struggle as a grievous misfortune, a tragic waste of 
time.  I emphasize, in contrast, its positive contribution to the democratic quality of 
debate and decision.  As in Reconstruction, the conflict between the branches presented 
critical choices to the American people with extraordinary drama and clarity.  The 
ultimate outcome was a redefinition of Americans’ relationship to government that was 
more reflective and more democratic than it would have been otherwise.217 
Having an activist government simply does not seem to be extraordinarily 
revolutionary.  To be sure, it was new in some ways.  To move from a paradigm case like 
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Hammer to one like Darby is quite a shift.  But to say that the people were involved in a 
revolution using dualist democracy does not seem right.  Perhaps the four-time election 
of Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats in Congress counts as a “mandate,” but an 
electoral mandate does not a revolution make.  It is thus difficult to justify Ackerman’s 
use of his revolutionary doctrine. 
I will now shift to explaining what I think makes a better model for the 
movements that have accompanied the growth of the American regime.  Were I to use the 
word revolutionary in this discussion, I would not mean it in the same way as Ackerman, 
but instead as something new that builds on the old foundations made at the Founding.  
This is not to say everything old is new again in these moments, and certainly is not to 
say that Ackerman’s focus on three important pieces of our history as turning points is 
wrong.  I even agree with Ackerman, as I stated before, that many of the shifts in 
American thought during the periods he calls constitutional moments are based in some 
form of illegality.  Illegalities that are then ratified by the country, however, do not seem 
to me to be the same as revolutionary breaks.  For example, I would not break the Union 
at the moment Abraham Lincoln suspended habeas corpus, but I would call that action 
illegal.  Thus, I will argue that we must look at the regime as a whole—perhaps even 
beginning from a place similar to Ackerman’s beginning—and watch it grow in fits and 
spurts over time. 
 
WHY WE MUST CRITICALLY VENERATE CONSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
First, it is notable that Smith identifies a place in Ackerman’s work where he 
basically concedes my main point: that the Constitution has evolved in one recognizable 
piece: 
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Though Ackerman repeatedly tries to make American processes of constitutional 
transformation look as legally legitimate as possible, he in fact essentially 
concedes that these claims are unconvincing.  In his more optimistic statements, 
he stresses that there is a plausible ‘sense in which the American Constitution 
remains continuous despite periods of unconventional activity.218 
However, as I imagine this is a slip on Ackerman’s part, I will continue the argument as 
if he always maintains his theory of revolutionary breaks at constitutional moments. 
Jeffrey Tulis argues that constitutional interpretation cannot be clause-bound, but 
rather must rest on constitutional interpretation as a whole.  This interpretation itself must 
not be merely the decision of the Court, but rather, as Sotirios Barber argues, the 
decisions with which the frame of the constitutional government accords:  
the decisions of the Supreme Court are only authoritative when they are adequate 
articulators of a constitutional frame of mind.  If the Constitution is truly supreme, 
Barber shows, decisions of the Court can not determine (in the sense of make, or 
create) the Constitution’s meaning, they can only attempt to discover it.  It 
follows that they can, and often do, fail to articulate the meaning of the 
Constitution.219  
A critique of Ackerman follows from this reasoning because Ackerman focuses on the 
particular structures of each branch at a specific time to signal his constitutional 
moments.  This approach disables him to see what Tulis sees: 
But the familiar argument is that such change [between the nineteenth and 
twentieth century political orders] represents a constitutional revolution is wrong, 
or mostly wrong.  Properly conceived, the Constitution is better understood as the 
generator of these developments rather than the repudiator of them, or most of 
them.”220 
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Thus we can understand Tulis as arguing that the framing of the Constitution led to 
change over time as the institutions of government developed in concert with each other 
and the American people.   
So how does critical veneration fit into a picture like Tulis’s as opposed to 
Ackerman’s?  Critical veneration makes far more sense within a system that changes 
radically over unbroken time than a system with constitutional moments that radically 
break time and stability.  Critical veneration, like any other kind of veneration, requires 
time to germinate.  Alongside critical veneration we can observe constitutional 
aspirationalism also growing over time.  If a system develops out of itself in an 
aspirational manner, it builds on itself internally in tandem with the outside world.  
Furthermore, as Tulis argues in the rest of his book chapter, most of the major changes 
like the New Deal that Lowi and Ackerman identify as a break with the past are 
contained in the controversy over the new Constitution fought between the Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists.  I find this argument convincing and will build the rest of my 
argument for critical veneration in radical times off of this premise. 
By contrast, Ackerman is arguing that without seeing those shifts as constitutional 
moments, we deny the creativity of the American people.  But to say that our most 
generative capacities require illegality is not to agree with Ackerman’s premises that the 
Constitution was created nearly altogether new with the advent of the Reconstruction 
Amendments and the New Deal.  Founding from illegality—or, perhaps refounding from 
illegality if we stretch the meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments and the New 
Deal—sits on precedent from the founders themselves.   
Never do the founders say that creative illegalities must stop with the founding.  
Article V is an option for change, not the only option for change.  Rather, the founders 
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left it open to people to rebel against their governments.  As James Wilson, second most 
influential member of the ratifying convention, wrote in his Lectures on Law: 
the sovereign power residing in the people, they may change their constitution 
and government whenever they please—is not a principle of discord, rancour, or 
war: it is a principle of melioration, contentment, and peace.  It is a principle not 
recommended merely by a flattering theory: it is a principle recommended by 
happy experience.  To the testimony of Pennsylvania—to the testimony of the 
United States I appeal for the truth of what I say.221 
But what might this mean? Wilson’s premise is that civil society underpins the 
government, and thus to change the government does not fundamentally change the 
American people.  Furthermore, what is essential to Wilson’s argument that the people 
themselves are actually changing the government—not their elected representatives.  
These arguments about democratic constitutionalism and the importance of civil 
society underscore the importance of a Madisonian approach to constitutional stability.  
Over time a people can evolve and this is good, but they should evolve in an organic way 
that can only be achieved well by the stability Dieter Grimm points to in the quotation at 
the beginning of this chapter: by maintaining identity over time.  This is why critical 
constitutional veneration is so important, because it allows for a certain sort of 
revolutionary change without making gaping breaks in political history.  If Ackermanian 
revolution is all that is available to a people, I would argue that their social and political 
lives are missing something, a sense of what it means to learn from your roots—in this 
case, the aspirations in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution—and make 
thoughtful and powerful changes to realize the truth of what those roots can offer a polity. 
Interestingly enough, Kalyvas’ description of Schmitt seems to support a form of 
veneration of constitutional texts: 
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The constitution is not only a formal text.  It keeps alive the founding moment and 
preserves the memory of the popular origins of a political regime.  It incarnates 
the political unity of the people, the identity of the regime, and the sources of its 
legitimacy.  For this reason, the citizens must be loyal to a set of higher, 
substantive, political forms and principles and should identify with their 
constitution rather than with some prepolitical, abstract, moral values, or even 
with a purely organic ethnic mythical past.  Schmitt argued, in a tone that 
anticipates today’s discussions about constitutional patriotism, that ‘unity rests, 
therefore, before anything first in the Constitution, recognized by all parties: in 
fact, the Constitution, which is the common foundation, demands an 
unconditional respect.  The ethic of the state becomes the ethic of the 
constitution.222 
This is too authoritarian in its demand for total unity to be critical veneration, but in 
addition to bringing veneration once more to the fore, it also leads me to ask once again 
what the relationship should be between veneration and popular sovereignty.  Schmitt 
seems to be for both, if we examine his notion of the people being first above the 
constitution in their extraordinary-constitution-making power, and then his people being 
able in their third moment (forgetting for now the second moment of ordinary 
lawmaking) to exist in “spontaneous forms of popular mobilization and informal 
participatory intervention that exists side by side with the established political system.”223  
Can a people exist as the first and third moments as well as the second moment?   
It is difficult to know how to answer this question.  The first and third moments 
might exist in one of two ways: tutored or untutored.  If they are tutored, perhaps, like the 
Civil Rights Movement led by King, they are able to keep their ambitions contained to 
one stream of activism, which would probably be where the people mobilized as a whole 
would be most effective.  But what if they are untutored?  Will they be able to create a 
constitutional order from scratch and then know when to change it?  The latter is 
definitely possible, as the people may have been educated to be able to buck the system 
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when necessary.  But to expect the first may be as bizarre as expecting a Rousseauian 
lawgiver to appear to give the people their first laws in accordance with some pre-
existing general will.  Thus it seems unlikely that an untutored people could do what 
Schmitt suggests.   
What is the importance of being tutored or untutored?  It appears that in 
Ackerman’s account, the people are ruled by institutions that do not give them much 
leniency to participate at all, outside of voting and generally approving or disapproving of 
government actions.  This is not serious involvement.  However, in accounts of 
constitutional democracy that we discussed in Chapter 2, or even in Schmitt’s conception 
of popular action just cited, the people by necessity must have a role.  Furthermore, not to 
allow the “People” a role seems downright odd in an Ackermanian system of 
constitutional moments where breaks are supposed to be in the public interest.  How does 
the public show its interest?  Voting is not enough.  However, tutored does not mean 
excessively tutored.  Having learned from outside mentors or other political systems how 
to act when there is a problem in your own backyard is not to be disparaged.  Being 
excessively tutored, or perhaps even ruled, in order to serve your individual interests, 
however, is somewhat perverse and odd.   
Furthermore, how can popular sovereignty stand a chance against veneration if a 
populace is overly tutored?  Veneration is important, but this dissertation advances 
critical veneration for a reason.  Schmitt’s conception of veneration that I quoted at 
length several pages ago is good in moderation, but terrifying in excess.  To venerate to 
the point where you do not know what is wrong with your system, especially if there are 
outside models that should show you there is another way, is a terrible way of using the 
wonderful effects veneration for a political order can create.  It is, at the very least, a type 
of blind veneration.  At the most, it shows the most dangerous modes of operation of the 
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fascism described in Chapter 2.  Fascism, as Loewenstein would certainly agree, is most 
often not used for the kind of democratic good he was advocating.  
Ultimately, popular sovereignty cannot exist without some distance between what 
the people are told by the government and what they actually think and observe about the 
world around them.  This is analogous to the dialogic communities Madison wrote about 
in Chapter 1 when referring to what I call cautious veneration.  Without this distance, the 
government becomes dangerously unchecked, and the people become dangerously out of 
touch with the representatives they are technically choosing.  Popular sovereignty needs 
air to breathe and most of all it needs critical faculties that are in good repair.  These 
critical faculties are what allow popular sovereignty to be good and not just a feature of a 
form of government.  This is a major part of why Smith and I disagree with Ackerman: 
goodness is one thing, popular consent plus legality is another.  
So, how can we become tutored in popular sovereignty?  First, by not allowing 
the last word during constitutional moments to be determined by institutions alone.  
Institutions are important and they serve functions that a large group of people cannot.  
President Lincoln freed (certain) slaves under the Emancipation Proclamation, not a 
roving band of citizens who would not have had the same authority to do so.  But citizens 
were essential participants in the Civil Rights movement as marchers and members of 
groups that conducted sit ins, demonstrations, parades, and fora to discuss issues.  They 
were tutored, perhaps, by the legendary example of President Lincoln, the experience of 
their ancestors who shook off the bindings of slavery, and by men like Martin Luther 
King, but they were self-tutored enough to respond to men like the latter in ways that 
were quintessentially their own.  They were able to critically venerate their system 
enough to make a difference, and although such a goal is shared by Ackerman and 
myself, I would argue that his version leaves too little fresh air for the people to breathe 
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Chapter 5: What Rights Meant to James Madison and Thomas 
Jefferson 
Thomas Jefferson’s commitment to rights in the form of the Declaration of 
Independence is famous.  He also was an early and strong supporter of having a bill of 
rights included in the new Constitution.  Jefferson’s concern with rights was mainly one 
of rights against oppressive governments.  Looking both at the example of King George 
III and the history of the French monarchy, Jefferson was filled with the desire to prevent 
any such oppression in the United States.  Thus it is fitting that the committee charged 
with drafting the Declaration had Jefferson write the first draft.  The Declaration of 
Independence is an important inspiration for American aspirational constitutionalism, 
and, as has been argued in this dissertation, should be read as containing key rights owed 
to Americans both as Americans and as human beings deserving of rights.  It should also 
be read, as Abraham Lincoln would have advised, as an essential addendum to the 
Constitution’s rights provisions and as a way to better understand the impulses behind 
writing the Constitution.   
Even once the Constitution had been drafted and ratified by nine states, the debate 
over the addition of a bill of rights to the new document raged, especially in New York.  
As gaining New York’s approval was necessary to recreating the Union under the 
Constitution, drafters like Madison began to talk amongst themselves about the potential 
additions to their Convention’s work.  Amidst “one of the most penetrating analyses of 
liberty and power ever written,” Madison wrote to Jefferson that his opinion “‘has always 
been in favor of a bill of rights, provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not 
meant to be included in the enumeration.’”224  In short, Madison was convinced that it 
was wise to frame a government of limited and enumerated powers, and, at that moment 
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at least, did not want a rights declaration to enlarge the powers of government by 
implying that it could do things that in truth, it could not.  Thus in this examination of 
rights we must be careful not to simply examine rights as tools of individuals against 
governments as in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, 
the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, but also as guidelines for action that show the 
nature of American aspirations.   
Rights are good places to put aspirations because they tend to become codified 
both in law and in the minds of the people, both of which are necessary to fully realize 
our aspirations.  If aspirations are only found in documents, they have no force because 
they become what Madison called parchment barriers.  If, however, the people accept 
those aspirations as their own, the people themselves become bulwarks against 
government excess.  Being granted rights also encourages people to expand those rights 
as their conceptions of who is truly a member of their polity expands.  For an example of 
that phenomenon, we should refer back to Chapter 4 where Eric Foner argues that 
abolitionists created the language that was eventually used to justify equal rights for 
blacks in America.  Thus, as we examine Jefferson and Madison on the subject of rights, 
we should remember how much rights have expanded over the course of our republic. 
 
RIGHTS OPPOSED TO POWER 
Virginia Declaration of Rights 
When George Mason drafted the Virginia Declaration of Rights in May 1776, he 
probably had no idea that the document would be so influential for two other Virginians: 
Thomas Jefferson and his Declaration of Independence, written one month later in 1776, 
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and James Madison and his Bill of Rights, drafted in 1789.225  The Virginia Declaration 
contains a strong declaration of the rights of life, liberty, property, happiness and safety, 
as Mason declares that men “cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity” of 
these “inherent rights.”226  Virtually the same clause that is in the Declaration of 
Independence exists in the Virginia Declaration—the right to “reform, alter, or abolish 
[government]”—as well as the necessity to secure the consent of the governed.  
The common good is guaranteed by the Virginia Declaration, unlike in the 
Declaration of Independence or Bill of Rights, perhaps because the utilitarian calculation 
Mason is trying to make for assuring that good is so difficult to ascertain.  One imagines 
Madison had a similar concern with the provision that declares “That no free government, 
or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to 
justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to 
fundamental principles,”227 because all of those values are so difficult to enforce unless 
you have a strong civic religion or some outside influence that promotes them.     
However, Madison must have found much to agree with in the references to 
criminal procedures for trial by jury, regulations against excessive bail, and innocence 
until guilt is proven, freedom of religion and conscience, press, and property.  All in all, 
despite Mason’s document’s inclusion of more regulated virtue for Virginia’s citizens, it 
provides a template for Jefferson and Madison as framers of declarations or bills of 
rights.   
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The Declaration of Independence 
The first formulation of Americans' rights as individuals in a new nation are 
encapsulated in the Declaration of Independence.  First penned by Thomas Jefferson, the 
Declaration is a combination of high philosophical principles and fairly ordinary 
complaints against the British Crown.  In order to best discern Jefferson’s view of rights, 
as opposed to the committee that revised his original draft, we will here compare his draft 
with the finished version on the more philosophical pieces of the Declaration to 
understand what sorts of rights we understand as due to Americans.   
In Jefferson’s draft, he notes not just the desire for separation from the British, but 
the colonies “subordination in which they have hitherto remained.”228  He emphasizes 
that “these truths [are] sacred & undeniable; that all men are created equal & 
independent”229 rather than simply being “self-evident.”  These differences, more than 
the others found between the two texts, are important because they show the nature of 
rights in Jefferson’s mind: they are sacred.  Sacred rights, rights that are “inherent & 
inalienable”230 should not only be inviolable, but unquestioned.  It would seem that these 
rights are a form of natural rights, as it seems the reference to nature and nature’s god 
continues from the first paragraph into the second.  It should once again be noted that to 
the Declaration’s rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is added “the right of 
the people to alter or abolish [government].”231 
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The Constitution 
Upon learning of the ratification of the Constitution by nine states, Thomas 
Jefferson writes to James Madison to congratulate him on his contribution and the 
success of the enterprise.  Unsurprisingly he also uses this letter to address rights he 
argues should be in the newly constituted Union’s bill of rights.  Many of these rights 
recollect to Mason’s list in the Virginia Declaration, but they are worth listing here again: 
“It seems pretty generally understood that this should go to Juries, Habeas corpus, 
Standing armies, Printing, Religion and Monopolies.”232  Before going through the 
exceptions to the rule of each right, he states, “The few cases wherein these things may 
do evil, cannot be weighed against the multitude wherein the want of them will do 
evil.”233  He gives many examples of the dangers during times when those rights might 
not be in force, but it is the suspension of habeas corpus that is most interesting to us 
here, given the role of emergencies in Chapter 3 where Jefferson’s parallel views were 
examined.   
Jefferson states: 
Examine the history of England: see how few of the cases of the suspension of the 
Habeas corpus law have been worthy of that suspension.  They have been either 
real treasons wherein the parties might as well have been charged at once, or 
sham-plots where it was shameful they should ever have been suspected.  Yet for 
the few cases wherein the suspension of the hab. corp. has done real good, that 
operation is now become habitual, and the minds of the nation almost prepared to 
live under it’s (sic) constant suspension. 
This getting used to living under law applies the same principles Madison calls on in his 
defense of veneration, except that these principles are in action for bad ends of subverting 
rights rather than good ones of stabilizing the government.  Jefferson basically writes 
here that if people live too long under a bad absence of law, they will not know that they 
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should be living under good law.  False opinion propagated by the government—that 
habeas corpus can be safely suspended—will eventually convince the people that they 
have no need of that law to be safe.  But if they were used to having the writ of habeas 
corpus protected, then when it would be taken away there would be not just public 
outcry, but also public suspicion over the government’s motives and proofs for doing so.  
This would make the people into the vigilant people Madison praises in his National 
Gazette essays and perhaps even the more vigilant people who can critically venerate the 
Constitution. 
 Therefore it is particularly interesting that Madison states on the same subject of 
habeas corpus that “Should a rebellion or insurrection alarm the people as well as the 
Government, and a suspension of the Hab. Corp. be dictated by the alarm, no written 
prohibitions on earth would prevent the measure.”234  This is a middle ground on bills of 
rights between this section of this chapter on the rights of the people and the section that 
follows this on the powers of government.  Madison’s argument here seems to be that 
mass panic will cause government and governed alike to abandon the law.  This seems 
sensible.  However, the correct Jeffersonian rejoinder should be that once the immediate 
danger is over, the safer way for the people to be is used to having the protections of 
habeas corpus rather than not used to having it, because once the people are calmer, they 
will desire to return to their previous organization of government.   
The Bill of Rights 
Jefferson defends the idea of a bill of rights with the suggestion that it would 
grant necessary powers to the judiciary to protect the people against the other branches of 
government.  He then appears to agree with Madison when he argues that the federal 
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government is indeed limited enough that a bill of rights might not be necessary, but 
concludes with a more typically Jeffersonian opinion: that the new government “leaves 
some precious articles unnoticed, and raises implications against others,” and therefore 
becomes an instrument that “forms us into one state as to certain objects, and gives us a 
legislature and executive body for these objects.  It should therefore guard us against their 
abuses of power within the field submitted to them.”235 
Jefferson’s next argument is simple: “Half a loaf is better than no bread.  If we 
cannot secure all our rights, let us secure what we can.”236  His next argument is that the 
“subordinate governments,” otherwise known as the states, need principles “to try all the 
acts of the federal government.”237  Finally he simply declares that having a bill of rights 
is more useful than not having one, because he believes in the preventative argument 
regarding rights provisions against the government. 
It is difficult to say if Madison was converted so swiftly to having a Bill of Rights 
after the convention because it was politically expedient or whether he was actually 
convinced by arguments like Jefferson’s for the purpose of securing rights at the federal 
level.  But in letters he wrote in 1789 as a newly elected Congressman, he seems to be 
convinced of the need for amendments to the Constitution to protect rights, amendments 
that “may serve the double purpose of satisfying the minds of well meaning opponents, 
and of providing additional guards in favor of liberty...particularly the rights of 
conscience in the fullest latitude, the freedom of the press, trials by jury, security against 
general warrants, etc.’”238 These rights, along with other guarantees of civil liberties, 
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were inserted as amendments to the Constitution.  Madison attempted to include a 
preamble: 
That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the 
people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of 
acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness 
and safety.   
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform 
or change their government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the 
purposes of its institution. 
Madison’s preamble was not successfully added to the Bill of Rights, but it is interesting 
that it is a statement of principle, not of institutional design.  In the Federalist, Madison 
spends most of his time focused on institutional design, pitting ambition against ambition 
for politicians, refining and enlarging public views by increasing the scope of the Union, 
defining how the federal and national elements of the Union fit together, etc.  But for a 
Bill of Rights, principles, not only institutions, are required.  Madison here states his 
aspirations for Americans as a people, united under or opposed to the new government.  
In this second paragraph, Madison gives the escape clause of the Constitution. It is one 
thing to allow for abolishing government as an idea in the Declaration of Independence or 
even in Federalist 40, but to put this sort of language in the Constitution could have 
much broader implications.  If it had been added, would institutional stability or rights 
have won in a conflict?  Would this language have disturbed the critical veneration of the 
people or would it simply have been a guarantee that not only can we change our 
government, but also we are a people of deep principles and aspirations?  It is difficult to 
know. 
Most interesting among Madison’s amendments was one found nowhere else in 
the literature of the time, an amendment declaring “‘No State shall violate the equal 
rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.’”  
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The editor of Madison and Jefferson’s letters describes this attempted amendment as 
“Madison’s final attempt to write the federal veto of state laws into the Constitution and 
underscored his view that the principal threat to individual rights came from unjust 
majority factions in the states ‘operating…against the minority.’”  Madison adds, “I think 
there is more danger of those powers being abused by the state governments than by the 
government of the United States.  The same may be said of other powers which they 
possess, if not controuled (sic) by general principle, that laws are unconstitutional which 
infringe the rights of the community.’”239 
 
THE BALANCE OF POWER AND RIGHTS 
In a letter to Thomas Jefferson on October 17, 1788, James Madison lays out an 
argument against bills of rights similar to his argument against faction in Federalist 10.  
He writes: 
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression.  
In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the 
invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of 
Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the 
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents.240 
The corollary argument in Federalist 10 is: “Complaints are everywhere heard…that the 
public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often 
decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the 
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.”241  Such are the actions of 
factions, whose members constitute what Madison calls in his letter to Jefferson: “the real 
power in a Government.”   
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 Madison notes that Jefferson, due to his sojourn in France as ambassador, is 
probably more likely to think of examples of princes overreaching, but that in a republic 
different dangers exist.  At least in a principality the multitude who are not able to use 
power to overreach can topple a prince who attempts to overreach.  But in a republic, the 
power of the multitude can drown out the rights of small groups of individuals easily and 
under the name of democracy—majority rule.   
 Yet Madison still defends bills of rights in republics immediately after making 
those claims about the dangers of majoritarianism.  His first reason is that “The political 
truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental 
maxims of free Government, and as they become incorporated with the national 
sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion.”242  This language conveys 
similar sentiments to that language Madison uses to talk about venerating the 
Constitution in Federalist 49, when he notes: “frequent appeals, would, in great measure, 
deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows on every thing, and 
without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite 
stability.”243  The focus on stability in Federalist 49 encourages making “opinion” 
preserved by all the people about their government into something that mirrors the 
“national sentiment” Madison writes about in his letter to Jefferson.   
 This statement of Madison’s that rights language will “acquire by degrees the 
character of fundamental maxims of free Government” answers my question in the 
previous section about the worthiness of rights next to institutions.  It seems Madison 
would argue that these rights almost become institutions in and of themselves.  This also 
takes us back to the discussion in Federalist 49 about opinion.  Opinion is an essential 
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piece of having a constitutional government, for it makes it possible for citizens to be 
united together toward the particular goals and aspirations of constitutional self-
government.   
 Madison’s second reason that bills of rights should still be created in republics, 
whose biggest danger is majoritarianism, is that despite the danger of majorities, “there 
may be occasions on which the evil may spring from the latter sources [the Government]; 
and on such, a bill of rights will be a good ground for an appeal to the sense of the 
community.”244  This process of the government oppressing the people can benefit from a 
bill of rights, if only to remind the people that they are a community that possesses rights.  
However, Madison immediately begins another argument, one that sounds rather strange 
to those who believe the people must protect itself from the government.  He writes first 
what seems to be an obvious argument: “Power when it has attained a certain degree of 
energy and independence goes on generally to further degrees.”245  But he follows this 
line with another: “but when below that degree, the direct tendency is to further degrees 
of relaxation, until the abuses of liberty beget a sudden transition to an undue degree of 
power.”246   
In the second statement, Madison is arguing that too much liberty is dangerous to 
a government.  Perhaps he thinks here of the Articles of Confederation, and the degree to 
which states that had no real national government to govern them were allowed to govern 
without guidance or in direct opposition to the national government.  Perhaps he thinks 
here of various rebellions during the 1780s that prompted the Constitutional Convention 
in Philadelphia in the first place.  But this is certainly not an argument that we hear very 
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often: that rights are in effect oppressing the government.  One way that this could 
manifest itself, however, does exist today.  Most people ignore the body of the 
Constitution in favor of the rights provisions, not thinking of how the procedural, 
structural parts of the Constitution are faring under one government or another.   
Madison concludes, “It is a melancholy reflection that liberty should be equally 
opposed to danger whether the Government have too much or too little power.”247 
Madison seems to be confining his remarks here to American situations only, but we can 
understand his words in light of his more general pronouncements on power and 
liberty—namely that the ruled need to be able to be the rulers and vice versa.  This theme 
helps illustrate what is interesting to Madison about republican government in America: 
the compound republic can teach itself, through adherence to the Constitution and its 
values, to maintain a reliable balance between consent of the governed and guidance by 
the government.  In the end, Madison—as we saw in the previous section—is a friend to 
bills of rights on very limited grounds, as a safeguard of liberty as far as they go, but 
ultimately as potentially salutary parchment barriers.   
 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, Madison and Jefferson were not as far apart as they may sometimes 
have seemed, especially once Madison let go of his initial opposition to including a Bill 
of Rights in the Constitution, or, rather, appended to it.  As Adrienne Koch, a scholar 
who works on Madison and Jefferson, put it: 
Madison’s agreement with Jefferson in regarding constitutions as subject to 
principled alteration was one of many convincing proofs that although he was a 
constitution-maker, he was not a constitution-idolator.  Both men were liberal and 
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experimental in their effort to provide a society that would meet the demands of 
each living being for conditions that would encourage growth and self-respect.  
That was why Jefferson really cared more for bills of rights than he did for 
constitutions…248 
The last sentence of this quotation is particularly interesting because it puts the 
responsibility of forming a people not on venerating institutions, but rather on the 
aspirational parts of the Constitution.  Madison was too concerned with veneration to 
agree with this position, but it is an interesting proposition that rights could be enough to 
constitute a people prone to “growth and self-respect.”  This theme will be addressed 
again in Chapter 6 when we examine the tension between rights and responsibilities in 
the thought of Mary Ann Glendon. 
However, regardless of their disagreements, both Madison and Jefferson 
illuminate pieces of the problem of constitutions and bills of rights—neither sees either as 
a cure-all.  Neither trusts governments to withstand the people if the people do not wish 
to be blocked, and both see the people as extraordinarily powerful forces if they join 
together, whether for Jeffersonian freedom or Madisonian factionalism.  This belief both 
men had in the people is very different than Madison is usually portrayed, but if, again, 
we consider both the Federalist Papers and his National Gazette essays, as well as letters 
to friends and colleagues like Jefferson, Madison seems far more trusting of what a 
people can become if properly taught an expansive notion of civic religion and what 
American aspirational politics ought to be.   
In the next chapter, where I discuss constitutionalism in terms of rights, many of 
these debates are essential to understanding the American situation.  For example, 
Americans such as Madison were not trying to frame international rights as many groups 
do today, but rather to articulate universal rights in a way that makes sense in the 
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American context.  Jefferson was thinking in a more international context, as he was 
living in France when these letters were written, but he was still aware that different 
rights might be more important for certain peoples than others—meaning that where there 
is no institution to protect the people they may need special rights, but that may not be 
true at all in other places where institutions have already created that protection.   
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Chapter 6: Critical Veneration and Rights 
Critical constitutional veneration depends for its appeal on the movement 
America makes towards constitutional goodness.  This goodness can be measured by 
exploring American constitutionalism on two planes.  The first must include our 
commitment to rights (and particularly rights-expansion).  The second notes how many 
people are included and who the people are who are included.  Movement on both planes 
is required for serious constitutional change that leads to greater critical veneration.  For 
example, although the goodness of the constitutional order was at a low during the Civil 
War because key rights were not being protected for African Americans, the creation of 
the 13th-15th amendments show an upward trend in constitutional goodness.  But in order 
to initiate such reforms, President Lincoln and his successors needed a point of view 
similar to Frederick Douglass’s—namely that the Constitution need not be understood as 
pro-slavery and blacks should begin to be a part of the larger political community.  This 
decision moved America closer to constitutional goodness because it included more of 
the people who had previously been excluded from the American promise of self-
government.   As for the second dimension of rights, we can understand that through the 
expansion of rights to citizens under state governments due to the movement towards 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the twentieth century.   This movement towards 
goodness can be understood in Balkin’s formulation earlier in Chapter 2 as the end result 
of successful redemptive efforts.   
The fact that we talk in terms of rights can be seen as positive for America’s 
movement towards goodness in its constitutional order, because rights help articulate our 
key principles, principles which help us to redeem the promises made to our people by 
the aspirational pieces of the Declaration of Independence and Constitution.   The 
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Declaration of Independence especially is a bulwark for our constitutional rights and 
aspirations.  But here, we will also examine the Declaration of Independence, along with 
the 9th and 14th amendments to the Constitution as sources of law and principle, using the 
work of Charles Black.  Black argues that aspirational principles, especially those in the 
Declaration, are laws that we must follow because they form the basis of our contract 
together. 
At first a transition from aspirations as law to the question of whether we should 
use foreign jurisprudential materials in our own constitutional law may seem to be 
missing a necessary connective piece.  That piece is the work on civil religion that Paul 
Kahn has done that comes very early in this second section.  Kahn articulates the values 
behind Justice Scalia’s patriotic parochialism—namely, a vision of civic religion that can 
only extend to those educated properly as Americans.  For this conception of patriotism 
to work, it is essential that this, as I stated in the Introduction to the dissertation, is an 
essentially American project.  But where does this leave Justice Breyer’s more 
internationalist position?  It explains well how aspirations might be universal among 
people and that is much closer to the stance of this dissertation.  Both Justices are 
patriots, but their patriotism takes different forms.  There is even research in political 
psychology that confirms the Madisonian instinct that, like blind veneration, there can be 
what Schatz, Staub, and Lavine call blind patriotism.  Their term for its counterpart is 
constructive patriotism, a term that fits nicely with critical veneration.   
After treating patriotism as an aspect of aspirationalism—after all, we are patriotic 
towards a nation that keeps with our ideas of what good aspirations are and should be in 
the future—I will move to more explicit discussion of general citizen involvement in 
understanding and creating the American project.  This will begin with Mary Ann 
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Glendon’s analysis of rights talk in America, which is judged by James Fleming and 
Linda McClain to be lacking.  
In each of these sections, the underlying premise will be that the use we get from 
rights defined in our Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights, and general 
constitutional law are profoundly important for critical veneration of law.  Black makes 
the most unconventional argument for this, when he argues that the Declaration of 
Independence itself is law.  It is easy to see how the Bill of Rights and other amendments 
connected to the Constitution would be pieces of constitutional law, but how does the 
Declaration fit?  It is clear that it is not ordinary law that can stand on its own as the 
governing document for the country.  Rather, it is the sort of law that contains our 
aspirations for our more procedural or institutional law.  It is also the case that in Chapter 
1 I argued that Jeffersonian veneration of the Declaration of Independence is not enough 
to bind a nation to any sort of veneration.  The question of what kind of law the 
Declaration is remains unsolved here, but it is clear from the way people do in fact honor 
the Declaration that they have reverence for it as the code of their civic religion, even if 
most people would not agree with Black’s assessment of it being on the level of 
constitutional law.  
The two goals for this chapter are first to explicate how rights discourse serves 
critical veneration and then to show how our aspirations can be more fully realized in a 
system utilizing some parts, at the very least, of popular constitutionalism.  But how do 
these two goals for this chapter merge into a single argument?  First, both are focused on 
the centrality of rights as law, begun in America through the Declaration of 
Independence’s guarantees of inalienable rights.  Second, there is a strong link between 
popular constitutionalism’s aim to have the people decide to alter their government and 
the Declaration of Independence that states that the people are allowed to alter or abolish 
 160 
their governments when it seems necessary to them.249  Third, both law according to the 
Declaration of Independence and law according to popular constitutionalism is centered 
on the people, rather than on institutions—both are quite democratic in fact.  Fourth, and 
finally, the goals of both advance the project of this dissertation: examination and defense 
of critical veneration of the law.  By comparing the principles in our rights language with 
the actual laws of the land, we can learn to venerate our government critically, with our 
anchor being our inalienable rights stated first in the Declaration.  
 
CHARLES BLACK ON WHY THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IS LAW 
Would it require abandonment of law to go towards the principles of the 
Declaration of Independence?  To put that question another way: is the fact that the 
Declaration of Independence is a revolutionary document primarily and not a document 
of governance problematic?  Does the right to alter and abolish a regime that commits a 
long train of abuses make the Constitution less binding if we focus on the revolutionary 
document?  Not according to legal scholar Charles Black.  In A New Birth of Freedom: 
Human Rights, Named & Unnamed, Black argues that Americans have a comprehensive 
set of human rights derived from the Declaration.  As he writes: 
Law is reasoning from commitment.  Where do we find those commitments from 
which we may derive our reasoned constitutional law of human rights? 
On the highest level and of fully general scope, there are just three such 
commitments: (1) the opening paragraphs of the Declaration of Independence 
(1776); (2) the Ninth Amendment to our Constitution (1791); and (3) the thirty 
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words or so that are the ‘citizenship’ and ‘privileges and immunities’ clauses of 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment (1686) thereto.”250 
It is easier to see how the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments show our fundamental 
human rights in a constitutional context.  The Ninth Amendment guarantees 
unenumerated rights, and the Fourteenth, using the theory of incorporation, extends those 
rights to a far greater number of people.  These amendments also commit us as a people 
to certain kinds of rights protections that make us the kind of American people we want 
to be—at least if we assume that the framers of these amendments’ intent mirrors our 
intentions and commitments today.  But how does the Declaration of Independence fit in?  
One interpretation of the Declaration, after all, is that it is a political manifesto, not a 
legal document.  But Black argues against this.  He calls the Declaration “an act of 
‘constitution,’ a juristic act, an act of law, after the manner of law in all its 
fields…[because] [t]hese words demolish one legal authority and set up another.251  They 
are, then, constitutive words…[and the] Declaration is the root of all political authority 
among us, of all legitimate exercise of power.”252  This is a compelling argument if we 
consider the historical facts of the promulgation of the Declaration of Independence.  As 
thirteen colonies, Americans were under British rule.  The Declaration of Independence 
was a declaration of war by people who intended to change their political situation and 
re-constitute themselves.  The colonists declared themselves no longer British subjects, 
and did so by announcing a program of rights—inalienable rights—that they were 
entitled to enjoying.  
The Ninth Amendment fits nicely into Black’s schematic of what rights 
provisions in the American case should be.  It   
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speaks of rights ‘retained by the people,’ —‘retained,’ that is to say, in 1789—
enacting that these are not to be ‘denied or disparaged’ by virtue of their not 
having been ‘enumerated in the Constitution.’  The crucial word is ‘retained.’  
What ‘rights’ could ‘the people’ be thought to have had before the enactment of 
this Amendment, though these are not ‘enumerated’ in the Constitution?253 
This last sentence indicates that Black is arguing that the Declaration explicated the rights 
prior to the Constitution, rights that existed for the people by virtue of their being human 
beings, human beings in particular who happened to divine their human right to 
inalienable rights in the Declaration of Independence.  The substance of the existence of 
inalienable rights is of course subject to debate, and has been debated quite often in 
recent years as second and third generation rights become included in constitutions—
most notably in the German Basic Law and the South African Constitution. 
 The fact that rights are inalienable in the American rights discourse is essential to 
our aspirational course towards constitutional goodness.  For example, slavery was a 
direct contradiction to the right to liberty.  Thus in our movement towards constitutional 
goodness prompted by our critical veneration of our constitutional system, slavery was 
abolished for good reasons that already existed within the American system.  This does 
not mean that rights not promulgated in those three places are not rights, or at least not 
aspirations.  The Preamble is a good example of aspirationalism, though oddly an 
aspirational piece that Black does not incorporate into his study.  The Preamble is not just 
pretty language; its placement at the start of the Constitution is a testament to the 
necessity of using symbolic language to interpret and give life to the procedural language 
that fills most of the rest of the Constitution.   
The Preamble, much like the Declaration, fills a necessary symbolic function for 
Americans’ understanding of themselves.  In the example of Martin Luther King we can 
see how these symbols help to create a forum for legal action on extending rights to more 
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Americans.  As Rebecca Klatch notes in her article on political symbolism, it is important 
that we “understand symbols in all of their complexity—as capable of legitimating 
political authority and of instigating political action, as perpetuating domination and as 
inspiring collective rebellion, as forces of constraint and as forces of potentiality.”254 Dr. 
King’s speeches mention both sides of these symbols, treating the oppressors and the 
oppressed, the potentiality for future democratic freedom and the current lack thereof.  In 
his “I Have A Dream,” he “alternated between confrontation (musing that Negroes had 
been given ‘a bad check’) and the visionary nationalism of a dream ‘deeply rooted in the 
American dream.’”255  This movement back and forth between admiration of the 
aspirations of America and wrestling with the problems of America allowed Americans 
to see what a version of their best selves could be and to hope to realize it, but it also 
condemned the actions of the present.  King called out to “the architects of our republic 
[who] wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of 
Independence…[who had] sign[ed] a promissory note to which every American was to 
fall heir.  This note was a promise that all men would be guaranteed the inalienable rights 
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”256   
These actions were fundamentally ones of critical veneration that took the 
Declaration of Independence as seriously as possible.  The commitments to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness that King prized so highly were commitments prior to the 
Constitution.  This strengthens Black’s argument because King was a prominent 
interpreter of the Constitution who justified the American project to many citizens.  
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Abraham Lincoln agreed with this approach in his Gettysburg Address, when he spoke of 
the beginning of the American experiment as “four score and seven years ago:” the time 
of the Declaration of Independence, not the Constitution.  As we move to discuss 
patriotism in connection with rights, it is important to remember that both Lincoln and 
King both saw rights as universal and God-given, not as civil or constitutional.  To agree 
with them changes the way we interpret American rights: should they be characteristic 
only of what our specific polity has learned in the course of its life, or should our polity 
take cues from others around the world?  How can aspirations that either are or seem 
foreign to us useful or harmful to America? 
 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSALIST RIGHTS V. AMERICAN PAROCHIAL RIGHTS? 
In a debate between Justices Breyer and Scalia, Scalia declares, “It seems to me 
that the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to prevent change, not to encourage it and have 
it written into a Constitution.”257  This is one pole of American constitutional debate that 
is obviously far from the aspirational bent of this dissertation.  But there is a significant 
amount of American exceptionalism that exists in a less polarized form.  As Paul Kahn 
argues: “We remain a deeply nationalist country.  Perhaps no other country is as deeply 
committed to its myth of popular sovereignty.  We have a sacred text—the 
Constitution—which we understand as the revelatory expression of the popular 
sovereign.”258  Whether this is a mythological conception of popular sovereignty or not is 
not important here, but the fact that Kahn identifies a real phenomenon in American 
society.  He pokes deeper into a quasi-Scalian consciousness to declare: 
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These points of our civic religion are so firm that we find it almost unimaginable 
that we would yield political or legal authority to institutions and actors outside of 
this web of popular sovereignty and law's rule. To do so appears to us as a form of 
political sin, a worshiping of false gods. Consider, for example, the resistance to 
any sort of international court with compulsory jurisdiction, whether the 
International Court of Justice or the proposed International Criminal Court, or the 
almost impossible task that domestic courts face in trying to understand how 
international law applies to such domestic issues as the death penalty. 
Justice Scalia dismisses Justice Breyer’s reliance on international norms, preferring to 
back his jurisprudence with his originalism and what he considers a proper functioning of 
American democracy.  Giving an example with regard to abortion, he states: “I regard the 
Constitution as having set a floor to American society...change is brought about by 
democracy. Abortion has been prohibited. You want to change that?....eliminate the laws 
against abortion.”259  By contrast, Justice Breyer wants to learn from the international 
sources that frame issues we have in different ways.  He uses a campaign finance case to 
explain his position:  
And now the European Court of Justice—sorry, human rights court gets Mrs. 
Bowman's claim that that limit on her campaign expenditure that few days before 
the election violated the freedom of expression that's guaranteed in the European 
Convention of Human Rights. Does that sound familiar, that issue? Now those are 
not great moral questions, or I'm just looking to their sentiment, but would I be 
reasonable to say I'm curious how they dealt with it? I'm not bound by it.260  
He finds this a fitting means of inquiry because “There are differences, but as law 
students or professors or judges or practitioners, the similarities are far more important, 
and I've seen that in my life, in whatever -- are far more important than the 
differences”261 between various nations’ jurisprudences. 
We have thus seen two radically different approaches to American law and 
aspirations that govern that law.  Although this is an American project, it would seem 
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that, despite the importance of democracy to American critical veneration, the European 
traditions of openness to other legal systems and abilities to transcend, say the Bill of 
Rights for more recently written human rights conventions, would be more congruent 
with aspirational approaches to law.  The American approach typified by Scalia and 
scholars like Jed Rubenfeld freeze American progress in democracy in the moment of the 
founding, which does not really allow for aspirational movement.  As Rubenfeld insists: 
“[t]he U.S. Constitution differed in one fundamental respect from any democratic 
constitution that any large state had ever had: It was enacted through a process of popular 
deliberation and consent.”262  This emphasis on popular sovereignty is similar to Bruce 
Ackerman’s take on American constitutionalism, inasmuch as both see consent as a 
measure of goodness (Ackerman also adds legality).  But is that enough for an 
aspirational people?   
Leaving aside how democratic the founding actually was given the absence of 
large segments of the population from its drafting,263 we continue with Rubenfeld to his 
highly Scalian reasoning that the democratic essence of America “embod[ies] a particular 
nation’s fundamental, democratically self-given legal and political commitments…Hence 
it is critical for constitutional law to be made and interpreted not by international experts, 
but by national political actors and judges,”264 who understand our home-grown 
conceptions of rights, duties, and realities of American constitutional law.  By contrast, 
aspirationalism seems to do much better with a Breyerian cast—one that allows for 
tradition and the American way but also is able to expand into international fora.  As 
Breyer explains:  
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I believe that all of us…ha[ve] in a sense quite a similar framework that fits most 
legal cases. All of us look to texts, all of us are interested in history, all of us are 
interested in tradition, all of us are interested in precedent, all of us, in fact, want 
to understand the value or purpose that underlie the law, and all of us are 
interested in how our decision -- how it will turn out in terms of the consequences 
viewed through the prism of that value or purpose. But there are differences, I 
think, in the weights that different judges tend over time to give those elements in 
different cases.    
This allows Justice Breyer to take from constitutional advances within and without our 
borders.   
 However, Justice Breyer’s reaction to foreign jurisprudence has not been 
common, perhaps because of the lag in popular opinion to an earlier time when the U.S. 
Constitution was the paradigmatic constitution.  As Sarah Harding puts it,  
Even popular opinion about the Constitution reflects a certain 
parochialism…Americans tend to think of questions of basic human rights and 
public policy almost exclusively in terms of their Constitution, as if it were the 
center and source of all such policies domestically and internationally.  Indeed, 
even American insistence on the use of the terms ‘civil’ and ‘constitutional’ 
rights, rather than ‘human’ rights as used in other places, is evidence that a sense 
of shared common experience with other jurisdictions regarding such rights is 
missing.265 
Furthermore, Bruce Ackerman made the complaint in 1997 that even law professors have 
not become comparativists.  As he states: “The typical American judge would not think 
of learning from an opinion by the German or French constitutional court.  Nor would the 
typical scholar—assuming, contrary to fact, that she could follow the natives’ reasoning 
in their alien tongues.”266  He would criticize this dissertation for its parochialism, as he 
writes: “Over the past decade, we have been grappling with the original understanding of 
the Constitution of 1787, the Bill of Rights, and the Reconstruction Amendments with 
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new intensity. Whatever the utility of this debate for Americans, it does not engage the 
texts that have paramount constitutional significance for the rest of the world.”267   
 This is partially true and partially overstated.  Americans—especially as a general 
population not made up mainly of law professors and judges—do have an extremely 
parochial view of constitutionalism, if they have any view of constitutionalism at all.  
Law professors and judges, however, have—with Scalian exceptions—moved towards a 
less parochial and more comparative stance in the last 15 years since Ackerman wrote 
that complaint.  However, there are dangers to ignoring the needs of a specific country in 
favor of universal standards, something of which comparative constitutionalists are 
certainly aware.  Thus, a balance is necessary, one we can find in studying Jan-Werner 
Müller’s work on constitutional patriotism, because he is neither parochial with Justice 
Scalia nor overly universalist like Jurgen Habermas.   
 
CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM: MEDIATING UNIVERSALISM WITH PARTICULARISM 
In Jan-Werner Müller’s conception, constitutional patriotism is meant  
to enable and uphold a liberal democratic form of rule that free and equal citizens 
can justify to each other. The object of patriotic attachment is a specific 
constitutional culture that mediates between the universal and the particular, while 
the mode of attachment is one of critical judgment.268 
In the American context, the universal corresponds to inalienable rights found in the 
Declaration of Independence, while the particular refers more to the American civic 
religion about which Paul Kahn writes.   His interpretation of civic religion that treats 
veneration with a bit of scorn, as he writes that “that we would yield political or legal 
authority to institutions and actors outside of this web of popular sovereignty and law's 
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rule…appears to us as a form of political sin, a worshiping of false gods.”  But Müller’s 
approval of “attachment” based on “critical judgment” in patriotic constitutionalism fits 
nicely with the critical veneration this dissertation aims to explain and encourage, rather 
than Kahn’s view that is largely discouraging of American civil religion and the 
veneration of it.   
How might this critical judgment between particular and universal actually work?  
There are criticisms, mainly in the literature about German constitutional patriotism, that 
this patriotism is either “‘bloodless’” in its universalism or dangerous in its 
particularity.269  It would be bloodless if it were unable to reach the souls of the citizenry 
because it congeals with the rest of the citizenry’s beliefs, aspirations, and even history.  
History is also a problem for those who think constitutional patriotism is too particular, 
and it is here that Germany’s Nazi past becomes relevant, as it is still unacceptable to 
romanticize German patriotism.   
But, if we are able to be critical about both aspects of constitutional patriotism—
universal and particular—it becomes a very useful concept to deploy.  First, I will argue, 
against David Abraham, that a patriotism that is particular can surmount the objection 
that “as a theory for organizing a polity, national belonging needs—and assumes—more.  
It assumes some overarching, shared prepolitical community…”270 This takes us back to 
Dieter Grimm and the integrative functions of constitutionalism.  His first sentence in 
“Integration by constitution” declares, “When we speak of the integrative functions of 
constitutions, we are referring to the extralegal effects of a legal object.”271  He 
specifically cites the American Constitution “which is seen by many as the veritable 
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embodiment of the national myth” to show how these extralegal effects might work.272  
In this mode, we can see particularities of constitutional patriotism in a different light.  
To be sure, there is more to America than the Constitution, particularly the strictly legal 
pieces that do not especially resonate with the American people.  Yet the Constitution, 
and in particular the myth surrounding its creation as a document, are able to unite 
Americans as a people constituted by the Founders.  If we add the Declaration of 
Independence into this equation, it is even easier to see how the national myth might 
work—namely, Americans can see themselves as a revolutionary people who possess 
certain rights enshrined in founding documents who have great aspirations for the future. 
Returning to the critical piece of constitutional patriotism, we must remember 
how fluid the concept of critical veneration is over time.  For example, we venerate a 
Constitution that changes over time, and thus our veneration cannot be fully stable.  We 
also venerate different pieces of the Constitution differently in different times.  As Müller 
notes, Frank Michelman argues that  
citizens are not asked to agree on or accept a particular constitution in all its 
specificity. In fact, it is perfectly reasonable for citizens to disagree even about 
constitutional essentials (and not just their application). Such disagreement will be 
likely, since a general justification, on the one hand, and application, on the other, 
cannot properly be separated…but it should come as no surprise that constitutions 
will serve as the site of intense, yet reasonable, moral and political contestation, 
not least in light of the core idea of fairness that is, as yet, imperfectly realized in 
any existing constitution.273 
 
Müller disagrees with Michelman, however, that the legal aspects of the Constitution are 
all that there is.  The legal, as I have been arguing, is only a piece of constitutionalism.  
Here I also stand with Müller.  He states 
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Constitutional patriotism is supposed to be reflexive. That is, it occasionally must 
be revised and refined in light of the further development and refinement of the 
principles at the heart of our constitutional regime. In that sense, it could also be 
called—drawing on a very Habermasian concept—a “collective learning process.” 
It presumes an open future and the willingness of citizens to adjust the reasons, 
the object, and the mode of their attachment in light of new experiences; 
consequently, they see their constitutional culture as always open and 
incomplete—a project in which those in the past have been engaged and in which 
their descendants will invest.274 
But within this quotation, we should immediately notice that it is not merely the 
principles of constitutions that must be revised—it is also the structures that those 
principles interpret.  Thus constitutional culture must be seen as more than Müller’s 
interpretation of constitutional patriotism.  Most of all, this statement of Müller’s in the 
American context should refer us back to Federalist 14 and Madison’s praise of the 
American people for not relying too much on the past, for looking for a new way to 
constitute themselves.  It is dangerous to go too far into Habermasian openness for fear of 
not retaining what is necessary to sustain a people who are connected by common 
traditions, including legal traditions. Müller understands this, as he states in the next 
paragraph that “We know that, practically speaking, polities cannot live in permanent 
states of self-questioning and ambiguity. The (highly stylized) point is about a basic 
attitude toward politics that calls at least sometimes for intense critical attention.”275  The 
same is true of critical veneration to some extent: in order to venerate we must sometimes 
be very firmly attached to the polity as it is.  But Müller points to a sort of aspirationalism 
here.  We can easily see someone like Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, or Martin 
Luther King Jr. practicing “intense critical attention.”  Thus, universalism and patriotism 
together can provide a fertile ground for nurturing critical constitutional veneration. 
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PATRIOTISM: MY COUNTRY RIGHT OR WRONG? 
In the preceding section, we established that too much universalism and not 
enough patriotism is unlikely to produce good results because rights need to be connected 
to the aspirational needs of a people of one particular place, as well as universalist rights.  
As Robert Schatz, Ervin Staub, and Howard Lavine report: “Patriotism is arguably one of 
the most important forms of group attachment in the modern world.”276  But, as they 
argue, patriotism is not uni-dimensional.  There is a “theoretical distinction between 
‘blind’ and ‘constructive’ patriotism,” where “blind patriotism [is]…a rigid and inflexible 
attachment to country, characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch 
allegiance, and intolerance of criticism.”  By contrast, “constructive patriotism refers to 
an attachment to country characterized by ‘critical loyalty,’ questioning and criticism of 
current group practices that are driven by a desire for positive change.”277 
In Mark Tushnet’s explication of his dichotomy between thick and thin 
constitutionalism, where the former are institutional forms and the latter aspirational 
content, he shows himself to understand why we might need constructive patriotism to 
understand the Declaration of Independence as a fixture in American constitutionalism.  
As he writes of Lincoln’s apple of gold in the picture of silver, he states “The project the 
Constitution established for the people of the United States…was the vindication of the 
Declaration’s principles: the principle that all people were created equal, the principle 
that all had inalienable rights.  This is the thin Constitution.”278  Tushnet expands this 
statement by justifying his use of modern terms—“people” not “men,” leaving aside 
religious terms—in the Declaration “to emphasize that the project is vindicating 
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principles.  Those principles may differ from the interpretation Thomas Jefferson had,” 
by expanding men to all people and eliminating deistic language.279   
He then cites Frederick Douglass as an excellent example of a man who focused 
on the phrase “We the People” and understood it in the broadest sense possible, rather 
than the narrow sense that the founders might have understood it: “As Douglass 
understood, the national project includes vindicating the parts of the Constitution’s 
Preamble that resonate with the Declaration…”280  Tushnet argues that it is a populist 
Constitution that we are interpreting, not a creature of the Court, due only to be 
interpreted by the Court.   
 
LINCOLNIAN AND ANTI-LINCOLNIAN THEORIES OF ASPIRATIONS 
We also must remember that it is not merely a constitution that we are examining, 
but the conceptualizations of how we came to be constituted as a people.  There are 
different ways to interpret how we ought to consider ourselves as a people.  For example, 
some argue that the aspirational approach to principles is perfectionist: as Beau Breslin 
explains, “The act of writing a Constitution… commences a dialogue between text and 
citizen (and future generations) about the pursuit of political perfection.”281  This move 
towards perfection bases itself on aspirations that are generally put forth in preambles.  
Preambles are ideal places to put perfectionist principles not only for prominence but also 
to signal the fundamental commitments of a society.   The American preamble is 
generally thought to be fairly well settled; as Liav Orgad states 
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The United States probably has the best example of an integrative preamble.  
However, just as preambles can foster integration by forging a common identity, 
so also they can be disintegrative, driving people apart and contributing to social 
tension.  This occurs when a preamble reflects only the story of a dominant 
group.282   
On the other hand, as Rogers Smith argues against the perfectionist model, “many 
Americans also defined their core political identities in terms of their race, gender, 
religion, ethnicity, and culture.  They warred passionately and often successfully against 
every force and faction that threatened to give the U.S. citizenry a different cast.”283  
Thus even if Orgad is right about the American integrative preamble, it seems unlikely 
that members of different groups passionately warring against each other would interpret 
the text of that preamble in the same way.  It would seem that we must question any 
perfection-based approach.  It does not matter that Orgad is probably right that “The 
preamble of the U.S. Constitution is an example of Plato’s concept of a preamble because 
it is persuasive, symbolic, and, generally, has no legal force.”284  If the persuasion and 
symbolism have the potential to inspire radically opposed groups, whether a preamble 
has legal force is no longer the question.  The question becomes what inspiration can that 
preamble give to a multitude of groups in a system built on aspirational conflict?  
Even what Abraham Lincoln considers our major aspirational principle—
liberty—as showcased in the Declaration of Independence, means many different things 
to different people.  However, Lincoln’s aspirationalism in the quotation expressing this 
point is rather simple: liberty is our fundamental principle, and only it can hold together 
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the aspirations we have for our government in our Constitution.  As Lincoln explains this 
in his “Fragment on Constitution and Union:” 
The expression of that principle, in our Declaration of Independence, was most 
happy, and fortunate. Without this, as well as with it, we could have declared our 
independence of Great Britain; but without it, we could not, I think, have secured 
our free government, and consequent prosperity. No oppressed, people will fight, 
and endure, as our fathers did, without the promise of something better, than a 
mere change of masters. 
The assertion of that principle, at that time, was the word, "fitly spoken" which 
has proved an "apple of gold" to us. The Union, and the Constitution, are the 
picture of silver, subsequently framed around it. The picture was made, not to 
conceal, or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and preserve it. The picture was made 
for the apple—not the apple for the picture.285 
Thus constitutional aspirationalism can be understood as a commitment to the 
principles—for I imagine that Lincoln would allow for additional ideals to join liberty in 
the pantheon of American principles—that create constitutional identity, so that 
“constitutional fulfillment can be measured and assessed in accordance with the 
progressive achievement of goals identified by constitutional actors.”286 
Yet for aspirationalists, principles—even contested ones—are the things that 
matter.  Abraham Lincoln goes to the Declaration of Independence as well to justify 
liberty.  By giving voice to a foundational principle, liberty, the Declaration of 
Independence plays a role ordinarily found in preambles:287 it shows our deepest 
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aspiration in forming and maintaining our constitutional government.288 In the 
contemporary literature, we see that Balkin starts his analysis with the Declaration of 
Independence because it “constitutes us” in a way that most of the Constitution does 
not.289  Tushnet also begins from the Declaration because “The Declaration and the 
Preamble provide the substantive criteria for identifying the people’s vital interests.”   
Mark Tushnet’s “thin constitutionalism” is aspirational and is meant for people 
who are schooled in critical veneration.  Without some aspect of critical veneration, the 
people would not be able to improve upon the Constitution themselves rather than relying 
on the Court to do so.  Tushnet distinguishes between thick and thin constitutionalism: 
the thick Constitution includes the structures of the Constitutions, what we might think 
about as hard-wired or procedural features of the Constitution, “[t]he thin Constitution is 
different in this regard.  We can think of the thin Constitution as its fundamental 
guarantees of equality, freedom of expression, and liberty.”290  These guarantees come 
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from the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution, and Tushnet 
notes that Lincoln would have agreed with his notion of thin constitutionalism: 
Political scientist Gary Jacobsohn has helpfully retrieved an obscure note written 
by Abraham Lincoln, describing ‘[t]he Union and the Constitution’ as ‘the picture 
of silver,’ the ‘frame[],’ around the ‘apple of gold,’ the principles of the 
Declaration of Independence: “The picture was made for the apple—not the apple 
for the picture.’  The project the Constitution established for the people of the 
United States, Lincoln believed, was the vindication of the Declaration’s 
principles: the principle that all people were created equal, the principle that all 
had inalienable rights.  This is the thin Constitution.291 
The frame, to use Lincoln’s language, is binding in a court of law.  Charles Black would 
argue that the apple is as well.  Understanding constitutionalism through the frame and 
the apple together gives meaning to the frame and the apple gives voice to the people’s 
aspirations.   
But what would it mean to realize these aspirations?  Mark Tushnet warns us 
against one approach, stating that we should guard against 
treat[ing] the Declaration and the Constitution as the organic seeds of a process 
that has been working itself out over history, almost without regard to what the 
people of the United States actually choose.  That [opinion] denies that we are 
dealing with a project, that is, a self-creating activity in which the people of the 
United States daily decide whether to continue to pursue the course we have been 
pursuing.  This expresses the Declaration’s commitment to self government.292 
Tushnet is right in one sense; it is deeply problematic because history is not an Hegelian 
exercise with the world just simply evolving towards the best aspirations of all the 
people.  This statement, however, is correct insofar as the American project has been 
continuous over time and has maintained certain aspirations over that time.  To not regard 
the Declaration and Constitution as seeds moves a bit too close to Ackerman’s argument 
that I argued against in Chapter 4—namely, causing us to ask with Ackerman whether the 
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project of America has substantially changed over time, particularly in constitutional 
moments that do not elucidate new pieces of a past program, but rather create new 
programs of work for the American people.  The project of the Founders is our project 
today, whether they would recognize it or not.  In the same way that the Anti-Federalists 
mentioned in Chapter 4 identified many of the developments that the nation was bent on 
a course to realize, especially the increasing trend towards nationalism, Abraham Lincoln 
and after him Martin Luther King Jr. looked back to Thomas Jefferson and the promises 
of the Declaration.   
Tushnet also cites Lincoln arguing against those who disapproved of his 
suspending of habeas corpus, saying “‘Are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the 
Government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?’”  Tushnet correctly assesses 
Lincoln’s reasoning, writing “As Lincoln saw it, the Constitution should be interpreted to 
advance the Declaration’s project, when its terms were fairly open to such an 
interpretation.”293  Often it is the case that the Declaration’s project is open, according to 
Tushnet: “But of course the Declaration’s principles are not self-interpreting.  People will 
inevitably disagree over the question of what policy actually advances the Declaration’s 
project in particular circumstances.”294 
Whether the Constitution possesses this openness, however, is not as easy to 
discern as I have just quoted Tushnet to make it seem.  Tushnet himself is aware of this, 
and notes that “A political leader will have to forge substantial agreement on the 
proposition he or she is asserting really does involve the vital interest of the people, often 
in the face of significant opposition.”295  This is the basis of what Tushnet calls populist 
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constitutional law.  He means that not only do political leaders need to fight to get people 
to agree with their interpretations of the Constitution, but that “the Constitution belongs 
to us collectively, as we act together in political dialogue with each other—whether we 
act in the streets, in the voting booths, or in legislatures as representatives of others.”296  
Thus, he defines populist constitutional law “as a law oriented to realizing the principles 
of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution’s Preamble.  More specifically it 
is a law committed to the principle of universal human rights justifiable by reason in the 
service of self-government.”297   
This talk of universal human rights loops back to our discussion of universalism 
v. particularism.  But Tushnet manages to avoid the universalist difficulty, which would 
distance his work from the quintessential American-ness of this project by inserting his 
populist constitutionalism as the arbiter of what universal human rights might mean.  The 
Declaration of Independence was drafted by and is now interpreted by Americans, not by 
those not tutored in the American system and how that system is to work with the 
American institutions that were put into place at the same time as the Preamble.   
 
THE DIFFICULTIES OF AMERICAN RIGHTS TALK 
Finally we must consider what effects various permutations of discussions of 
rights are beneficial to the American system as far as civic consciousness and community 
are concerned.  In this section we will not be concerned with universalist and particularist 
conceptions of rights, but rather what ends those rights serve, and in particular, do those 
rights serve to make us more responsible citizens.  In her book, Rights Talk, Mary Ann 
Glendon writes of the difficulties of having “rights talk” rather than responsibility talk, 
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especially in the American context.  She attributes this mainly to the absolute nature of 
our rights talk, noting that 
Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens 
social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus, 
accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground.  In its silence 
concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone acceptance of the benefits of 
living in a democratic social welfare state, without accepting the corresponding 
personal and civic obligations…In its neglect of civil society, it undermines the 
principal seedbeds of civic and personal virtue…298 
She is not wholly pessimistic about America’s ability to change; in fact, on the 
next page, Glendon writes 
A refined rhetoric of rights would promote public conversation about the ends 
towards which our political life is directed.  It would keep competing rights and 
responsibilities in view, helping to assure that none would achieve undue 
prominence and that none would be unduly obscured.  It would not lead to the 
notion that freedom is being able to do anything you want.299 
Jim Fleming and Linda McClain agree with these passages of Glendon’s project in their 
work, Liberalism with Responsibilities, which is otherwise critical of Glendon’s work, in 
large part because Glendon’s communitarianism leads her to emphasize “responsibility as 
accountability.”300  By contrast, they agree with Ronald Dworkin’s emphasis on 
“responsibility as autonomy.”  As they state, “responsibility as accountability connotes 
being answerable to others for the manner and consequences of exercising one’s rights, 
whereas responsibility as autonomy connotes self-governance, that is, entrusting the 
right-holder to exercise moral responsibility in making decisions guided by 
conscience.”301  This autonomy discussion leads Fleming and McClain to one of their 
project’s guiding principles: it “conceives the Constitution as a charter of positive 
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benefits imposing affirmative obligations upon government to secure the preconditions 
for…justice,”302 which ties together well with their contention that “government…has an 
important responsibility to carry out a formative project of fostering persons’ capabilities 
for democratic and personal self-government.”303  These statements do not mean that all 
rights will be well used or morally used.  This is neither shocking nor unreasonable. 
However, there may be a difficulty with rights as autonomy versus accountability 
if we consider Fleming and McClain’s educative project.  How are we to convince people 
who understand the Constitution as a granter of “a charter of positive benefits…[and] 
preconditions for justice” that they should be “fostering…capabilities for democratic and 
personal self-government”?  Looking at the Constitution as a rights-granting document is 
important.  So is making the Constitution a just document.  These are good goals, but 
they are not goals that make people look outside themselves as they will need to be good 
democratic citizens.  It would seem to help quite a bit with personal self-government, 
insomuch as personal self-government requires much thought about what an individual 
needs.  Democratic rights, on the other hand, require a broader conception of rights-
bearing individuals and what they need both as an entire populace and as individuals who 
perhaps are minorities or members of minority groups.  Is civic education enough to 
make us all respect each other in a democratic way?  Is it enough to convince people who 
already enjoy certain rights to work to continue expanding rights to groups who have 
historically not enjoyed those rights?   
In order to really understand what a democratic people needs, both Glendon’s 
conmmunitarian conception of accountability and Fleming and McCain’s Dworkinian 
conception of autonomy need to be meshed together.  This is not to say that they will 
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never be in tension, but others of our values conflict regularly as well.  One good 
example is liberty and equality, which are often in conflict, liberty pushing us towards 
individualism and equality towards the collectivity.  Just as individual rights are 
important, so is accountability to the community that protects those rights by virtue of 
protecting the community.   
An education in the Declaration of Independence might just be enough.  If all 
Americans can connect their own plights and the plights of their neighbors with the 
original complaints to King George III, perhaps they can understand why a critical 
faculty that promotes justice and rights is appropriate, and then move to a critical 
veneration of their system of government.   
How does this explanation of rights meld with the rest of this chapter—namely, 
with the American particularistic use of human rights in constitutional law?  First, under 
Fleming and McClain’s conception of government as formative for democratic people, 
there are of course infusions of American understandings of what rights mean, how we 
get them, and how we are to use them.  This educative project does not infringe on the 
liberty interest stated in the Declaration because that interest will not be trampled on by a 
Dworkinian approach to responsibility as autonomy.  This autonomy, though guided by 
the government, and even Black’s Declaration as law, makes it possible for citizens to 
conceive their version of the good within a fairly large framework.  Both the Constitution 
and the Declaration are frameworks under which multiple worldviews fit. 
But does the particularism of America make it impossible to have those multiple 
worldviews fit nicely?  After all, Tushnet’s notion of popular constitutionalism as 
advanced in this chapter could lead to illiberalism through democracy.  The proper sort of 
rights/responsibility thinking, as explained in the last few paragraphs, easily fixes this.  
As we move forward towards the constitutional goodness achieved by proceeding 
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through the process of constitutional veneration, the trend in America is to be more 
inclusive.  Of course there are steps forward and steps backward.  However, once a group 
is settled with the pantheon of American rights and no longer is seen as an “outsider” 
group, it is unjustifiable to take those rights away.  
Let us, in conclusion, take one issue of the last seventy years that shows the 
ability of our rights talk to move us closer to what we venerate in the Constitution today.  
Although the modern activist state is oft decried, particularly by the Republican Party, 
Social Security has become a third rail of American politics.  President George W. Bush 
was unable to get his idea of private accounts for retirement instead of the traditional 
Social Security plan off the ground even though he had wide popular support following 
his election to a second term as President.  Why is Social Security virtually untouchable?  
It is not because it is part of the so-called modern activist state, that is to be sure, because 
that does not have a particularly positive association for many Americans.  It is because 
that particular social program has been absorbed into what Americans think of as their 
constitutional rights.  Nowhere in the Constitution is a program like Social Security 
mentioned.  Nowhere in the Declaration of Independence is a program like Social 
Security mentioned.  But there are ways to justify the program under the kind of rights 
the Declaration mentions.  Without the assistance of Social Security, elderly men and 
women might be denied their rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  This 
argument appears bizarre at first.  But without money for food, housing, health care, and 
sundry goods promoting happiness, it is possible to argue that seniors who could no 
longer work would be deprived of their rights under the Declaration. 
But one needn’t agree with that political argument to understand the main point: 
the Declaration has been read into the Constitution just as both are now read to 
encapsulate all rights to which Americans feel entitled.  Certainly rights can contradict 
 184 
each other, and so opponents of Social Security might consider the extra income tax they 
pay into Social Security to be an infringement of their liberty.  The argument that results 
can proceed on constitutional grounds or on ordinary law grounds, but it is far more 
interesting as a constitutional argument.  In order to have this constitutional argument, the 
people must consider their interests in life, liberty, and their pursuits of happiness, and 
argue from there.  Educated as they should be, these bouts of contestation can help 
American democracy to flourish.   
But how would this contestation look?  First, it should not be dominated by a 
Court-centered approach.  As valuable as the Court may be for minorities who have 
difficulty making their voices heard, it would seem that an issue as big as Social Security 
would not fit under that rubric of minority-protection.  Rather, people, in their 
deliberative capacities, could influence their Representatives and Senators, as well as 
their President, to make a decision concerning this issue that would be more likely to fit 
well into our current framework of law.  After all, Social Security is one of those issues 
that Fleming and McClain’s formulation should work with: a charter of positive benefits 
given by the government to its people.  Under this formulation, rights are not endangered 
by government action but are rather enhanced.  The government is able to promote 
justice—a value of the Preamble—by extending certain rights to everyone.   
To be sure, such an extension takes time and work.  But when we consider how 
far we have come as far as what the Constitution means as regards rights, the future 
seems awfully bright.  The Declaration of Independence does its work through a 
combination of particularism and universalism—a characteristic of the document’s actual 
structure as well, as it goes from universal demands of rights to particular offenses that 
the King has committed.  And finally, we can learn how to contest with each other using 
a form of popular constitutionalism that satisfies our desires to have a democratic polity 
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In Sanford Levinson’s Our Undemocratic Constitution, he ends his Introduction 
with the following call to thoughtful action:  
If I am correct that the Constitution is both insufficiently democratic in a country 
that professes to believe in democracy, and significantly dysfunctional, in the 
terms of the quality of the government that we receive, then it follows that we 
should no longer express our blind devotion to it.  It is not, as Jefferson properly 
suggested, the equivalent to the Ark of the Covenant.  It is a human creation open 
to criticism and even to rejection.  To convince you that you should join me in 
supporting a new constitutional convention is what this book is about.304 
Similarly, Larry Sabato’s A More Perfect Constitution: Why the Constitution Must be 
Revised—Ideas to Inspire a New Generation, begins with the Preamble to our current 
Constitution, and states that although we have upheld the goals of the great Preamble 
over time, we have not updated “the basic structures and systems” of the Constitution.  
This leads Sabato to the conclusion that “We need to apply the ageless values contained 
in the Preamble to the new demands of a very different country than the one that existed 
in the founders’ world.  I have written this book to begin a discussion with you about why 
and how we must do so, and about the potent possibilities of such action.”305 
 The type of work these two men do was mentioned in my Introduction, where I 
argued that the only people who talk about veneration anymore are the ones criticizing it.  
They use some of the same sources I do to make their points, among them Federalist 
49306 and the letter from Jefferson to Madison on the expiration of constitutions.307  But 
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the most telling statement regards Federalist 14 in Levinson’s new book, Framed, where 
he discusses how this particular Federalist Paper can make us think: 
We best honor the founding generation by forthrightly confronting the ‘lessons of 
experience’ and accepting Madison’s mandate to view the national Constitution 
and its state analogues as works in progress.  We must therefore use our critical 
intelligence to ‘improve’ them if they are to perpetuate themselves in time and, 
even more importantly, prove friends rather than enemies to achieving the great 
purposes most inspiringly set out in the Preamble to the national Constitution.” 308 
From this quotation especially, we might think of both of these men as Jeffersonians.  But 
before jumping to that conclusion, we should return to Federalist 40 and examine what it 
means to create a new system of law, as this is what these scholars are recommending.  In 
the end, we will find that both of these scholars need a lot more veneration than they 
contend in order to make the kind of changes they recommend. 
 In Federalist 40, as we saw in Chapter 3, Madison discusses whether or not the 
Philadelphia Convention was authorized to create a new Constitution.  He argues that it is 
based first on the stipulations for holding the Annapolis Convention, and then on the 
wording of the Congressional approval for the Philadelphia Convention, which included 
the instructions that the Philadelphia Convention was to address exigencies in 
government as well as the preservation of the Union.  He argues that the Convention was 
also entitled to examine the principles of the Articles of Confederation, and concludes 
“The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the convention 
may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are 
found in the articles of Confederation.”  Furthermore, he argues “The misfortune under 
the latter system has been, that these principles are so feeble and confined as to justify all 
the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it, and to require a degree of 
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enlargement which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the 
old.”309 
 These two last statements apply equally to the projects that Levinson and Sabato 
contemplate.  Both value the principles of the American regime—after all, Sabato even 
begins his book with the Preamble to the Constitution, where, as this dissertation has 
argued, many of the main principles of the Constitution are found.  But are we justified in 
continuing to call them Jeffersonian critics with no need of veneration?  Jeffersonian 
veneration is not veneration proper, because veneration requires a reverence joined to the 
substance of the Constitution and its procedural pieces.  Thus, because of their emphasis 
on keeping our principles alive while eschewing our institutions for better versions, 
anyone wishing to make arguments like Levinson’s and Sabato’s might consider him- or 
herself far from veneration. 
 Quite the contrary, neither project will work without veneration.  Levinson and 
Sabato have given themselves a difficult assignment if we listen to cultural observers and 
historians like Michael Kammen and E.J. Dionne: they aim to take a people that 
venerates too much and turn them into critical Jeffersonian constitutionalists.  However, I 
would argue that Levinson and Sabato are remiss if they are attempting to turn Americans 
into Jeffersonians.  For several reasons it would be better—and conduce better to their 
projects—were they to turn Americans into critical venerators.  As critical veneration 
builds on the blind veneration Americans already have, it would be an easier transition.  
But that is merely a question of efficacy, a question that is not made for books that dream 
big dreams of better constitutional institutions.  Rather, we should consider how much 
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institutions matter to both Levinson and Sabato.  They both value aspirations, but think 
that the institutions are what really matter to our national pursuit of happiness.   
 What then do Levinson and Sabato need to exist in a citizenry in order to make 
immense changes in institutions while maintaining key principles?  They need a citizenry 
educated in a system that sees institutions as important, and not merely transient.  They 
need a political culture to support those institutions.  This political culture needs trust 
from the citizenry.  Thus, Levinson and Sabato should side with Madison over Jefferson 
on the problematic nature of the idea of repeated constitutional conventions because of 
this need for trust.  Right now, as Levinson and Sabato note, there is very little 
institutional trust in this country.310  As both men think that is a problem, they should 
agree with me here that institutions require a degree of veneration to be said to be truly 
successful.   
It is unlikely, however, that either would immediately agree with that statement.  I 
agree with both Levinson and Sabato that at the moment, despite low approval ratings 
there is too much trust in the institutions of American government as institutions.  Much 
of it is founder-worship, and that is simply a bad reason to support any form of 
government.  James Madison said as much in Federalist 14: 
Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent 
regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a 
blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the 
suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and 
the lessons of their own experience?311 
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In other words, we are wise not to let veneration for the past dictate our future.  
But it is also the case that people need a grounding in the past to understand the choices 
that change their future.  It is not enough to agree with Levinson that our current system 
is bad or to like Sabato’s suggestion for change: the people must understand fully what 
those incitements to change and actual changes will do to their political and institutional 
culture.  Levinson and Sabato spend a good deal of time on the latter, but not much on the 
former.  But political culture is incredibly important: it gives life to our aspirations in a 
world created by our institutions.  As I have tried to establish in this dissertation: 
principles help us realize aspirations; principles along with institutions help us realize 
critical veneration. 
 Within our political culture, the people must also be educated to be concerned 
about the public good.  No one is served if we have a new constitutional convention and 
the people scream the whole time, getting nothing accomplished.  Compromise is 
necessary, though we hope that no compromise we make today will be as bad as past 
compromises.  Once the government is created, the people must continue to care about 
their government.  Reformers like Levinson and Sabato need a certain kind of people to 
be effective: they need a citizenry concerned with some aspect of the public good and one 
that is not too individualized to care about the collective. They must care about the 
government and see that public officials care about their welfare too.  They need not only 
the universalist principles that Müller describes but also the particular principles that 
cause attachment to one’s country—in other words, some aspect of veneration is 
necessary to make people care. 
 Finally, the people would require an education in being a constitutional people at 
all.  This truth has been recognized for centuries, by men no less great than Aristotle, 
Rousseau, and Burke as I noted in the Introduction.  This too requires veneration of 
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constitutions, otherwise men are too quick to venerate other men who rule for a moment, 
rather than a document or constitutive force meant to last lifetimes.  This is one reason 
that James Madison refused to publish his notes on the Convention during his lifetime: he 
did not want his fellow Americans to deify the founders over the people who formed the 
document and the document itself.   
 Therefore, although neither Sanford Levinson nor Larry Sabato would call 
himself a critical venerator in the way I have described in this dissertation, I would argue 
that the people they aim to educate must be.  A nation of critical venerators, like 
Douglass, or as we will see in the next section, King, understand the important tensions 
between faith and doubt, constitutional stability and emergency situations, and veneration 
and rebellion, just as Madison and Jefferson did.   
 
VIOLENCE REDUX: BOUNDARIES AND EXCEPTIONS 
There are many ways to initiate a new order.  The Declaration of Independence 
was written amid enormous bloodshed by Americans and British alike, not to mention the 
French or the Native Americans.  The same is true of the post-Civil War amendments, 
which would not have existed without the blood of two percent of the nation’s 
population.  But obviously violence is not always necessary to make social change, even 
important social change.  Martin Luther King was successful in the Civil Rights 
Movement without using violence, indeed, by condemning it.  One of his justifications 
for nonviolent protests is that if the protests become violent, they will later be a wedge 
between different sectors of society, preventing additional change and growth of 
America.  As he states in his “The Birth of a New Nation”: 
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The aftermath of nonviolence is the creation of the beloved community.  The 
aftermath of nonviolence is redemption.  The aftermath of nonviolence is 
reconciliation.  The aftermath of violence are emptiness and bitterness.  This is 
the thing I’m concerned about.  Let us fight passionately and unrelentingly for the 
goals of justice and peace.  But let’s be sure our hands are clean in this struggle.  
Let us never fight with falsehood and violence and hate and malice, but always 
fight with love, so that, when the day comes that the walls of segregation have 
completely crumbled in Montgomery, that we will be able to live with people as 
their brothers and sisters.312 
 
King’s reasoning here shows his desire not to create a factional group opposed to the 
permanent interests of the majority, as James Madison would have feared during such an 
uprising.  He acknowledges the struggle between segments of the society, acknowledges 
that violence could lead to permanent factional strife, and then works against that 
threatening tide created by high tensions between the white and black communities.  
Peace and justice are objects of veneration that are deeply tied to the Constitution, which 
has to exist for reformers to refuse violence.   
Instead, he worked to make African Americans a part of the rest of society. 
During his first major civil rights action, the Montgomery Bus Boycott, King was 
preaching at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery.  In his autobiography, he 
writes: “I took an active part in current social problems.  I insisted that every church 
member become a registered voted and a member of the NAACP and organized within 
the church a social and political action committee—designed to keep the congregation 
intelligently informed on the social, political, and economic situations.”313  King 
orchestrated the necessary education in action, training protestors and disseminating 
information.  He continued this method when the white leaders of the community falsely 
announced in the newspaper that the boycott situation had been resolved, hoping to get 
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blacks to ride the buses once again and break the power of the movement.  However, as 
King had a social network of churches and ministers, he was able to contact those 
ministers to have them tell their congregations that the boycott was to continue, as well as 
rally support from his community to go to popular night spots in Montgomery to spread 
the word as widely as possible.314  The 1960s Civil Rights Movement is an example of 
critical veneration in practice. 
However, if we return to the Cover/Breslin distinction between physical and 
metaphorical violence, we see that even Martin Luther King had to deal in metaphorical 
violence.  In his “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” King confronts this issue of present 
understanding in his statements to the “white moderates.”  They ask him to slow down 
and obey the law to the letter.  King’s revolutionary movement will not allow this 
prioritization of law and order over justice and social progress.  He states that he “had 
hoped that the white moderate would understand that the present tension in the South is a 
necessary phase of the transition from an obvious negative peace…to a substantive and 
positive peace” and that “we who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the creators 
of tension.  We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive.”315  
However, King does foment a creative tension by opposing himself to slow evolutionists 
like the white moderates: he uses his words and actions to oppose aspects of American 
democracy that are supposed to be on the same side—law and freedom—to convince 
them that their stances are contrary to the values they claim to hold.  Oppositions like 
these show politicians in power that certain laws and modes of behavior need to be killed 
in favor of allowing others to live.  This is Frederick Douglass’s metaphorical violence 
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that inspires him to continue his work after the Civil War as an orator and shaper of 
public opinion.  King and Douglass also had the same aspirations—those portrayed in the 
Declaration of Independence and aspirational parts of the Constitution—and made those 
aspirations clear.  Whatever success either man had was then predicated on the change of 
opinion, the change in the reading of laws that elicited from their words.   
In King’s case in particular, the audience was black America and his message was 
that the dream was open, that the promise could be redeemed without serious violence, or 
any violence at all.  This shows progress in the American order past the depths of 
difficulties and violence with which Abraham Lincoln and Frederick Douglass had to 
contend.  King needed to do less to get the change that he wanted than Lincoln or 
Douglass because some of his revolution had already been created by those men.  At the 
very least, the American constitutional project had been advanced towards constitutional 
goodness with the redemptive project of freeing the slaves.  Tasks like that are larger, and 
so violence may be required, whereas contemporaries of King like Malcolm X were 
misguided to believe that the situation had hit the violence threshold, where minds could 
only be changed with such great action.  As Douglass says: “‘The American 
public…discovered and accepted more truth in our four years of war than they learned in 
forty years of peace.’”316  But violence in the late 1960s was not the most effective tool 
for convincing anyone of anything positive. 
Rather, in the 1960s, there is a conflict over violence at the state level when the 
federal government deems state-sanctioned violence illegitimate violence.  In that way, 
we can call this state-sanctioned violence both physical and metaphorical violence.  Just 
as President Kennedy called in troops for physical force to integrate the schools, 
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President Johnson did metaphorical violence upon laws of the states by pushing through 
the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act.  King therefore needed the violence that the 
state was able to marshal with the National Guard and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  King 
provides the aspirational argument, along with the Warren Court’s Brown ruling in 1954; 
the office of the Presidency joined by Congress provides the actual redemption of that 
aspirational argument by making and enforcing laws against discrimination.  Thus, King 
is able to teach how far we can get without violence and how violence does not 
automatically overwhelm non-violence.  The latter refers to King’s opponents, who were 
unable to crush the Civil Rights Movement with violence, even the violence of killing 
King himself.  King’s movement, like Douglass’s later in his life, was more about 
changing public opinion through intellectual, aspirational conflict and some measure of 
metaphorical violence in his civil disobedience rather than physical violence.  These men 
were endeavoring to welcome new voices into the canon, which is still expanding as 
rights-protection expands, as we shall see in the next section on Ahkil Amar’s work.   
 
A RETURN TO THE SYMBOLISM NECESSARY FOR CRITICAL VENERATION 
 As Ahkil Amar argues in his new book on the relationship between the written 
and unwritten—or symbolic—American Constitutions, “each element of America’s 
symbolic Constitution at some point in American history won the hearths and minds of a 
wide swath of the American people, thereby helping to bind citizens together as a legal 
and political entity.”317  This is true not only of the Constitution, but of the Declaration 
before it, and the Federalist Papers that convinced the “relevant” people to ratify it.  But 
over time, texts like the Declaration and the Federalist “closely resemble the written 
                                                
317 Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution, 246. 
 196 
Constitution itself: They are public, democratic, and uniform.”318  Amar lists among 
those texts also the Northwest Ordinance, the Gettysburg Address, and King’s “I Have a 
Dream” speech.  These are all texts that have become canonized and now, with a variety 
of other texts, represent a coherent body of aspirations.  These texts even inspire a degree 
of veneration over time.  Lincoln’s Gettysburg address once was just a wartime speech, 
but now is an address that everyone in my grandfather’s high school class in Gettysburg, 
PA was told to memorize not simply because they lived in Gettysburg, but mostly 
because of its importance to America and who we are as Americans.   
As Lincoln puts it 
Let reverence for the laws be breathed by every American mother to the lisping 
babe that prattles on his lap; let it be taught in schools, in seminaries, and in 
colleges; let it be written in primers, spelling-books, and in almanacs; let it be 
preached from the pulpit, proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in courts of 
justice.  And in short, let it become the political religion of the nation…319 
This is not the end of the process, of course, but it is the start.  In order to critically 
venerate a government one must first love it.  Lincoln emphasizes this love in his 
“Address before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois,” saying, “Let every 
American, every lover of liberty, every well-wisher to his posterity swear by the blood of 
the Revolution never to violate in the least particular the laws of the country, and never to 
tolerate their violation by others.”320  He makes this argument to dispute the justifiability 
of mob violence, even if the laws that Americans are to obey are unjust or bad.  This 
argument may seem a bit odd considering that, after all, Lincoln broke the law himself.  
But I imagine Lincoln would argue with Jefferson about his suspension of habeas corpus 
if asked, using Jefferson’s letter to John Colvin discussed in Chapter 3.  Illegalities may 
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be justified by their necessity for the political order, but the one who takes upon himself 
the right to behave illegally is in great danger of making a mistake and behaving illegally 
according to false reasoning.  Almost all illegalities are dangerous to the Union.   
Therefore, all people should be reared in the way Lincoln suggests, so that their 
love for the American polity, Constitution, and other unwritten aspects of America and 
Americana are preserved, as in the example of the Civil Rights Movement.  That love is 
then deepened by education about the nature of one’s government, and eventually 
tempered by an understanding of the bad in the constitutional order.  This more nuanced 
vision of government’s successes and failures allows us to move forward with our 
constitutional goals and aspirations with a respect for the past and the future.  
Constitutional veneration takes this redemptive project and figures out a way to redeem 
the Constitution, which requires a movement towards democratic or populist 
constitutionalism.  
One problem that crops up as we rely on the people is the continued support of the 
people.  Lincoln himself admits in his “Lyceum address” that passion is no longer the 
engine of the Union—reason is.321  This means that the question of legitimacy of the 
government often becomes an issue, because it is not solely veneration of the 
Constitution that drives legitimacy—some sort of intellectual connection must exist for 
real legitimacy to characterize a government.  The people must desire to participate and 
actually do it for a democratic constitutionalist or populist government to exist. So, what 
is democratic legitimacy if the people are not inclined to participate?  How could a 
regime whose actions consist mainly in the elected and appointed members of a 
government be democratically legitimate under Balkin’s conditions?  It is important to 
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remember that democratic legitimacy is not the sole form of legitimacy for Balkin: he 
also briefly writes about sociological legitimacy, procedural legitimacy, and moral 
legitimacy.  Sociological legitimacy refers to popular acceptance of a government, 
procedural legitimacy to acting according to the legal rules and procedures of the 
government, and moral to just and moral action by the state.  Procedural legitimacy is the 
most complicated of the three when we consider law in conjunction with metaphorical 
violence in protest movements like King’s, which aim to realize the aspirations of the 
American polity.  Perhaps because Balkin is missing an account of extra-institutional 
actors he is led to a dour vision of constitutional faith, where that faith “helps buttress our 
confidence in systems that are only minimally acceptable in their current state…may lead 
us to give the benefit of the doubt to the systems that are not yet adequate, but that might, 
with some alteration, become minimally acceptable…affects how we view deviations 
from what we regard as fair, just, and democratic…as mistakes or temporary failings” 
and because it centers our mind on what progress might mean in the future and keep us 
hopeful.”322   This description of faith seems weak because it does not seem reachable.  
No vision of redemption could guarantee progress, but it is possible to look at past 
redemptive projects to generate hope for the future.  It is an interesting tension in 
Balkin’s work that while his project tends towards guaranteeing that if we can escape the 
problems of constitutional tragedy and evil, we should progress just fine, his own 
description of the faith necessary to complete this project is not hopeful.  Perhaps this 
stems from his distance from the people acting outside of government.  
Any discussion of how we can involve the people at this point in the dissertation 
is obviously preliminary.  But some reflections on how critical veneration might become 
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more widespread are obviously necessary.  First, I would agree with Madison, Douglass, 
and King that the battle (using metaphorical violence) is a battle of public opinion.  It is 
of a grander scope than public opinion polls collected daily, weekly, and monthly by 
political experts who aim to get their candidates elected, however.  It is public opinion 
about our aspirations and where they should take us.  The reason the canon Amar talks 
about is expanding because the mass of people have been convinced, not simply the 
elites.   
Unfortunately, however, it seems in this analysis that these public opinion 
changes will not actually happen in the absence of great men and women leading the 
masses in support of their positions.  This is somewhat worrisome if we are realists, or 
perhaps even pessimists, like James Madison, who argued that enlightened statesmen 
would not be around to lead our country.  If this logic holds, then the same sorts of states-
people are unlikely to pop up out of nowhere when needed.   
However, there is a compelling argument based in the veneration we already have 
absorbed as citizens of this nation.  If individuals are well educated and have any bent 
towards social criticism, and it seems that we have no shortage of these people, given the 
universal childhood veneration of the Constitution, they are ripe for conversion to critical 
veneration.  With more and more young adults attending college, there are more 
opportunities for great minds to develop critical faculties.  After that development, 
critical veneration is a relatively simple phenomenon to teach to the elites.  But what of 
the masses more generally?  This deserves more attention, but we should certainly take 
our cues from King on teaching people who feel disconnected to and disparaged by the 
state to join together in their own organizations (in King’s case, church groups) to make 
productive metaphorical violence against laws contrary to our aspirations as a 
democratic, constitutional, and free people.  These are not people who can only be well 
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served by the Court, but would benefit most from a robust democratic education along 
with the veneration they were most probably taught from an early age.   
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